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character required to carry on plantation operations. She had two cotton plantations in Louisiana and a small place in Mississippi, besides movable property and paper values, all of which were placed under the control and management of the plaintiff.

She was the widow of the late N. D. Murdock.

Her husband accumulated quite a competency. Dying, he made her his legatee. They had no forced heirs.

At least four times during their married life she was placed in an asylum because of her mental condition.

agency, created in our opinion a mandate. The terms and conditions of the contract do not give rise to the thought that it secured to plaintiff unearned salary claimed in case the defendant decided to put an end to the employment.

Moreover, the death of defendant, before noted, had the effect of putting an end to the agency, so that all claim for unearned salary passes out of consideration.

As to cause for discharging plaintiff : Her personal property of which plaintiff had control amounted to $46,434.40. In accounting for it the bookkeeping had been incomplete and insufficient, and in some instances entirely wanting of entries which is required in bookkeeping. It did not satis

About the time of the death of her husband, she became an inmate of the asylum at Jackson, Miss., and the court rendered a decree of interdiction, which was subsequent-factorily show what had become of a numly removed as before stated. ber of dollars expended according to statement.

We infer from the facts and circumstances, made evident by the record, that she was of a nervous temperament, and at times unable to properly control her mind.

As she had been released from the law's restraining influence, we have to consider her case as that of a person sui juris, without overlooking, however, that in her nervous condition of mind she was entitled to every reasonable consideration in all that related to her business affairs.

After the property had been delivered into the possession of plaintiff, she became extremely extravagant, and, we infer, lived beyond her means. She drank intoxicants to excess at times.

At the end of the first year of plaintiff's gestion, he prepared an account which she signed. It consisted of a list of different amounts which plaintiff submitted to his principal, and it ends with an unsustained statement of a large indebtedness to him.

This statement she approved and signed. The plaintiff thereafter continued with the management.

About the end of the second year the defendant chose to put an end to plaintiff's employment. She notified him to consider himself discharged, and to surrender possession and management of the property to Judge E. C. Montgomery, his successor.

The right of defendant to discharge plaintiff is the first question before us for decision.

Mr. Holmes, defendant's employé, was not defendant's servant or ordinary overseer or manager. He was her trusted agent, and had the administration, supervision, and control of her business affairs.

In addition, she was in debt for over $16,

000.

She doubtless thought that a change was necessary in order to escape ruin.

An agent was needed who would bring more conservative influence to bear as relates to business affairs on all concerned, from the first to the last.

In this, after having carefully examined the condition of affairs, we cannot hold that she erred in discharging plaintiff.

At this point it occurs to us to take up again the account, to which we referred above, as having been rendered by plaintiff at the end of the first year of his gestion.

As to this account, plaintiff's position is that the account was one rendered to the defendant, the accountee; that it made complete proof and operated as a release from any further inquiry, because she had approved it.

If this account were near correct, it would be different.

The account of July, 1906, cannot be considered correct. The columns "credit" and "debit" were not added. Deducting the one from the other, the error is evident if the statement in red ink is to be taken as showing the correct balance after deducting the one from the other. The difference is great, taking the respective addition of the column into account.

The oversight of the accountant, if an oversight, discredits the accounting of that date. The balance arrived at is arbitrary. The defendant sustained her defense that the approval of said account was an error.

It must be borne in mind that it devolved upon plaintiff to sustain his account under

After her confidence had been shaken, she the circumstances. 1 Rice on Evidence, 103did not discharge him for good cause.

142; 5 Current Law, 89; 3 Current Law, 380;

The mandate could be removed, even if McAllister v. Srodes, 14 La. 443; Scarborshe had not had good cause.

The principal may revoke his power of attorney whenever he thinks proper if the agency was not an agency with an interest. Civ. Code, art, 3028.

The contract between the parties, insep

ough v. Stevens, 3 Rob. 148; Succession of Peytavin, 7 Rob. 478; Succession of Desorme, 10 Rob. 474; Police Jury v. Herbert, 2 La. Ann. 149.

On the subject of agency and the necessity of rendering a complete account to the

ing paragraphs. There must be perfect fairness, adequacy, and equity on the part of the attorney. Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 312a, 312b, 312c.

We take as a basis the item above referred to as stated in red ink, on account of July, 1906, viz., $4,196.81.

The appellee does not particularly object to it.

We therefore leave it as it is, and arrive at the following result:

Debit: Attorney's fee:

The following are the reasons for not allowing that amount. The leading counsel in matter of removing the interdiction stated that $1,000 is an ample fee for all services rendered.

Two thousand dollars were paid.

The plaintiff did not take an active part as an attorney. He made no argument in court, examined no witnesses, made no suggestion to the court. His name does not appear as attorney in any of the proceedings. Defendant testified that she did not know that the amount was charged in the account of July, 1906, numbered 207. She further testified that she assumed at the time that in contracting to pay plaintiff the salary stated in the contract it included everything in the way of services.

