Wigm. Er., §§ 78, 204. There is, however, a necessary limitation upon the use of evidence of specific acts and language growing out of the necessity of proving knowledge on the part of the defendant. Since he cannot be charged with guilt unless he knows, or may be assumed to know, the bad character of those who frequent his place, it has been held that bad character cannot be proved by the fact that crimes were committed elsewhere, even though there have been convictions. State v. Baans, 77 N. J. L. 123. In such cases proof of general reputation is admissible, but general reputation cannot be proved by evidence of specific acts of immorality. The reason is that it is not ordinarily probable that the defendant would know of such specific acts and new issues would be introduced into the case if he had to be ready to defend all his guests against charges of misconduct wherever committed. When, however, the misconduct takes place in or near his place, the situation is different. He may well be held accountable for the preservation of good order within the premises, and the public nuisance caused by acts or language in the immediate neighborhood may exist as the direct result of what goes on inside. A house may be disorderly if it attracts disorderly persons who cause a disturbance even in the public street. State v. Webb, 25 Iowa 235 (per Chief Justice. Dillon); State v. Pierce, 21 N. W. Rep. (Iowa) 195. All the testimony of this character related to what was said and done within the dance hall, or immediately outside, and most of the latter class related to the conduct and condition of persons as they came out the door, or so close thereto that it was apparently a continuation of what had gone on inside. On the question of remoteness, much must be left to the discretion of the trial judge, and we see no reason to think that discretion was abused. As to the language used, an important distinction is that already referred to which was pointed out in State v. Sweet. The language must itself be disorderly, or used in connection with acts which, together with the language, exhibit disorderly conduct. It is this distinction which justifies the ruling in Commonwealth v. Harwood, 4 Gray 41. The language which the state offered to prove showed a specific wrongful act which the witness said had taken place in the house, but the language was not itself disorderly. The report in Heflin v. State, 20 N. J. L. J. 151, states no facts and gives no reasons. Some of its broader statements as given in the law journal were no doubt justifiable as applied to the facts of the case. The testimony of Stapleton as to his agreement with Kerwin seems to have been meant only to fix a date by reference to a circumstance connected with it in the mind of the witness. We think it was not prejudicial to the defendant. The charge to the jury that if the defendant participated with others in conducting the place in such an obnoxious manner, and lent his aid to maintaining it, the law charged him as a principal offender, is not complained of as a legal proposition. It is said there was no evidence justifying the submission of the question to the jury. We think there was ample evidence. The portion of the charge as to which complaint is made in the thirtieth assignment of error is misquoted. There is no reference to Sunday selling in the charge as printed on page 114. If there were, it would have been cured by the court charging the fifth request. The complaint that the court charged that the jury must find that it was reasonable to believe that the defendant had knowledge, and that was as far as it was necessary for the jury to go, is hypercritical. The judge had told the jury that the defendant must be proved to have known the fact of the existence of the acts which went to make up the elements of a disorderly house; he then added that it need not go to such an extent that the defendant would admit his knowledge on the stand. Then followed the passage complained of. All it could mean was that it was enough if the evidence caused in the minds of the jury a reasonable belief of defendant's knowledge. This is enough. State v. Callahan, 77 N. J. L 685. The judgment is affirmed. 88 N. J. L. Borough of Verona v. Essex Freeholders. BOROUGH OF VERONA AND ANOTHER V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF ESSEX. Argued February 17, 1915-Decided November 16, 1915. 1. The board of chosen freeholders of Essex as successors of the Essex Public Road Board, is authorized to vacate gores and angles of old roads appropriated to Bloomfield avenue, outside of the seventy-five feet allowed by statute for the width of the avenue. 