such grantor."12 Under these statutes it is held that actual notice must be given of the fraudulent intent, or in the absence of actual notice, that it is necessary that the facts and circumstances relied upon to charge the purchaser with knowledge should be of a character equivalent to such notice. If the facts within the knowledge of the purchaser are of such a nature as, in reason, to excite the suspicion of an ordinarily prudent person and put him upon inquiry, and he fails to make some investigation, he will be chargeable with that knowledge which a reasonable inquiry, as suggested by the facts, would have revealed. But, as well under these statutes as under the common law, circumstances to put the purchaser who pays full value on inquiry, must be equivalent to actual notice.13 In some of the states it

held that the doctrine of constructive notice has no application, but that, while the existence of the facts to put the purchaser on inquiry raises a presumption of knowledge of all facts which such inquiry, if reasonably pursued, would have disclosed, it is not a conclusive badge of fraud, and simply raises a question of fact for the consideration of the jury as to whether the purchaser had actual notice.14

12. Real Property Law, chap. 547, Laws 1896, § 230; Personal Property Law, chap. 417, Laws 1897, § 29.

13. Greenwald v. Wales, 174 N. Y. 140, 66 N. E. 665, if the purchaser has knowledge that the effect of the sale is to deprive the vendor's creditors of the means of collecting their debts, it is a question of fact for the jury whether such knowledge does not give him rotice of the fraudulent intent of the vendor; First Nat. Bank of Amsterdam v. Miller, 163 N. Y. 164, 57 N. E. 308; Anderson v. Blood, 152 N. Y. 285, 46 N. E. 493, 57 Am. St. Rep. 515; Wilson V. Marion, 147 N. Y. 589, 42 N. E. 190; Jacobs v. Morrison, 136 N. Y. 101,

32 N. E. 552; Parker v. Conner, 93 N. Y. 118, 45 Am. Rep. 178; Starin v. Kelly, 88 N. Y. 418; Stearns v. Gage, 79 N. Y. 102; Bailey v. Fransiolo, 101 App. Div. 140, 91 N. Y. Supp. 852; Gilmour v. Colcord, 96 App. Div. 358, 89 N. Y. Supp. 689; Peetsch v. Sommers, 31 App. Div. 255, 53 N. Y. Supp. 438. 28 Civ. Proc. R. 124; King v. Holland Trust Co., 8 App. Div. 112, 40 N. Y. Supp. 480; Wilmerding v. Jarmulowsky, 85 Hun, 285, 32 N. Y. Supp. 983; Farley v. Carpenter, 27 Hun, 359. Compare Vilas Nat. Bank v. Newton, 25 App. Div. 62, 48 N. Y. Supp. 1009. Contra, Salomon v. Moral, 53 How. Pr. 342.

14. U. S.-Batavia v. Wallace, 102

18. Knowledge of facts to put on inquiry.-No duty of inquiry as to the fraudulent intent of the grantor or as to his motives in making the sale devolves on the grantee or purchaser, unless he has actual knowledge of some suspicious fact or circumstances; but knowledge, on the part of the grantee, of such suspicious facts and circumstances as would put a prudent man on inquiry, is equivalent to knowledge of all facts which would be developed by a reasonable pursuit of such inquiry." By reasonable pursuit is meant that implied where there is reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel in which

Fed. 240, 42 C. C. A. 310, under rule in Missouri.

Colo.-Riethmann v. Godsman, 23 Colo. 202, 46 Pac. 684.

Conn. Knower v. Cadden Clothing Co., 57 Conn. 202, 17 Atl. 580.

Mass.-Carroll v. Hayward, 124 Mass. 120, an instruction is erroneous which disregards the distinction between means of knowledge and actual knowledge.

Mo.-John Deere Plow Co. v. Sullivan, 158 Mo. 440, 59 S. W. 1005; Van Raalte v. Harrington, 101 Mo. 602, 14 S. W. 710, 20 Am. St. Rep. 626, 11 L. R. A. 424; State v. Purcell, 131 Mo. 312, 33 S. W. 13; State v. Mason, 112 Mo. 374, 20 S. W. 629, 34 Am. St. Rep. 390; Eck v. Hatcher, 58 Mo. 235; Looney v. Bartlett, 106 Mo. App. 619, 81 S. W. 481; White v. Million, 102 Mo. App. 437, 76 S. W. 733; Hearn v. Due, 79 Mo. App. 322; Simon-Gregory Dry Goods Co. V. Schooley, 66 Mo. App. 406. But see State v. Estel, 6 Mo. App. 6. Neb.-Bender v. Kingman (1902), 90 N. W. 886.

Or.-Coolidge v. Heneky, 11 Or. 327, 8 Pac. 281. See Garnier v. Wheeler, 40 Or. 198, 66 Pac. 812; Philbrick v. O'Connor, 15 Or. 15, 13 Pac. 612, 3 Am. St. Rep. 139; Lyons

v. Leahy, 15 Or. 8, 13 Pac. 643, 3 Am. St. Rep. 133.

15. N. Y.-Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70.

U. S.-Holladay's Case, 27 Fed. 830.

Ark.-Dyer v. Taylor, 50 Ark. 314.
Ill.-Hanchett v. Kimbark, 118 Ill.

121.

Iowa.--Jones v. Hetherington, 45 Iowa, 681.

Ky-Ferguson v. May, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 989.

Mich.-Eureka Iron & S. Works v. Bresnahan, 66 Mich. 489.

