Brains/Practices/Relativism: Social Theory After Cognitive ScienceUniversity of Chicago Press, 2002 - 214 páginas Brains/Practices/Relativism presents the first major rethinking of social theory in light of cognitive science. Stephen P. Turner focuses especially on connectionism, which views learning as a process of adaptation to input that, in turn, leads to patterns of response distinct to each individual. This means that there is no common "server" from which people download shared frameworks that enable them to cooperate or communicate. Therefore, argues Turner, "practices"—in the sense that the term is widely used in the social sciences and humanities—is a myth, and so are the "cultures" that are central to anthropological and sociological thought. In a series of tightly argued essays, Turner traces out the implications that discarding the notion of shared frameworks has for relativism, social constructionism, normativity, and a number of other concepts. He suggests ways in which these ideas might be reformulated more productively, in part through extended critiques of the work of scholars such as Ian Hacking, Andrew Pickering, Pierre Bourdieu, Quentin Skinner, Robert Brandom, Clifford Geertz, and Edward Shils. |
Contenido
Introduction SOCIAL THEORY AFTER COGNITIVE SCIENCE | 1 |
Learning and Practices | 23 |
2 SEARLES SOCIAL REALITY | 35 |
Is TwentiethCentury Social Theory Based on the Wrong Choice? | 58 |
4 RELATIVISM AS EXPLANATION | 74 |
5 THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM | 108 |
6 MAKING NORMATIVE SOUP OUT OF NONNORMATIVE BONES | 120 |
The Lessons of Contextualism | 142 |
8 PRACTICE IN REAL TIME | 160 |
9 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SHILS | 168 |
| 195 | |
| 205 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Brains/Practices/Relativism: Social Theory After Cognitive Science Stephen Turner Vista previa limitada - 2002 |
Brains/Practices/Relativism: Social Theory after Cognitive Science Stephen Turner Sin vista previa disponible - 2002 |
Términos y frases comunes
acceptance activity actual alternative analogy answer argued argument attitudes basic behavior beliefs Brandom causal child abuse claims cognitive science collective intention collective intentionality common concepts connectionism connectionist constructionism contingencies critical thinking culture depends discussion distinctions ethnomethodology example experience explanation explanatory explicit fact folk psychology function habits Hägerström historical idea ideology imitation implicit norms individual inferences institutional facts institutions intellectual issue kind language learning liberal liberal democracy logic matter means mechanism ment mental Michael Polanyi moral notion objects paradigm particular perhaps person philosophical plausible Polanyi political practice premises model presuppositions problem psychological question rational reason relativism relativistic role Schmitt scientific Searle Searle's sense shared Shils Shils's simply social constructionism social theory sociology sort Speech Acts starting points structure T. S. Eliot tacit knowledge tacit rule book texts theory of mind things thought tion tradition understanding understood validity Weber wrong