2. Where the vacation of gores and angles formerly part of a highway, does not make access to the prosecutor's property more inconvenient nor close any highway and there is no statutory provision for damages in case of vacation, the prosecutors are not entitled to notice of the proceedings to vacate. On certiorari. Before Justices SWAYZE, PARKER and KALISCH. For the prosecutors, Borden D. Whiting. For the defendants, Robert M. Boyd, Jr., and Harold A. Miller. The opinion of the court was delivered by SWAYZE, J. The prosecutors seek to set aside a resolution of the board of freeholders vacating all the strips and tracts. of land formerly included within Bloomfield avenue, and now lying outside of the present established lines of the avenue in the borough of Verona, the township of Caldwell, and the borough of Caldwell, formerly known as the old Newark and Horseneck road. The so-called Horseneck road is an old colonial highway. In later days, a branch of the Newark and Pompton turnpike was constructed following in a general way the old road, in part coincident with it, in part lying outside. In 1869 the Essex Public Road Board was created. Pamph. L., p. 957. It seems at once to have prepared a map of a proposed avenue which acquired the name Bloom Borough of Verona v. Essex Freeholders 88 N. J. L. field avenue. In 1870 by a supplement to its charter (Pamph. L., p. 181) the road board was authorized to lay out, construct, appropriate, improve and maintain certain named avenues, one of which was Bloomfield avenue. Section 2 of the supplement vested the road board with all the rights and powers necessary and expedient to survey, lay out, locate, construct, reconstruct and maintain the avenues and roads and to vacate such parts of existing roads as might be necessary therefor. A proviso enacted that such parts of the avenue as extend west of the summit of the First mountain should not exceed in width seventy-five feet. This limited the width of the avenue now in question through the borough of Verona. The board of freeholders has succeeded to the powers of the road board. Bloomfield avenue was constructed along the lines of the Newark and Pompton turnpike and the Horseneck road, at first forty, and later seventy-five feet wide. The lines of the avenue were not coincident with the lines of either the turnpike or road; gores and angles were left which had been part of the old highways but were outside the lines of Bloomfield avenue. These gores and angles were separated by the lines of the new avenue and did not themselves form a connected highway. The prosecutors challenge the right to vacate the gores and angles. That the language of the statute gives the board power to vacate such parts of the existing road as may be necessary for the construction of the avenue is plain and is not disputed. The question raised is whether the power to vacate is within the title of the act. The title is "An act constituting a public road board for the laying out, constructing, appropriating, improving, maintaining public carriage roads in the county of Essex." The word "appropriating" is unusual and is evidently intended to point out the power given the board by the act to appropriate and take into their charge all the existing public roads or highways or any parts thereof. The supplement of 1870 specifically authorized the board to purchase or take any turnpike road. (Section 16.) Van Riper v. Essex Public Road Board, 38 N. J. L. 23. It has never been questioned, and we think it clear, that the title of the 88 N. J. L. Borough of Verona v. Essex Freeholders. act indicated that the board was to have entire control of the avenues. Under that title the legislature might enact any provisions necessary to secure such control. This necessarily included the power to vacate the old road if necessary to prevent a conflict of jurisdiction with the township or borough. Indeed the appropriation of the old road involved. the vacation thereof and the substitution of the new avenue. After the appropriation the power of the township authorities was at an end. There is nothing to indicate that this appropriation was to be of a part of the old road. On the contrary, the natural implication is, that if appropriated at all, it was to be appropriated as an entirety as far as it lay between the prescribed termini of the new avenue. It seems It was to us equally clear that it was competent for the legislature under the title to enact provisions for any action that might be rendered necessary as a result of the appropriation of the old road and the construction of the new avenue. certainly proper to enact that the avenue should not exceed seventy-five feet in width, and that the board might widen or straighten any avenue. After appropriating the Horseneck road, and straightening the lines of the avenue, the gores and angles in question remained. Perhaps they were still subject to the public easement, and as the legislature had enacted that the avenue should not exceed seventy-five feet in width, it was necessary that the possible public easement in gores and angles outside of the seventy-five feet should be terminated, in order to relieve the board from theresponsibility of maintenance and make the width of the avenue what the legislature said it should be. For this purpose it was necessary that these gores and angles should be vacated. We think therefore that the board was authorized to pass the resolution in question. It is said, however, that it was not authorized to do so without notice to the prosecutors. This depends upon whether the action of the freeholders in vacating the gores and angles was judicial in character. We think it was not. In Moore v. Haddonfield, 62 N. J. L. 386, the Court of Errors and Appeals said: "As to all public rights in the street, the mu |