might otherwise be impoverished, and the community be exposed to inconvenience without any corresponding benefit. It follows from these views that the plaintiffs must have judgment in their favor." This decision maintains two points. 1st. That the defendant had no valid mark in the collocation of words mentioned. 2d. That the plaintiffs have a valid mark in theirs. It was not necessary for the purposes of the suit that the learned judge should go further, or he might have truly said that the word "Bell" is the essential part of the mark. In the former suit, it was admitted in argument that the word "Schiedam," being the name of a town in Holland, could not be appropriated by the plaintiff, and that the word "Schnapps was a word adopted from the German language, meaning a dram.

§ 597. Just as worthless for the purpose of constituting trade-marks are such words as "Old London Dock Gin; "1 or "Prize Medal, 1862;" 2 or "Yankee Soap "3 (which a judge in 1863, through mistaking the scope of the decision in another case, declared to be a trade-mark to which the plaintiff had an exclusive right). So in the "Moline Plow" case, in the Supreme Court of Illinois, in 1870, where the manufacturers branded upon their plows, for the purpose of designating the size, shape, and quality of the different grades, respectively, certain letters and figures in combinations as follows: "A No. 1," "AX No. 1," "No. 1," "AX No. 11," "B No. 1," &c., it was held that no exclusive right to their use existed; but that they could be used by any other manufacturer of the same articles. And so in the case of Stokes v. Landgraff, where certain words and figures were employed to designate the size and quality of glass. The "English's Broom " matter is also in the same category, and so are also many other cases

1 Binninger v. Wattles, 28 How. Pr. R. 206.

2 Batty v. Hill, 84 T. R. (N.s.) 791.

3 Williams v. Spence, 25 How. Pr. R. 366.

4 Williams v. Johnson, 2 Bos. 1.

5 Candee, Swan, & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439.

to be found in close proximity to it in this book, and all designating the mere quality of the merchandise to which they were affixed, or being necessary names and common phrases which all persons have a right to use.

§ 598. In the Court of Lyons, in 1866 (Chabrier v. Peillon1), came up a suit involving a question similar to that which arose in the subsequent "Akron" 2 and "Lackawanna " 3 cases in this country. On the banks of the Rhone, in the environs of Seyssel, exists a natural repository of asphaltum. To distinguish it from many mineral deposits of the same kind situated in other parts of France, the usage has been to attach the denomination of " ASPHALTE DE SEYSSEL." The court held: Considering that this is a denomination of region adopted in the language of mineralogists and in the usages of industry, said denomination cannot become the subject of an exclusive right of property for asphaltum extracted from a particular place of deposit. That names of locality, simple geographical expressions, are common property, and can be employed with equal right by all interested in using the designation is wellestablished as law. The claim of the plaintiff was accordingly rejected. This is the principle that governed the Office in the "Geyser Spring" case. The "Congress Spring "5 was not brought within the reason of the rule, because all persons had not the same right as the plaintiffs, who possessed the entire title to the land where such spring had its outlet.

4

§ 599. In the Court of Bordeaux, in 1853 (Salignac & Co. v. Levanier & Co.), it appeared that the plaintiffs had adopted as a designation of commerce for their brandy the words "Salignac et compagnie," and beneath the same the words "PROPRIÉTAIRES DE VIGNOBLES RÉUNIS." The defendants, for the same purpose, adopted the words "J. Levanier et compagnie," and beneath the same the words "COMPAGNIE DES PROPRIÉ

TAIRES DE VIGNOBLES." PER CUR.: The words "Propriétaires de Vignobles" (Vineyard Proprietors) is a generic qualification belonging to an indefinite number of proprietors, and cannot indicate to commerce the origin of the article to which they are affixed. Dismissed.1

§ 600. An application was made for the registration of the words "Great Lightening Ink Eraser." These words, being descriptive of the article to which they were intended to be affixed, could not be favorably entertained. The Examiner made a suggestion that the interpolation of a single letter had quite changed the meaning of the essential word. Any ink eraser would lighten the ink marks, and therefore might truly be called a lightening ink eraser. The diminution of weight was not the exact point. The verb could be taken in but one sense. It could not possibly be meant to imply that the applicants' eraser burst or darted forth with an instantaneous illumination. That would be nonsense. The second vowel made the trouble. The word should have been written "LIGHTNING." The use of the metaphor would then have imported that, with the quickness of the electric flash, the stains of ink would be caused to disappear. That improper spelling would, in ninety-nine cases in a hundred, defeat the cause of the person who claimed the word. The rule of idem sonans could not save it. A man is supposed to have meant what he said, especially when suing for a penalty.

