1

ticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia being in the negative, but the Convention re-opened the discussion of the subject the same day, and again receded from its decision. Ibid., 358. Various propositions followed, but none were adopted. Ibid., 359 to 368. These and the difficulties which environed the subject are clearly stated in the following remarks of Mr. Mason:

In every stage of the question relative to the executive, the difficulty of the subject, and the diversity of the opinions concerning it, have appeared; nor have any of the modes of constituting that department been satisfactory. First, it has been proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that is, that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most of eminent characters and qualifications should be performed by those who know least; secondly, that the election should be made by the Legislatures of the States; thirdly, by the executives of the States. Against these modes, also, strong objections have been urged. Fourthly, it has been proposed that the election should be made by electors chosen by the people for that purpose. This was at first agreed to; but on further consideration has been rejected. Fifthly, since which, the mode of Mr. Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote for ⚫ several candidates, has been proposed. This seemed, like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a society for the members of which he had a great respect, but which he never wished to have a preponderating influence in the government. Sixthly, another expedient was proposed by Mr. Dickinson, which is liable to so palpable and material an inconvenience, that he had little doubt of its being by this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who happened not to be popular within his own State; though the causes of his local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend him to the States at large. Seventhly, among other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will probably not be carried on, and nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all these various modes, he was led to conclude, that an election by the National Legislature, as originally proposed, was the best; if it was liable to objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived, at the same time, that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary object--for the polar star of his political conduct-the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of state, and particularly the executive, should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel and respect those rights and interests which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving, that the constitution of the executive, as reported by the Committee of the Whole, be reinstated, viz.: "that the executive be appointed for seven years, and be ineligible a second time.”

Mr. Mason's motion was agreed to by a vote of seven to three, and on the question to agree to the whole resolution as amended, relating to the Executive, namely: "That a National Executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of seven years, to be ineligible a second time, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise pro

vided for, to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty, to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury ;" the same passed by the following vote: New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-aye, six; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland-no, three; Massachusetts, not on the floor; Virginia divided, (Mr. Blair and Col. Mason, aye; Gen. Washington and Mr. Madison, no; Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.) Ibid., 369.

The Committee, consisting of Messrs. Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth and Wilson, appointed to report a Constitution, conformable to the resolutions passed by the Convention, reported the article relating to the Executive, as instructed, but when it came up for adoption by the Convention it was again opposed. Daniel Carroll moved to strike out legislature and insert people, but only two States, Maryland and Pennsylvania, voted for it. Others followed, however, with like motions to amend, and there being much dissatisfaction on the subject, it was referred to another Committee, which reported the following:

"After the word 'excellency,' in Sect. 1, Art. 10, to be inserted: "He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz.: Each State shall appoint, in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and members of the House of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which they shall sign, and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the General Government, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in that House, open all the certificates, and the votes shall be then and there counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for President; but if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose, by ballot, the President; and in every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be Vice President; but if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the Vice President. The Legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the electors, and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes.'" Deb., 507.

5 Elliott's

This presented a new mode, more acceptable in the main than any other that had yet been proposed, and was modified and amended to the form in which it was finally adopted, and made part of the Constitution, as agreed upon by the Convention.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE SENATE.

THE small number, and long duration of the Senate, were intended to render them a safeguard, says Chancellor Kent, against the influence of those paroxysms of heat and passion, which prevail occasionally in the most enlightened communities, and enter into the deliberation of popular assemblies. In this point of view, a firm and independent Senate is justly regarded as an anchor of safety amidst the storms of political faction; and, for want of such a stable body, the republics of Athens and Florence were overturned, by the fury of commotions, which the Senates of Sparta, Carthage and Rome might have been able to withstand. The characteristical qualities of the Senate, in the intendment of the Constitution, are wisdom and stability. The legal presumption is, that the Senate will entertain more enlarged views of public policy, will feel a higher and juster sense of national character, and a greater regard for stability in the administration of the government. These qualities, it is true, may, in most cases, be found in the other branch of the Legislature; but the constitutional structure of the House is not equally calculated to produce them; for, as the House of Representatives comes more immediately from the people, and the members hold their seats for a much shorter time, they are presumed to partake, with a quicker sensibility, of the prevailing temper and irritable disposition of the times, and to be in much more danger of adopting measures with precipitation, and of changing them with levity. A mutable legisla

