ber of society." (Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. i., p. 1, ed. 1874, New York.) In so far as the faculties of the mind are native to the mind, they are natural—but in so far as they are developed into power by this or that kind of life, or by this or that branch of knowledge, and for this or that purpose, the developed powers and the resulting products of effort, although quite natural, are known as artificial. Methods of Education are artificial. Modes of Teaching are artificial, yet, if based upon principles, they are naturally founded upon the native powers of the learning mind and the subject-matter to be learned. This subject-matter is both natural and artificial, although all produced by the capacities of Nature. Methods of Teaching, being founded upon the innate nature of things, are natural.

136. It is also true that the term “natural,” as commonly understood when applied to the human conditions, means the general idea or notion that people acquire as an induction from experience. An action is pronounced natural in proportion as it approaches spontaneous favor from the greatest number of observers. In proportion as it diverges from this it is called

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affected," " false, sham, unnatural,''

66 monstrous." Still all these phases of experience and observation are within the capacities of Nature, and hence natural. A broad discrimination should be made between the term natural as applied to one individual, and as applied in the sense of the inductive general idea. The author who can gather up the sense of the

greatest number of people into one picture or character, or trait of experience, is called the most life-like and natural in his writings. But

he is no more natural than the man who stammers, or squints, or says, as the child, "I be going.

137. "But the only distinct meaning of that word (natural) is, stated, fixed, or settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i.e. to effect it continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it once. (Butler, Analogy, Malcom's ed., 1860, p. 94.)

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138. According to its derivation, nature (natura-nascitur) means that which is born or produced-the becoming; that which has a beginning and an end; that which has not the cause of its existence in itself, and the cause of which must be sought in something antecedent to and beyond itself—that is, nature is the phenomenal. This the word expresses in the strongest manner. That which begins to be, as the necessary consequence of antecedent conditions, is natural. The co-existence, resemblance, and succession of phenomena constitute the order of nature; and the uniformity of these relations among phenomena are the laws of nature.

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The word nature' is also employed to denote the essential properties of matter, and the various forms of energy, potential and kinetic." (Cocker, Theistic Conception of the World, pp. 193-4, ed. 1875.)

139. "Nature is the aggregate or totality of all material or physical phenomena. A Law of Nature is the statement of a certain uniformity observed in the relations among phenomena. The laws of nature are simply expressions of phenomenal uniformities, having no coercive power whatever.' (Carpenter.)

stances.

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140. "The Uniformity of the Order of Nature may mean either uniformity of co-existence' or 'uniformity of succession.'' Uniformity of co-existence' means that the same substances must always have the same essential properties and the same permanent relations to other subThe constancy of the course of nature or the uniformity of causation is not a self-evident and necessary truth. In so far as it is a scientific truth it is purely an induction from experience, an experience which is necessarily limited, and therefore does not warrant a universal conclusion. It is an immediate fact of consciousness that the will is a cause which is adequate to the production of a diversity of effects. Physical science itself

does not teach that the course of nature is absolutely uniform. 'Nature,' says Dr. Cohn, of Breslau, is an equation with very many unknown quantities. It is the work of natural science to determine the value of these quantities.'" (Ibid., pp. 325–33.)

141. "According to its derivation, nature should mean that which is produced or born; but it also means that which produces or causes to be born. The term nature is used

sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When employed in its more. restricted signification, it is a synomym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek philosophy,

the word was general in its meaning; and included not only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term nature is more vaguely extensive than the terms physics, physical, physiology, or even than the adjective natural; whereas, in the philosophy of Germany, natur and its correlatives, are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of intelligence.

"Nature as opposed to art, all physical causes, all the forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inorganic. The nature or essence of any particular being or class of beings, that which makes it what it is.

"The word nature has been used in two senses, viz., actively and passively; energetic forma formans), and material ( = forma

formata). In the first it signifies the inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a thing as existent; while the essence, or essential property, signifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the possibility of a thing. Hence, in accurate language, we say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the nature, because in the conception of forms, purely geometrical, there is no expression

or implication of their real existence. In the second or material sense of the word nature, we mean by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience the aggregate of phenomena, whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning nature, would therefore be more properly entitled phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, somatology (= doctrine of the general properties of bodies or material substances), and psychology.' (Coleridge.)

"There is no such thing as what men commonly call the course of nature, or the power of nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting, being in every movement perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at any time as to be preserved.' (Clarke.)

"All things are artificial,' said Sir Thomas Browne, for nature is the art of God.' The antithesis of nature and art is a celebrated doctrine in the peripatetic philosophy. Natural things are distinguished from artificial, inasmuch as they have, what the latter are without, an intrinsic principle of formation. (Arist.)

"Dr. Reid said that nature is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects which fall daily under observation. But if it be asked what nature is? whether the first universal cause or a subordinate one? whether one or