43 lent intent. Such a purchaser is as much favored and protected by the law as a creditor." The same rule applies where the grantee, although originally a fraudulent grantee, subsequently acquires title to the property through one who is a bona fide holder or purchaser, since it is a general rule of equity that a purchaser with notice may protect himself by buying the title of a bona fide purchaser without notice. The fact that an insolvent debtor, who conveyed his land with the avowed intention of using the proceeds in payment of the claims of certain of his creditors, did not pay such creditors, will not affect the title of the purchaser, if the purchase was made in good faith.16 The title as a purchaser of one who takes goods from debtors in payment of an honest debt is not affected by his knowledge of suspicious dealings by the debtors with their property among themselves, or by his knowledge that attachment proceedings are threatened, or that writs were issued, unless an actual levy was made." A bona fide purchaser of a stock of goods fraudulently sold by an insolvent debtor is entitled to all the stock purchased and paid for, and his interest therein is not limited to the amount paid by him. And where a portion of the stock has been wrongfully attached by an officer as the property of the vendor, such officer cannot defeat an action for damages by showing an adjudication of a state court that after the seizure the goods still retained by the purchaser were of sufficient value to reimburse him for the purchase price actually paid." Whether a bona fide purchaser, who has paid only a portion of the purchase money before notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate vendor, in an action of trespass against the sheriff who has levied in behalf of creditors, can recover more damages than the amount he has paid, will de 43. See Nature and extent of con sideration, § 47, infra. 44. Pierson v. Tom, 1 Tex. 577. 45. Funkhouser v. Lay, 78 Mo. 458, aff'd 9 Mo. App. 585. 46. Priest v. Brown, 100 Cal. 626, 35 Pac. 323. 47. Windmiller v. Chapman, 38 Ill. App. 276. 48. Walker v. Collins, 50 Fed. 737, 4 U. S. App. 406, 1 C. C. A. 642. 49. Walker v. Collins, supra. pend, in each case, upon the extent of the liability over to his vendor under the contract of purchase.50 Where a fraudulent conveyance is set aside at the suit of creditors, the creditors tako only such interest as the debtor had fraudulently conveyed.51 Where a mortgagor conveys absolutely to a mortgagee in payment of the mortgage debt, if the conveyance can be avoided by the creditors of the mortgagor as fraudulent, it leaves the mortgage in force as to such creditors.52 § 47. Nature and extent of consideration in general.-To constitute the defense of a bona fide purchaser, without notice, of property sold with the intent to defraud the creditors of the vendor, the purchaser must have paid the purchase money or consideration in full before notice of the fraud of the vendor, since no one but a purchaser for a valuable consideration, actually passed before notice of the fraud, can, as against creditors, claim title to the property which has been fraudulently disposed of.53 The purchaser is protected only as to the interest in the property actually paid for without knowledge of the fraud, and any payment made by him after notice is in his own wrong and will not protect him. as a bona fide purchaser to that extent.54 To the extent of pay La.-Schultz v. Morgan, 27 La. Ann. 616. Mich.-Dixon v. Hill, 5 Mich. 404. Mo.-Dougherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 528; Arnholt v. Harting, 73 Mo. 485; Stein v. Burnett, 43 Mo. App. 477; Pribe v. Glenn, 31 Mo. App. 215. Neb.-Hedrick v. Strauss, 42 Neb. 485, 60 N. W. 928. Okla.-McFadyen v. Masters, 11 Okla. 16, 66 Pac. 284, 8 Okla. 174, 56 Pac. 1059. Tex.-Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 14 S. W. 700, 22 Am. St. Rep. 77, 11 L. R. A. 628. 54. Ala. Florence Sewing Mach. Co. v. Zeigler, supra. ments made, or security or property appropriated in payment thereof, before knowledge or notice of the fraud of his vendor, he acquires an equity and will be protected pro tanto,55 but not as to any unpaid portion.56 Where the title in such case is held to be in the purchaser, the unpaid purchase money should be subjected to the payment of the defrauded creditors.57 Where payment is made partly in money and partly by note, the purchaser will be protected only to the extent of the payment actually made, unless the note is negotiable, and the burden of proof is upon him to show its negotiability.58 The principle that, where the purchaser has paid only part of the purchase money, he can only be protected pro tanto, can only be invoked where it is determined that the seller sold with fraudulent intent, and that the purchaser was not aware of his intent.59 The grantee has a preferred lien on the land, as against the grantor's creditors, for the money Ark.-Massie v. Enyart, 32 Ark. 251. V. Hanna, 7 Ind.-Parkinson Tex.-Cleveland v. Butts, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 272, 35 S. W. 804, a bond for deed given after notice of the fraud is not a payment sufficient to protect the purchaser to that extent. 55. Ala. Florence Sewing Machine Co. v. Zeigler, supra. Kan.-Work v. Coverdale, 47 Kan. 307, 27 Pac. 894; Wafer v. Harvey County Bank, 46 Kan. 597, 26 Pac. 1032; Green v. Green, 41 Kan. 472, 21 Pac. 586; Moxley v. Haskin, 39 Kan. 653, 18 Pac. 820. Mo.-Dougherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 528. Neb.-Hedrick v. Strauss, 42 Neb. 485, 60 N. W. 928. N. J.-Phelps v. Morrison, 24 N. J. Eq. 195. Okla.-McFadyen v. Masters, 11 Tex.-Schuster v. Farmers', etc., 56. Ind.-Rodes v. Green, 36 Ind. 7. 535. Mich.-Ball v. Phenicie, 94 Mich. 355, 53 N. W. 1114, where land worth ten thousand dollars is transferred in payment of a debt of eight thousand, a court of equity will subject the land to a vendor's lien of two thousand and subrogate the husband's creditors to his rights as vendor. Neb.-Hedrick v. Strauss, supra. 57. Lockhard v. Beckley, 10 W. Va. 87. 58. Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 14 S. W. 700, 22 Am. St. Rep. 77, 11 L. R. A. 628. 59. Adam Roth Grocery Co. v. Ashton, 69 Mo. App. 463. སྐ 60 actually paid by him. If the purchaser takes the conveyance without any consideration, or purchases at a grossly inadequate price, without notice, his title will not be protected against creditors of the grantor.61 Marriage being a valuable consideration, the wife is considered in the light of a bona fide purchaser under a marriage settlement, and will be protected as such." 62 48. Rights and liabilities of grantees as to subsequent purchasers. A fraudulent grantee holding under a conveyance made to defraud subsequent purchasers can derive no benefit from his conveyance, as against such a purchaser for full value from the original grantor,63 unless he is both innocent and ignorant of the fraud, and then only to the extent that he has parted with value on the strength of the conveyance and before notice of the fraud.64 The grantee, without consideration, of a fraudulent grantor of property will not occupy, in a controversy in a court of equity with bona fide purchasers, any better ground than his grantor. Where a vendee admits that he acquired no title to property in his possession from the owner, but that the sale to him was simulated, and permits a creditor of his vendor to sell the property, at public sale, the purchaser will acquire a valid title without a suit to annul his sale. Constructive notice will not affect the right of such subsequent purchaser," and where a conveyance is actually fraudulent as to the grantor's creditors, it is void as to subsequent 60. Adams' Assignee v. Branch, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 178. 61. Galbreath v. Cook, 30 Ark. 417; Jewett v. Cook, 81 Ill. 260; Kuevan v. Specker, 74 Ky. 1, where there is doubt as to whether the grantee has paid any consideration he will not be favored in equity; Shultz v. Morgan, 27 La. Ann. 616; Preston v. Cutter, 64 N. H. 461, 13 Atl. 874. 62. Armfield v. Armfield, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 311. See Marriage as consideration, chap. VIII, § 25, supra. 63. Howe v. Waysman, 12 Mo. 169, 65 49 Am. Dec. 126; Mellick v. Mellick, 47 N. J. Eq. 86, 19 Atl. 870, aff'd 48 N. J. Eq. 613, 23 Atl. 582. 64. Mellick v. Mellick, supra, but he cannot be allowed for a past indebtedness against the grantor unless he has given up some security or has otherwise changed his position on the strength of the conveyance. 65. Searcy v. Carter, 36 Tenn. 271. 66. Harris v. Denison, 8 La. 543. 67. Mellick v. Mellick, supra. Compare Effect of notice as to subsequent purchasers, chap. V, § 25, supra. 69 purchasers for value, such purchasers not being affected by either actual or constructive notice of the conveyance." But deeds, though fraudulent on the part of the grantor, if accepted bona fide by the grantee, and without knowledge of the fraud, give a color of title, under the statute of limitations, and if a fraudulent or voluntary conveyance is permitted to stand without attack for the period within which it may be attacked, the grantee under it acquires a perfect title, which he can enforce by action against a subsequent purchaser.70 The possession of a fraudulent vendee, however, cannot be deemed adverse as against purchasers from the vendor, where the subsequent purchase was made under judicial process, and the possession of the tenants of the fraudulent vendee must be considered as his possession." 49. Rights and liabilities of purchasers from grantee generally. That a conveyance was made to defraud creditors does not, per se, and as to strangers, avoid the title of a purchaser or other transferee from the fraudulent grantee." The title of one holding under a conveyance from the grantee in a conveyance fraudulent as to the grantor's creditors cannot, as a general rule, be defeated, in favor of the creditors of the original grantor, unless it be alleged and proved that he participated in or had knowledge of the fraudulent intent of the original grantor, except 68. Brown v. Connell, 85 Ky. 403, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 27, 3 S. W. 794. 69. Gregg v. Sayre, 33 U. S. 244, 8 L. Ed. 932. 70. Brown v. Connell, supra. 71. McCaskle v. Amarine, 12 Ala. 17. 72. Gridley v. Wynant, 23 How. (U. S.) 500, 16 L. Ed. 411. 73. U. S.-Pratt v. Curtis, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,375, 2 Lowell, 87. Ark.-Apperson v. Ford, 23 Ark. 746. Ga.-Colquitt v. Thomas, 8 Ga. 258, and it is necessary for the plaintiff 73 in an action to subject the land to prove such knowledge or participation. Ill.-Boies v. Henney, 32 Ill. 130, evidence to be considered by the jury. Iowa.-Burtis v. Humboldt County Mass.-Mansfield v. Dyer, 131 Mass. 200, the fact that the purchaser took his title by quitclaim was not conclusive that he was not a purchaser in good faith and without notice of |