delay, and defraud creditors, but an intent either to hinder, or to delay, or to defraud is sufficient; the statute being in the disjunctive, either intent is held to be sufficient." A debtor may sell his property, though the effect of the sale is to hinder creditors, if the sale is an honest one, made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and is not made for the purpose of hindering creditors.15 And a debtor, although in failing circumstances or insolvent, may make such sale or disposition of his property, in good faith, as he may deem necessary to meet his obligations and pay off his creditors, although such sale may in fact hinder and delay creditors, and the fact that the sale hinders or delays creditors will not avoid it.16 It is not enough that the effect of a conveyance is to delay creditors. It must be executed with such 14. N. Y.-McConnell V. Sherwood, 84 N. Y. 522, either intent, both by the common law and the statute, is a fraud; Buell v. Rope, 6 App. Div. 113, 39 N. Y. Supp. 479; Warner v. Lake, 14 N. Y. Supp. 10. Ala.-Lehman v. Kelly, 68 Ala. 192. Ill.-Adams v. Pease, 113 Ill. App. 356. Iowa.-McCreary v. Skinner, 75 Iowa, 411, 39 N. W. 674. Mo.-Rupe v. Alkire, 77 Mo. 641; Dougherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 528; Coon v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435; Burgert v. Borchert, 59 Mo. 80; Baer v. Lisman, 85 Mo. App. 317; DunhamBuckley v. Halberg, 69 Mo. App. 509; State v. Nauert, 2 Mo. App. 295. Neb.-Foley v. Doyle, 1 Neb. (Unoff.) 643, 95 N. W. 1067; Knapp v. Fisher, 58 Neb. 651, 79 N. W. 553. N. C.-Peeler v. Peeler, 109 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 59. Tex.-Ellis v. Valentine, 65 Tex. 532; Cook v. Greenberg (Civ. App. 1896), 34 S. W. 687; Houston, etc., W. Va.-Edgell v. Smith, 50 W. Wis.-Norwegian Plow Co. v. Haw- Can.-Murthau V. McKenna, 14 15. In re Strenz, 8 Fed. 311; Hes- 16. Pochel v. Read, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 208, 46 N. Y. Supp. 775; Lowery v. Howard, 35 Ind. 170, 9 Am. Rep. 676; Farwell v. Norton, 77 Ill. App. 685; State v. Purcell, 131 Mo. 312, 33 S. W. 13; Adam Roth Grocery Co. v. Ashton, 69 Mo. App. 463. an intent and purpose. The fact that a conveyance may incidentally delay or hinder creditors, or does actually hinder and delay creditors, is not sufficient to make it void, if there was no intent on the part of the grantor." A trust mortgage given by an insolvent corporation to secure creditors which requires all creditors to accept its terms before they can take any benefit therefrom, and if their debts become due before the mortgage to so extend the time of payment that they cannot be enforced until after the mortgage matures, a period of ninety days, and thus places the property of the mortgagor beyond the reach of creditors for an indefinite period, constrains the creditors to forego, by affirmative action, a right provided by law, and hinders and delays creditors, within the meaning of the statute against fraudulent conveyances, and is therefore void.18 § 2. Intent to defraud one or more creditors.—It is not necessary in order to vitiate a sale or conveyance by a debtor that he intended to defraud all of his creditors. If a conveyance is made with intent to defraud one existing creditor or some of the creditors, it is fraudulent and the conveyance is rendered void as to 17. U. 8.-Strauss v. Abrahams, 32 Fed. 310. Ill.-Murry Nelson & Co. V. Leiter, 93 Ill. App. 176, aff'd 190 III. 414, 60 N. E. 851, 83 Am. St. Rep. 142. Ind. T.-Noyes v. Tootle, 2 Ind. T. 144, 48 S. W. 1031. La.-Succession of Coyle, 32 La. Ann. 79; United States v. United States Bank, 8 Rob. 262. Mass.