General result of this chapter. mitting the fact, it is still true, that there are works generally esteemed, and consequently rules of taste, the observation of which produces in all the sensation of beauty. If this question be thoroughly examined, it will appear from the different manner in which men are affected by the same objects, that the difference of impression arises more from their moral than their corporeal properties. The result of this chapter is, that the diversity of tastes in men, supposes a small difference only in the degrees of their sensations: that the uniformity of their judgments, proved by the uniformity of the proverbs of different nations; by the resemblance of their laws and governments; by the taste that all have for poetry, and the simple and magnificent pictures of nature, demonstrate that the same objects make nearly the same impressions on all men; and that if they differ, it is only in the degrees of their sensations*. * If nature, as has been supposed, gives men such unequal disposition to understanding or discernment, why in the arts of dancing, music, painting, do the scholars scarcely ever equal their masters, and why does not the unequal disposition in nature overbalance in the pupils the small superior degree of attention that the masters perhaps exercise in the study of their art. This will scarcely be allowed. Raphael was the disciple of Perugino, a name that would have been long since forgotten, but for the transcendent accomplishments of the scholar. Many similar instances might be produced. T. CHAP. The difference of sensations has no influence on the understanding. CHAP. XIV. THE SMALL DIFFERENCE PERCEIVED BETWEEN OUR SENSATIONS, HAS NO INFLUENCE ON THE UNDERSTANDING. MEN at the presence of the same objects can doubtless feel different sensations; but can they in consequence perceive different relations between these same objects? No: and supposing, as I have elsewhere said, that snow should appear to some a degree whiter than to others, they would still all agree that snow is the whitest of all bodies. In order that men should perceive different relations between the same objects, those objects must excite in them impressions of a nature altogether peculiar. Wood on fire should freeze some, and water condensed by cold should burn others; all the objects of nature should offer to each individual a chain of relations" altogether different; and in short, men should be with regard to each other what they are with regard to those insects whose eyes being constructed in a different manner, doubtless see objects under very different forms, The difference of sensations has no influence on the understanding. On this supposition individuals would have no analogy in their ideas and sentiments. Men could neither communicate their knowledge, nor improve their reason, nor labour in common on the immense edifice of arts and sciences. Now experience proves, that men every day make discoveries, and improve the arts and sciences; therefore they perceive the same relations between objects. The enjoyment of a fine woman may excite in the soul of my friend an intoxication of delight that it does not produce in mine; but that enjoyment is in both him and me, the most poignant of all pleasures. When two men receive a stroke of the same power, they feel perhaps two distinct impressions: but if the violence of the blow be doubled, tripled, quadrupled, the pain that each of them feels will in like manner be doubled, tripled, quadrupled. Suppose the difference of our sensations at the sight of the same object to be more considerable than it really is, it is evident, that the objects preserving the same relation to each other, would strike us with a constant and uniform proportion. But, it will be said, cannot this difference in our sensations change our moral affections, and cannot this change produce the difference and inequality in minds? I answer, that all diversity of affection* caused by any difference in the *The only affections that have any sensible effect on the mind, are those that depend on education and prejudice. The difference of sensations has no infinence on the understanding. bodily organisation, has not, as experience proves, any influence on the mind. We may therefore prefer either red or yellow, and still be, like d'Alembert and Clairaut, an equally great geometrician: our palates may be unequally delicate, and we may be equally good poets, painters, or philosophers. In short a person may, with a taste for sour or sweet, milk or anchovies, be an equally great orator, physician, &c. All these tastes in us are nothing more than unconnected and sterile facts. It is the same with regard to our ideas, till the moment they are compared with each other. Now to give ourselves the trouble of comparing them, we must be excited by some interest. But when men have this interest, and compare these ideas, why do they draw the same conclusions ? Because, notwithstanding the difference of their affections, and the unequal perfection of their organs, they can all attain the same ideas. In fact, while the scale of proportions in which objects strike us, is not broken, our sensations constantly preserve the same relation to each other. A rose of a very dark colour, when compared with another rose, still appears dark to every eye. We make the same judgments of the same objects. We can therefore always acquire the same number of ideas, and consequently the same extent of understanding. Men that are commonly well organized, are like certain sonorous bodies, that without being exactly the same The difference of sensations has no influence on the understanding. It re same, still yield the same number of sounds*. sults from what has been here said, that men always perceiving the same relations between the same objects, the unequal perfection of their senses has no influence on their understanding. Let us make this truth more striking by annexing a precise idea to the word Understanding. * Certain bodies yield the same number of sounds, but not of the same kind. It is the same with the mind. It presents ideas or images equally fair, but different, according to the various objects with which chance has filled the memory. Does my memory represent nothing but snow and ice, the tempests of the north, and the flames of Vesuvius or Hecla? With these materials what picture can I compose? That of the mountains that defend the entrance of the garden of Armida. But if my memory, on the contrary, presents none but smiling images, the flowers of spring, the silver waves, the mossy ground, and fragrant orange groves, what shall I compose with these delightful objects? The bower to which love carried off Renaud. The species therefore of our ideas, and our imaginations, does not depend on the nature of our mind, which is the same in all men, but on the sort of objects, that chance has engraved on our memories, and the interest we have to combine them. CHAP. |