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177. Knowledge of fact is knowledge by onlook ; knowledge inferred is knowledge of one thing through means of another ; knowledge of first principles is knowledge by insight into truth higher than fact.” (Calderwood, Hand Book, Moral Phil., p. 39, ed. 1879.)

178. In giving the difference between Thought, properly so called, and other phenomena of the mind, I cannot do better than to quote the following: Every state of consciousness necessarily implies two elements at least : a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. In every exercise, for example, of the

. senses, we may distinguish the object seen, heard, smelt, touched, tasted, from the subject seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting. In every emotion of pleasure or of pain, there is a certain affection, agreeable or disagreeable, existing within me, and of this affection I am conscious. In every act of volition, there takes place a certain exercise of my will, and I am conscious that it takes place.

But to constitute an act of Thought, more is required than the immediate relation of subject to object in consciousness. Every one of the above states might exist in a mind totally incapable of thought. Let us suppose, for example, a being, in whose mind every successive state of consciousness was forgotten as soon as it had taken place. Every individual object might be presented to him precisely as it is to us.

Animals, men, trees, and stones, might be successively placed before his eyes ; pleasure, and pain, and anger, and fear, might alternate within him ; but, as each departed, he would retain no knowledge that it had ever existed, and consequently no power of comparison with similar or dissimilar objects of an earlier or later consciousness. He would have no knowledge of

. such objects as referred to separate notions ; he could not say, this which I see is a man, or a horse ; this which I feel is fear, or anger.

He would be deficient in the distinctive feature of Thought, the concept or general notion resulting from the comparison of objects. Hence arises the important distinction between Intuitions, in which the object is immediately related to the conscious mind, and Thoughts, in which the object is mediately related through a concept gained by comparison.

By Intuition is meant to include all the products of the perceptive (external and internal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an individual, thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time. It is necessary to distinguish between the act of thought and its product—the former is designated by the term conception, the product by concept.

Intuition contains two elements only, the subject and the object standing in present relation to each other. Thought contains three elements, the thinking subject, the object about which he thinks, and the concept mediating between the two. Thus even the exercise of the senses upon present objects, in the manner in which it is ordinarily performed by a man of mature faculties, does not consist of mere intuition, but is accompanied by an act of thought. In mere intuition, all that is simultaneously presented to the sense appears as one whole ; but mere intuition does not distinguish its several parts from each other under this or that notion. I may see at once, in a single panorama, a ship upon the sea, an island lying behind it, and the sky above it. To mere intuition this is presented only in confusion, as a single object. To distinguish its constituent portions, as sea and land, ship and sky, requires a comparison and classification of them relatively to so many separate concepts existing in the mind; and such classification is an act of Thought.

In every act of Consciousness the ultimate object is an individual. But in intuition this object is presented to the mind directly, and does not imply the existence, past or present, of anything but itself and the mind to which it is presented. In thought, on the other hand, the in

. dividual is represented by means of a concept, which contains certain attributes applicable to other individuals of the same kind. This implies that there have been presented to the mind prior objects of intuition, originating the concept or general notion to which subsequent objects are referred. Hence arises another important distinction. All intuition is direct and presentative ; all thought is indirect and representative.

By representation are here included the concept, which is representative of many individuals, and the image, which is representative of one.

Perception is employed to denote all those states of Consciousness which are presentative only, not representative. It will thus include all intuitions except those of Imagination.

The office of the faculty of Imagination, whose office is the production of images representative of the several phenomena of Perception, internal as well as external. Imagination, regarded as a product, may be defined, the consciousness of an image in the mind resembling and representing an object of intuition. It is thus at the same time presentative and representative. It is presentative of the image which has its own distinct existence in consciousness, irrespective of its relation to the object which it is supposed to represent. It is representative of the object which that image resembles ; and such resemblance is only possible on the condition that the image be, like the object, individual.

The distinguishing feature of a concept is, that it cannot in itself be depicted to sense or imagination. It is not the sensible image of one object, but an intelligible relation between many.

A second important characteristic of all concepts is, that they require to be fixed in a representative sign, which is language." Mansel, Prolegomena

( Logica, pp. 20–6, ed. 1860.)

179. " In a psychological point of view, to enumerate separate mental faculties and operations, as viving rise to the various products of thought, is, to say the least, to encumber the science with unnecessary and perplexing distinctions. It will be sufficient to refer them to the single faculty of thought or reflection, the operation of which is, in all cases, comparison. The unit of thought is always a judgment, based on a comparison of objects, and the several operations of thought are, in ultimate analysis, nothing more than judgments derived from different data. In order to exhibit this in special instances, it will be convenient to adopt provisionally the logical classification, and to examine the phenomena of thought under the several heads of Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning." (Mansel, Metaphysics, pp. 176-7, ed. 1871, New York.)

180.“ In a psychological point of view, to enumerate separate mental faculties, as giving rise to the various products of thought, is, to say the least, to encumber the science with unnecessary and perplexing distinctions. It will be sufficient to refer them to the single faculty of Thought, the operation of which is in all cases Comparison (see Hamilton, Lect. on Metaphysics, Lect. xxxiv.). But the faculty of Thought, though uniform in its own nature and in the manner of its operation, may yet give rise to different products, according to the diversity of the materials upon which it operates ; and this difference forms the basis of the classification usually adopted in Logic. Extending the terms Apprehension and Judgment beyond the region of Thought proper (into Psychology), it may be laid down, as a general canon of Psy

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