From her statement plaintiff never at any time claimed the fee in question.

Another item added to "debit" is the sum of $2,300, identified by reference to the Stubb loan.

When this item was called to the attention of plaintiff, he said that the expert bookkeeper who had prepared the account would explain and show that it is correct.

The testimony does not sustain it.
In matter of the Union Oil Company:
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Statement of account current of J.

M. Parker & Co., amount drawn
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Amount paid to hands on the De
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List of drafts of plaintiff as per ac

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CALDWELL v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 18, 1909.) Appeal from Probate Court, Perry County; J. B. Shivers, Judge. W. F. Hogue, for appellant. Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BURGIN v. COCKRELL. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Pickens County; A. H. Alston, 1,583 01 Judge. Curry & Robison, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed on certificate. 602 35 3,157 73 $ 8.216 23 7,979 97 $16,196 02 $ 8,216 23 We will state in conclusion, there is a concurrence of facts excluding the possibility of rendering judgment in favor of plaintiff.

As against credit.

Leaving a balance against plaintiff of.

We add that there is a standard of diligence to which one should conform when in charge of the property of another, who, as in this instance, is an old lady, who had been placed in an asylum at different times.

She was not accustomed to plantation management, and was unable to judge of the efficiency of such management.

For reasons stated, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from

DOWDELL, J. It is ordered that the petitioner be allowed bail; and the cause is accordingly reversed, rendered, and remanded. HARALSON, SIMPSON, and DENSON, JJ., concur.

CARROLL v. T. C. BINGHAM & CO. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; S. L. Brewer, Judge. R. J. Hooten, for appellent. Heflin, Burns & Bynum, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of prosecution.

Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from CrimCONNELL v. STATE. (Supreme Court of inal Court, Jefferson County; S. L. Weaver,

and appeals. Affirmed. Alexander M. Garber, Judge. Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for Atty. Gen., for the State. the State.

ANDERSON, J. There is no error of record, and no bill of exceptions; so the judgment is affirmed.

EVANS, J. In this case, there being no bill of exceptions, and no error apparent upon the record, the judgment of the criminal court of Jefferson county is affirmed. Affirmed. DOWDELL, C. J., and ANDERSON and JJ., concur. SAYRE, JJ., concur.

HESTER v. TAYLOR. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; S. L. Brewer, Judge. Blake & Walker, for appellant. R. J. Hooten, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed for want of assignment of errors.

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. OF AMERICA v. MARTIN. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 18, 1910.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; A. A. Evans, Judge. B. B. Hayes, for appellant. R. W. Miller, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Death of appellee suggested on June 8, 1909, with leave to revise, and cause continued. Cause not having been revised, on motion of appellee, the appeal is abated.

JACKSON v. CITY OF ANNISTON. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from City Court of Anniston; Thomas W. Coleman, Jr., Judge.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed on motion.

JACKSON v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from City Court of Anniston; Thomas W. Coleman, Jr., Judge. Tate & Walker, for appellant. Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State. PER CURIAM. Dismissed on motion of appellant.

LEVINS et al. v. NUSS. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 16, 1909.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Cullman County; D. W. Speake, Judge. F. E. St. John, for appellants. Brown & Kyle, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed on motion of appellee.

MCDUFFIE v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 3, 1910.) Appeal from City Court of Gadsden; Alto V. Lee, Judge. Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

ANDERSON, J. There being no bill of exceptions in this case, and no error appearing in the record proper, the judgment of the city court is affirmed. Affirmed.

DOWDELL, C. J., and MAYFIELD and SAYRE, JJ., concur.

MELTON & STUART v. FARMERS' OIL & MFG. CO. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 10, 1910.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Wilcox County; B. M. Miller, Judge. Miller & Miller, for appellant.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed on motion. See, also, 159 Ala. 469, 49 South. 225.

MILLER v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 3, 1910.) Appeal from Crim

MCCLELLAN, MAYFIELD, and SAYRE,

SCHULER v. FISCHER. of Alabama. Jan. 13, 1910.) Appeal from City (Supreme Court Court of Gadsden; John H. Disque, Judge.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed on certificate.

SMITH V. JEFFERSON. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 10, 1910.) Appeal from Chancery Court, Jefferson County; A. H. Benners, Judge. Suit by E. A. Smith against H. H. K. Jefferson. From an adverse decree, complainant appeals. Affirmed. Charles E. Elder and John H. Miller, for appellant. A. C. & H. R. Howze, for appellee.

MCCLELLAN, J. The complainant's (appellant's) bill sought the enforcement of liens on real estate, asserted to have resulted, to his benefit, from registered judgments against the respondent, Jefferson. The defenses were these: Novation, in that certain parties, named Rich, assumed, with complainant's consent and agreement, the payment of Jefferson's indebtedness to complainant, and the discharge of Jefferson as debtor, and the substitution of the Riches therefor; secondly, the satisfaction of the indebtedness by the Riches in a transaction between the Riches and complainant. The issues were of fact purely, and the learned chancellor resolved the matter in favor of the extinguishment of any liability on the judgments as far as Jefferson was concerned. A careful consideration of the evidence in this record does not convince us that the conclusion below was erroneous. Affirmed.