tion is attended with a more formidable train of mischiefs to the community. It weakens the force, and increases the intricacy of the laws, hurts credit, lessens the value of property, and it is an infirmity very incident to republican establishments, and has been a constant source of anxiety and concern to their most enlightened admirers. A disposition to multiply and change laws, upon the spur of the occasion, and to be making constant and restless experiments with the statute code, seems to be the natural disease of popular assemblies. In order, therefore, to counteract such a dangerous propensity, and to maintain a due portion of confidence in the government, and to insure its safety and character at home and abroad, it is requisite that another body of men, coming likewise from the people, and equally responsible for their conduct, but resting on a more permanent basis, and constituted with stronger inducements to moderation in debate, and to tendency of purpose, should be placed as a check

upon the intemperance of some of the popular department. Kent's Commentaries, vol. i., p. 225.

The superior weight and delicacy of the trust confided to the Senate, says the same eminent jurist already quoted, is a reason why the Consti tution requires not only that the senators shall be chosen for six years, but that each senator should be thirty years of age, and nine years a citi zen of the United States, and, at the time of his election, an inhabitant of the State for which he is chosen. The same age was also requisite for a Roman senator, though, in their executive offices, no qualification of age was required. Ne atas quidem distinguebatur quin prima juventa consulatum ac dictaturus inirent. It has also been deemed fit and proper, in a country which was colonized originally from several parts of Europe, and has been disposed to adopt the most liberal policy towards the rest of mankind, that a period of citizenship, sufficient to create an attachment to our government, and a knowledge of its principles, should render an immigrant eligible to office. The English policy is not quite so enlarged. No alien born can become a member of Parliament. This disability was imposed by the act of settlement of 12 Wm. III., c. 2; and no bill of naturalization can be received in either House of Parliament, without such disabling clause in it. Kent's Commentaries, vol. i., p. 228.

There appears to have been no discussion in the Convention which framed the Constitution, as to the age of a person to be qualified as a Senator. The original proposition was a blank, and that was filled by the insertion of the words thirty years, seven States voting in the affirmative, and four in the negative. 5 Elliott's Debates, 186. Four years citizenship had been at first proposed as a qualification, but Gouverneur Morris moved fourteen instead of four years, and in doing so urged "the danger of admitting strangers into our public councils," when a discussion ensued, from the report of which the following extracts are made :

Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to the motion, as discouraging meritorious aliens from immigrating to this country.

Mr. Pinckney. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties and managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject, who made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their legislative proceedings.

Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that many, not natives of this country, had acquired great credit during the Revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate to natives.

Mr. Madison was not averse to some restrictions on this subject, but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction however in the Constitution, unnecessary and improper-unnecessary, because the National Legislature is to have the right of regulating naturalization; and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence, as conditions of enjoying different privileges of citizenship—improper, because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution; because it will put it out of the power

of the National Legislature, even by special acts of naturalization, to confer the full rank of citizens on meritorious strangers.

Mr. Butler was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the country. They bring with them, not only attachments to other countries, but ideas of government so distinct from ours, that in every point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that, if he himself had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits, opinions, and attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject.

Dr. Franklin was not against a reasonable time, but should be very sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. It did not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution, that the persons in question would be actually chosen.

Mr. Randolph did not know but it might be problematical whether immigrants to this country were, on the whole, useful or not, but he could never agree to the motion for disabling them, for fourteen years, to participate in the public honors. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings, as possible. What is the language of reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the expense of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives and daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house; he would invite them to his table, would provide for them comfortable lodgings, but would not carry the complaisance so far as to bed them with his wife. He would. let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make priests of them. He ran over the privileges which immigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices of government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world, and that as every society, from a great nation down to a club, had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those citizens of the world, as they called themselves, he owned he did not wish to see any of them in our public councils. He would not trust them. The men who can shake off their attachments to their own country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France; an Englishman, and he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England. It has been said that the Legislatures will not choose foreigners-at least, improper ones. There was no knowing what Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals practiced on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace, and walked himself into an appointment from another to Congress. 5 Elliott's Debates, 398.

The motion of Mr. Morris to insert fourteen was negatived-yeas four, nays seven. So also were motions to insert thirteen, and then ten; and a motion to insert nine years was agreed to-yeas six, nays four, the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland and Pennsylvania, voting in the negative, and North Carolina being divided. 5 Elliott's Debates, 398. An effort was afterwards made by James Wilson to reduce