Miss.-Tuteur v. Chase, 66 Miss. 476, 4 L. R. A. 832.

Mo.-State, Pierce v. Merritt, 70 Mo. 276.

N. D.-Fluegal v. Henschel, 7 N. D. 276, 74 N. W. 996, 66 Am. St. Rep. 642.

Okla. Jackson v. Glaze, 3 Okla. 143, 41 Pac. 79.

Pa.-Kemmerer v. Tool, 78 Pa.

16

17

it would be successful. There need not be "good and substantial evidence of the vendor's fraudulent intent such as sends conviction home to the mind and establishes a well founded belief" to charge the vendee with notice thereof. A less degree than this will charge the vendee with the duty of inquiry.' Actual notice of facts which to the mind of a prudent man indicate notice is proof of notice.18 The known fact or facts must be of an unusual or suspicious nature, must have reference to the transaction sought to be impeached, and must so relate to it that, if faithfully pursued and inquired into, they will lead to a knowledge of the fraud committed.19 A purchaser having knowledge of any fact sufficient to put him on inquiry is presumed either to have made the proper investigation or to have been guilty of negligence fatal to his claim as a bona fide purchaser.20

§ 19. Mere suspicion. Knowledge of circumstances amounting to mere suspicion of the seller's fraud or bad faith respecting his creditors is not equivalent to notice to the purchaser of the seller's intended fraud,21 or sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry as to the existence of such fraudulent purpose.

Rep. 290. A direct statement to a purchaser of the existence and nature of an adverse claim or title, whether made by or on behalf of the holder of the adverse title or by a mere stranger. Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551.

Facts not sufficient to put on inquiry.-Access to invoice which shows that the stock was purchased on credit. Smith v. Kaufman, 94 Ala. 364, 10 So. 229. The fact that the purchaser was told by the seller that he was not indebted except as to those debts assumed by the purchaser, and that the purchaser discovered a small claim against the seller. B. C. Evans Co. v. Reeves, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 254, 26 S. W. 219. Hearing reports as to an encumbrance on the land

22

about to be purchased. Colquitt v. Thomas, 8 Ga. 258.

16. Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326; Maul v. Rider, 50 Pa. St. 167.

17. Hopkins v. Langton, 30 Wis. 379.

18. Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195; 3 Wash. Real Prop. (3d Ed.) 335.

19. Simons v. Morse, 2 Fed. 325; Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 103; Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. St. 167; Wilson v. Hunter, 30 Ind. 466.

20. Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326; Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Farmer's Loan, etc., Co. v. Walworth, 1 N. Y. 433.

21. N. Y.-Pohalski v. Ertheiler, 18 Misc. Rep. 33, 41 N. Y. Supp. 10.

§ 20. Matters of common or general knowledge.-Where the issue is as to whether or not a sale of a stock of goods was fraudulent as to creditors of the seller, general knowledge in the community of the fact is evidence tending to show notice of such fact to the purchaser; but general rumor that such sale was fraudulent does not amount to general knowledge or notoriety, and does not tend to show notice to the vendee of the fraud, nor is a general statement that the sale was fradulent sufficient to put the purchaser upon inquiry.23 That a prospective wife had notice that the intention of a prospective husband in transferring all his property to her was to defeat the claim of another woman against him for breach of promise of marriage may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, in connection with her failure to testify as a witness and deny such knowledge.24

21. Knowledge or notice of indebtedness or insolvency of grantor.-Mere knowledge by the vendee or mortgagee that his vendor is largely indebted will not avoid the sale to him, and put him on inquiry, though it was made with fraudulent intent by the vendor.25 Knowledge by the purchaser or mort

U. S.-Wilson v. Welsh, 41 Fed. 570; Simms v. Morse, 2 Fed. 325, 4 Hughes, 579.

Ark.-Erb v. Cole, 31 Ark. 554. Iowa.-Urdangen V. Doner, 122 Iowa, 533, 98 N. W. 317.

Tex.-Hooks v. Pafford, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 516, 78 S. W. 991.

22. Tuteur v. Chase, 66 Miss. 476, 6 So. 241, 14 Am. St. Rep. 577, 4 L. R. A. 832.

23. Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 103.

24. Dent v. Pickens, 46 W. Va. 378, 33 S. E. 303.

25. N. Y.-Beals v. Guernsey, 8 Johns. 446, 5 Am. Dec. 348.

U. S.-Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22, 26 L. Ed. 360.

Ala.-Simmons v. Shelton, 112 Ala. 284, 21 So. 309, 57 Am. St. Rep. 39. Ark.—Riggan v. Wolf, 53 Ark. 537, 14 S. W. 922.

D. C.-Davis v. Harper, 14 App. Cas. 463.

Kan.-Baughman v. Penn, 33 Kan. 504, 6 Pac. 890.

Ky.-Wood v. Elliott, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 952, 7 S. W. 624.

Mo.-Durkee v. Chambers, 57 Mo.

575.

N. C.-Eigenbrum v. Smith, 98 N. C. 207, 4 S. E. 122.

Or. Spalding v. Brown, 36 Or. 160, 59 Pac. 185.

gagee of the insolvency of the grantor does not put him on inquiry or render the conveyance fraudulent, even if the object of the grantor was to defraud his creditors, unless such fraudulent purpose or intent was known to the purchaser or mortgagee.” But the purchaser or mortgagee may be charged with such notice