1 ly required by them, and to enjoin their representatives, to employ every proper method to obtain a ratification. In this way of proceeding, the undoubted sense of every state, collected in the coolest manner, not the sense of individuals, will be laid before the whole union in congress, and that body will be enabled with the clearest light that can be afforded by every part of it, and with the least occasion of irritation, to compare and weigh the sentiments of all United America; forthwith to adopt such alterations as are recommended by general unanimity; by degrees to devise modes of conciliation upon contradictory propositions: and to give the revered advice of our common country, upon those, if any such there should be, that in her judgment are inadmissible, because they are incompatible with the happiness of these states. It cannot be with reason apprehended, that congress will refuse to act upon any articles calculated to promote the COMMON welfare, though they may be unwilling to act upon such as are designed to advance PARTIAL interests; but whatever their sentiments may be, they MUST call a convention for proposing amendments, on applications of twothirds of the legislatures of the several states. MAY those good citizens, who have sometimes turned their thoughts towards a second convention, be pleased to consider, that there are men who speak as they do, yet do not mean as they do. These borrow the sanction of their respected names, to conceal desperate designs. May they also consider, whether persisting in the suggested plan, in preference to the constitutional provision, may not kindle flames of jealousy and discord, which all their abilities and virtues can never extinguish. FABIUS. LETTER IX. WHEN the sentiments of some objectors, concerning the British constitution, are considered, it is surprising, that they should apprehend so much danger to United America, as, they say, will attend the ratification of the plan proposed to us, by the late federal convention. THESE gentlemen will acknowledge, that Britain has sustained many internal convulsions, and many foreign wars, with a gradual advancement in freedom, power and prosperity. They will acknow. ledge, that no nation has existed that ever so perfectly united those distant extremes, private security of life, liberty, and property, with exertion of public force-so advantageously combined the various powers of militia, troops, and fleets-or so happily blended together arms, arts, science, commerce, and agriculture. From what spring has flowed this stream of happiness? The gentlemen will acknowledge, that these advantages are derived from a single democratical representative branch in her legislature. They will also acknowledge, that in this branch, called the house of commons, only one hundred and thirty-one are members for counties; that nearly one half of the whole house is chosen by about five thousand seven hundred persons, mostly of no property; that fifty-six members are elected by about three hundred and seventy persons, and the rest in an enormous disproportion* to the numbers of inhabitants who ought to vote. † THUS are all the millions of people in that kingdom, said to be represented in the house of com mons. LET the gentlemen be so good, on a subject so familiar to them, as to make a comparison between the British constitution, and that proposed to us. Questions like these will then probably present themselves: is there more danger to our liberty, from such a president as we are to have, than to that of Britons from an hereditary monarch with a vast revenue-absolute in the erection and disposal of offices, and in the exercise of the whole * No member of parliament ought to be clected by fewer than the majority of 800, upon the most moderate calculation, according to Doctor Price. + By the constitution proposed to us, a majority of the house of representatives, and of the senate, makes a quorum to do business: but, if the writer is not mistaken, about a fourteenth part of the members of the house of commons, makes a quorum for that purpose.. executive power-in the command of the militia, fleets, and armies, and the direction of their operations in the establishments of fairs and mar kets, the regulation of weights and measures, and coining of money-who can call parliaments with a breath, and dissolve them with a nod-who can, at his will, make war, peace, and treaties irrevocably binding the nation-and who can grant pardons for crimes, and titles of nobility, as it pleases him? Is there more danger to us, from twenty-six senators, or double the number, than to Britons, from an hereditary aristocratic body, consisting of many hundreds, possessed of enormous wealth in lands and money-strengthened by a host of dependents--and who, availing themselves of defects in the constitution, send many of these into the house of commons--who hold a third part of the legislative power in their own hands--and who form the highest court of judicature in the nation? Is there more danger to us, from a house of representatives, to be chosen by all the freemen of the union, every two years, than to Britons, from such a sort of representation as they have in the house of commons, the members of which, too, are chosen but every seven years? Is there more danger to us, from the intended federal officers, than to Britons, from such a monarch, aristocracy, and house of commons together? WHAT BODIES are there in Britain, vested with such capacities for |