-Kimball v. Thompson, 4 Cush. 441, 50 Am. Dec. 799. Miss.-Ingraham v. Grigg, 13 Sm. & M. 22. Mo.-State v. Estel, 6 Mo. App. 6; State v. Laurie, 1 Mo. App. 371. N. H.-McCormick v. Towns, 64 all existing creditors; and if it is made with intent to detraud one or some of the subsequent creditors, it is fraudulent and void as to all subsequent creditors.19 A deliberate and avowed intention on the part of a debtor who makes an assignment, that certain creditors shall not be paid out of the property assigned until a preferred class of creditors is paid, is not per se a fraudulent intent.20 Whether a conveyance fraudulent as to existing creditors is fraudulent as to subsequent creditors is discussed elsewhere.21 § 3. Accomplishment of purpose.-A mere intent to defraud on the part of a grantor does not render a conveyance fraudulent which is otherwise valid;22 to avoid a sale as made to hinder or delay creditors of the vendor, not only such fraudulent intent, but some accomplishment thereof must be shown.23 Fraud does not consist in mere fraudulent intention; it is something done in pursuance of the intention; something which operates prejudicially on the right of others, and which was intended to have such effect. In addition to the sale or conveyance actual fraud, hindrance, or delay resulting therefrom to creditors must be shown.24 But it has been held that whatever the legal effect of a Conn.-Allen v. Rundle, 50 Conn. 9, 47 Am. Rep. 599. Ind.-Personette v. Cronkhite, 140 Md.-Spuck v. Logan, 97 Md. 152, 151 Mass. 132, 24 N. E. 33. Pa.-Barrett v. Nealon, 119 Pa. St. 171, 12 Atl. 861, 4 Am. St. Rep. 628; Miner v. Warner, 2 Grant, 448. Vt.-Corey v. Morrill, 71 Vt. 51, 42 Atl. 976. 20. Wilson v. Eifler, 47 Tenn. 31. 21. See Effect of fraud on preexisting creditors, chap. V, § 4, supra; Effect of want of consideration as to subsequent creditors, chap. VIII, § 36, supra. 22. Bancroft v. Blizzard, 13 Ohio, 30. 23. Rice v. Perry, 61 Me. 145. 24. N. C.-Briscoe v. Norris, 112 N. C. 671, 16 S. E. 850, a conveyance from husband to wife, of lands purchased with her separate moneys and taken in his name, with her consent, upon an agreement to convey to her when requested, is not fraudulent as deed, if the parties to it supposed that it would have the effect to hinder and delay a creditor, the fact that this object was not accomplished, would not relieve the disability attached to the fraudulent intention.2 25 It is not necessarily conclusive that a conveyance was not made with fraudulent intent that aside from the property embraced therein the debtor had real estate worth more than the incumbrances on it and the unincumbered personal property within reach of creditors, or that he was not insolvent, though it is competent evidence tending in some measure toward that conclusion. 27 26 § 4. Knowledge and intent of grantee; Effect of want of knowledge or notice where transfer is for a valuable consideration. The statute of 13 Elizabeth provided among other things that a conveyance, "upon good consideration and bona fide law to creditors, in the absence of any consent on her part that the land remain in his name to enable him to acquire a fictitious credit, or any act or word on her part, which can create an estoppel. Pa.-Williams v. Davis, 69 Pa. St. 21; Bunn v. Ahl, 29 Pa. St. 387, 72 Am. Dec. 639. See also Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367, 60 Am. Dec. 51, though the purchaser of goods knew at the time of the purchase that he was unable to pay for them, and did not intend to do so, but used no actual artifice intended and fitted to deceive the vendor, the latter cannot, after delivery, avoid the contract. Tenn.