ANDERSON, MAYFIELD, and SAYRE, JJ., concur.

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VINEGAR BEND LUMBER CO. v. SOULE STEAM FEED WORKS. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 18, 1910.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Samuel B. Browne, Judge. Charles L. Bromberg and Massey Wilson, for appellant. G. L. & H. T. Smith, for appellee.

MAYFIELD, J. Reversed and remanded, for errors in the admission of evidence.

DOWDELL, C. J., and SIMPSON and Me

BLOUNT . BARWICK. (Supreme Court of Florida. Aug. 16, 1909.) In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Marion County; W. S. Bullock, Judge. Hocker & Duval, for plaintiff in

error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment in favor of defendant in error. Writ of error dismissed before the clerk on præcipe of counsel for plaintiff in error.

FLORIDA ICE MFG. CO. v. RUST BOIL ER CO. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909.) In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; R. M. Call, Judge. Fletcher & Dodge, for appellant. Cooper & Cooper, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Decree in favor of appellee.

JONES v. TYLER. (Supreme Court of Florida. Aug. 10, 1909.) In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; J. B. Wall, Judge. Frazier & Mabry, for plaintiff in error.

PER CURIAM. Writ of error from a judgment in favor of the defendant in error. Dismissed before the clerk on præcipe of counsel for plaintiff in error. See, also, 51 South. 283.

KNICKERBOCKER TRUST CO. et al. v. INGALLS et al. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909.) In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; J. B. Wall, Judge. MacFarlane & Davis, for appellants. P. O. Knight, E. R. Gunby, F. M. Simonton, and Wilson & Boswell, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. Appeal by appellants from Appeal dismissed on motion of counsel for ap- missed by order of court. an order in favor of appellees. Appeal dis

pellant.

GAINESVILLE & GULF RY. CO. v. PEPPER PUBLISHING & PRINTING CO. (Supreme Court of Florida. Jan. 8, 1910.) In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Alachua County; J. T. Wills, Judge. F. M. Simonton, for plaintiff in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment in favor of defendant in error. Writ of error dismissed before the clerk on præcipe of counsel for plaintiff

in error.

NICHOLS et al. v. FRANK et al. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909.) In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; J. B. Wall, Judge. E. R. Gunby and W. H. Jackson, for appellants. F. M. Simonton and Wall & McKay, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. Decree in favor of appellees. Appeal dismissed, as to appellee L. Athanasaw, on motion of counsel for appellee.

GRIFFITH et al. v. GRIFFITH. (Supreme Court of Florida. Nov. 29, 1909.) In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Manatee County; J. B. Wall, Judge. Singeltary & Reaves, for appellants.

PER CURIAM. Appeal from a decree in favor of appellee. Appeal dismissed before the clerk on præcipe of counsel for appellants.

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY COM'RS v. JACKSON, Sheriff. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909.) In Banc.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated in the opinion this day filed in the case of County Commissioners of Hillsborough County v. R. A. Jackson, as Sheriff, 50 South. 423, the judgment in this cause must be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

JOHNS v. TUTEN. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909). In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Hamilton County; B. H. Palmer, Judge. Small. Palmer & Sanford and C. A. Stephens, for plaintiff in error. M. F. Horne and H. S. Caldwell, for defendant in er

ror.

PER CURIAM. Action by defendant in error against plaintiff in error. There was judgment for the defendant in error, and the plaintiff in error takes writ of error. Writ of error dismissed by the court on motion of counsel for the defendant in error.

NICOPOLOPOLUS V. STOMATIATHIS BROS. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909.) In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; J. B. Wall, Judge. J. Hall Brumsey, for plaintiff in error. Wall & McKay, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. There was judgment for the defendants in error, and the plaintiff in error takes writ of error. Writ of error dismissed on motion of counsel for the defendants in error.

THOMAS v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Florida. June Term, 1909.) In Banc. Error to Criminal Court of Record, Walton County; D. Stuart Gillis, Judge. The Attorney General, for the State.

PER CURIAM. Judgment against plaintiff in error. Writ of error dismissed on motion of the Attorney General.

SPELLMAN et al. v. McKEEN. (No. 14,445.) (Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 11, 1910. Suggestion of Error Overruled May 2, 1910.) On suggestion of error. Overruled. For former opinion, see 51 South. 914.

PER CURIAM. The judgment heretofore entered in this cause affects only those defendants in the court below who are parties to this appeal. The cause, in so far as those defendants are concerned who are not parties to the appeal, is still pending in the court below. The suggestion of error is therefore overruled.

END OF CASES IN VOL. 51.

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