many ? whether intelligent or unintelligent ?— upon these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are sensible that they know nothing of the matter." (Fleming, Vocab. of Phil.)

142. "When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances. Miserable, the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect, for men do not marry in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered. Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? I acted naturally, the man replied. But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. This is the case, said the man, with all or at least most fathers. I do not deny that.: but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong.

Do you show me then how your behaviour is natural. I cannot, he said; but do you show me how it is not done according to nature, and is not rightly done." (Epictetus, Discourses, Book I., Chap. XI., Long' trans.)

143. The object of what we commonly call education-that education in which man intervenes and which I shall distinguish as artificial education-is to make good these defects in Nature's methods; to prepare the child to receive Nature's education, neither incapably nor ignorantly, nor with wilful disobedience; and to understand the preliminary symptoms of her displeasure, without waiting for the box on the ear. In short, all artificial education ought to be an anticipation of natural education. And a liberal education is an artificial education, which has not only prepared a man to escape the great evils of disobedience to natural laws, but has trained him to appreciate and to seize upon the rewards, which Nature scatters with as free a hand as her penalties. Ignorance is visited as sharply as wilful disobedience-incapacity meets with the same punishment as crime." (Huxley, Lay Sermons, p. 34, ed. 1870.)

II.

ON THE PRACTICE OF METHODS OF TEACHING.

(A) ON THE KNOWING FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

144. In discussing these Elements of Methods of Teaching, no attempt is made to present a systematic view of Psychology. To do this would require a volume by itself, and must be reserved for another occasion as opportunities shall permit. Sufficient data are introduced to serve as bases for Methods of Teaching. Without endeavoring to classify the matter inserted, it is used as it best serves the scope of the investigation. This matter is also very valuable to the student for its suggestiveness, even when it does not bear directly upon the line of the inquiry. Those professional students, who are already familiar with some system of Psychology, will need to be delayed only a short time on this division of the volume.

145. Adapting from Sir William Hamilton's Metaphysics, Murray's text, edition of 1874, pp. 39-66, psychological phenomena of consciousness are classified under three great divisions: (1) Cognitions, or the faculties which have the

power to know; (2) Feelings, or sensibilities, those which are susceptible of giving pain or pleasure; (3) Conations, which are "tendencies to action, and are divisible into classes, as such tendencies are either blind and fatal, or deliberate and free. The former are desires, the latter, volitions, (p. 226). For present purposes it is necessary to elaborate only the first division, cognitions, including consciousness.

146. (a) "Consciousness is the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections. It is an actual and not a potential knowledge. It is an immediate, not a mediate knowledge. It supposes a contrast, a discrimination ―as the ego and non-ego, the discrimination of states or modifications of the internal subject or self from each other, and the distinction between the parts and qualities of the outer world. It involves judgment, or the mental act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another. It is conditioned upon memory, for without this our mental states could not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to self. Consciousness in its simplicity necessarily involves three things,-(1.) a recognizing or knowing subject, ego; (2.) a recognized or known modification; and (3.) a recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification (pp. 39–42).

(b) "Comparison requires a tertium quid, a locus-call it what you will-in which the two outward existences may meet on equal terms. Thisiferum is what is known as a consciousness.

Even sensations cannot be supposed, simply as such, to be aware of their relations to each other. A succession of feelings is not (as James Mill reiterates) one and the same thing with a feeling of succession, but a wholly different thing. The latter feeling requires a self-transcendency of each item, so that each not only is in relation, but knows its relation, to the other. This selftranscendency of data constitutes the conscious form. Where we suppose it to exist we have mind; where mind exists we have it.

Thus, then, the words Use, Advantage, Interest, Good, find no application in a world in which no consciousness exists. Things there are neither good nor bad; they simply are or are not. Ideal truth to exist at all requires that a mind also exist which shall deal with it as a judge deals with the law, really creating that which it professes only to declare. This category (of consciousness, or personality) might be defined as the mode in which data are brought together for comparison with a view to choice. Both these points, comparison and choice, will be found alike omnipresent in the different stages of its activity. The former has always been recognized; the latter less than it deserves. Many have been the definitions given by psychologists of the essence of consciousness. One of the most acute and emphatic of all is that of Ulrici, who in his Leib und Seele and elsewhere exactly reverses the formula of the reigning British school, by calling consciousness a discriminating activity. But even Ulrici does not pretend that conscious