§ 601. An inventor may give the products of his genius, or skill, or good fortune, a distinctive appellation of infinitely great value to him than a patent for the machine or discovery. This is a matter that is worthy of the consideration of applicants for registration. The object is to select, or rather invent, a designation peculiarly applicable to the thing of which a monopoly

1 The report of this case states that, during the progress of this suit in France, Salignac in the name of his company had obtained from the Lord Chancellor of England an injunction, and sequestration of certain goods so marked found in the London Docks. If so, it doubtless was on the ground of unfair competition; for there is nothing of the nature of a trade-mark in the whole case.

is desired. Now for an illustration of this idea. In or about the year 1814, John B. Logier obtained from the British Government a patent for fourteen years, for an instrument for guiding the hands of learners on the piano-forte. He compounded two Greek words, signifying "to form the hand," and named his machine the "Chiroplast." He acquired great reputation and a considerable pecuniary profit from the favorable reception of the instrument. If it had occurred to him that this new word was a valid trade-mark, it would have mattered little that his patent expired in fourteen years; for the mark would have virtually given him a monopoly so long as the public called for the "Chiroplast." As it was, the word is now generic. -In Bardin v. Gobert et al., the plaintiff had obtained a patent for a species of ornamental feathers produced by his invention of detaching the epidermis of all kinds of natural feathers, and dyeing them of all colors, as ornaments of various sorts for head-dresses, finery, flowers, embroideries, lace-work, and tissues. This constituted a new product of commerce. It needed a name. He composed one," FAILLANTINE." This meant his patented article, and nothing else. It was a perfect trade-mark.

§ 602. Propriety must be the standard in the selection of something intended to serve as a symbol of commerce.2 Commerce extends throughout the world; therefore a mark should be valid in all lands or it is valid in none. The moral, religious, or political sensibilities of any people must not be shocked by the perversion of an emblem sacred in their eyes. There is no necessity for so doing, for the objects suitable for use as trade-marks are as infinite in number as the sands of the seashore. A violation of this rule is not only in bad taste, but is also an outrage. The spirit of commerce is conciliatory. We must not blindly follow the loose, random sayings of judges, that any emblem may be lawfully employed for this purpose.

1 Annales de la Prop., tome xii. p. 380.

2 See case §§ 342-344; also cases in § 370, ante.

To be a "lawful trade-mark" the emblem must not transgress the rules of morality or public policy. The law will not aid any person to blasphemously bring obloquy upon objects and symbols consecrated to religion. But what is religion, in its relation to commerce? It is the recognition of God, as an object of worship, love, and obedience. All peoples worship God under some form or other, or at least think that they do. Their religious prejudices must not be trampled upon. We tolerate all religions, true or false. A reader of these lines may be a Chinaman. His joss must not be caricatured. If a scoffer should endeavor to curry favor with an infidel class by the profane use of an Agnus Dei, or of any symbol of the Alpha and Omega, or the Ineffable Name, or even of angels, apostles, saints, and martyrs, or of a thousand objects depicted by ancient art, and hallowed by associations, would any court of justice sustain a claim to a trade-mark so composed? No! This is a rule of universal application. The Office hesitated to permit a representation of the Evil One himself to be registered as a trade-mark. The device is set forth in the specification as "a smiling, half-drunken demon or devil in a sitting posture, with the left leg raised at an angle of about forty-five degrees, while the right one is folded under it, and his tail passes over his right ankle. The demon wears a broad-brim hat with conical top and feathers, and in his arms and hands he carries six bottles." Enough! the frightful thing might possibly convey a moral lesson by an association of ideas. The bottles turned the scale. It had been recognized in Germany; and was registered.1 Suppose, for the sake of further illustration of this topic, that the fiend had borne the likeness of a human being venerated by a large class of followers. It would have been in law an atrocious libel, and must have been rejected on that account.

§ 603. We have seen that a colored bordering of a woven fabric may be as valid a trade-mark as any other device, espe

1 Walter & Shaeffer, No. 434.