-Wagner v. Smith, 13 Lea, 560, a conveyance is not in fraud of creditors of the grantor where the rights of the grantee to the land were in any event paramount to those of the grantor's creditors, and could have been enforced notwithstanding their opposition. Tex.-Moore V. Robinson (Civ. App. 1903), 75 S. W. 890, a transfer of property from a debtor to a creditor is not invalidated because he intended to defeat another creditor in the collection of his claim, if he transferred no more property than was reasonably sufficient to pay his debt; Ellis v. Valentine, 65 Tex. 532, a hindrance or delay contemplated and effected by a conveyance by way of preference, to render the conveyance invalid, must operate to defraud other creditors, as well as to hinder and delay them. But see Main v. Lynch, 54 Md. 658. See also Prejudice to rights of creditors, chap. III, § 9, supra. 25. Drum v. Painter, 27 Pa. St. 148. 26. First Nat. Bank v. Maxwell, 123 Cal. 360, 55 Pac. 980, 69 Am. St. Rep. 64. 27. Hager v. Shindler, 29 Cal. 47. fully conveyed or assured to any Person or Persons, or Bodies Politick or Corporate, not having at the Time of such Conveyance or Assurance to them made, any Manner of Notice or Knowledge of such Covin, Fraud or Collusion," shall not be fraudulent.28 Under this and similar statutes in the United States it is held, as a general rule, that in order to vitiate a conveyance based upon a valuable consideration and render it void as to creditors on the ground that it was made with intent to defraud them, it must be shown either that the grantee had actual knowledge or notice of such fraudulent intent, or knowledge or notice of facts calculated to and which would put a reasonable and ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would lead to a discovery of such fraudulent intent of the grantor, or that the grantee participated in the fraudulent intent of the grantor. 28. St. 13 Eliz. chap. 5, § 6. See Statute of 13 Elizabeth and earlier English statutes, chap. I, §§ 7, 8, supra. 29. N. Y.-Galle v. Tode, 148 N. Y. 270, 42 N. E. 673; Starin v. Kelly, 88 N. Y. 421; Dudley v. Danforth, 61 N. Y. 626; Jaeger v. Kelley, 62 N. Y. 274; Ruhl v. Phillips, 48 N. Y. 125, 8 Am. Rep. 522; Buongierno v. Schiller, 112 App. Div. 916, 98 N. Y. Supp. 464; Lary v. Pettit, 55 App. Div. 631, 66 N. Y. Supp. 834; Bogert v. Hess, 50 App. Div. 253, 63 N. Y. Supp. 977; Demarest v. House, 91 Hun, 290, 36 N. Y. Supp. 291; Dorr v. Beck, 76 Hun, 540, 28 N. Y. Supp. 206; Van Wyck v. Baker, 16 Hun, 168; Stowell v. Haslett, 5 Lans. 380; Holmes v. Clark, 48 Barb. 237; Newman v. Cordell, 43 Barb. 448; Carpenter v. Muren, 42 Barb. 300; Hall v. Arnold, 15 Barb. 599; Gowing v. Warner, 30 Misc. Rep. 393, 62 N. Y. Supp. 797; Ravin v. Subin, 30 Misc. Rep. 193, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1104, rev'd 31 Misc. Rep. 742, 64 N. Y. 29 Supp. 138; First Nat. Bank v. Hamil- U. S.-Rea v. Missouri, 17 Wall. 532, 21 L. Ed. 707; Clements v. Nicholson, 6 Wall. 299, 18 L. Ed. 786; Astor v. Wells, 4 Wheat. 466, 4 L. Ed. 616; Watson v. Bonfils, 116 Fed. 157, 53 C. C. A. 535; Vansickle v. Wells, 105 Fed. 16; Evans v. Mansur, etc., Implement Co., 87 Fed. 275, 30 C. C. A. 640; Moline Wagon Co. v. Rummell, 14 Fed. 155; Howe Mach. Co. v. Claybourn, 6 Fed. 438; Jenkins v. Einstein, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,265, 3 Biss. 128; Magniac v. Thompson, 16 Fed. Cas. No. 8,956, Baldw. 344, aff'd 7 Pet. 348, 8 L. Ed. 709. Ala.-Teague v. Bass, 131 Ala. 422, 31 So. 4; Roden v. Ellis, 113 Ala. 652, 21 So. 71; Simmons v. Shelton, 112 Ala. 284, 21 So. 309, 57 Am. St. Rep. 39; Carter v. O'Bryan, 105 Ala. 305, 16 So. 894; Jaffrey v. McGough, 83 Ala. 202, 3 So. 594; Keel v. Lar |