tion of a word; by real the more accurate determination of the contents of a notion. The one clears up the relation of words to notions; the other of notions to things. The substitution of notional for real would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term real, the aim of a verbal definition being to specify the thought denoted by the word, such definition ought to be called notional, on the principle on which the definition of a notion is called real; for this definition is the exposition of what things are comprehended in a thought.

"In the sense in which nominal and real definitions were distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned with real, i.e., notional definitions only; to explain the meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or gram

"There is a real distinction between definitions of names and what are erroneously called definitions of things; but it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a definition, but a postulate. The definition is a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions respecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact which may lead to consequences of every degree of importance. It affirms the real existence of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and this, if true, may be foun

dation sufficient to build a whole fabric of scientific truth.'

Real definitions are divided into essential and accidental. An essential definition states what are regarded as the constituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined; and an accidental definition (or description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, &c.

"Essential definition is divided into physical (natural) and logical (metaphysical); the physical definition being made by an enumeration of such parts as are actually separable; such as are the hull, masts, &c., of a 'ship'; the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c., of a tree.' The logical definition consists of the genus and difference, which are called by some the metaphysical (ideal) parts; as being not two real parts into which an individual object can (as in the former case), be actually divided, but only different views taken (notions formed) of a class of objects, by one mind. Thus a magnet would be defined logically, an iron ore having attraction for iron.'"

Accidental or descriptive definition may be— 1. Causal; as when man is defined as made after the image of God, and for his glory. 2. Accidental; as when he is defined to be animal, bipes implume. 3. Genetic; as when the means by which it is made are indicated; as, if a straight line fixed at one end be drawn round by the other end so as to return to itself, a circle

will be described. Or, 4. Per oppositum; as, when virtue is said to be flying from vice.

The rules of a good definition are:-1. That it be adequate. If it be too narrow, you explain a part instead of a whole; if too extensive, a whole instead of a part. 2. That it be clearer (ie., consist of ideas less complex) than the thing defined. 3. That it be in just a sufficient number of proper words. Metaphorical words are excluded because they are indefinite.

2. From Mill's System of Logic, pp. 105-106, 8° edition.

The simplest and most correct notion of a Definition is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which it bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for the particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it.

This form of definition is the most precise and least equivocal of any; but it is not brief enough, and is besides too technical for common discourse. The more usual mode of declaring the connotation of a name, is to predicate of it another name or names of known signification, which connote the same aggregation of attributes. The definition of a name, according to this view of it, is the sum total of all the essential propositions which can be framed with that name for their subject. All propositions the truth of which is implied in the name, all those which we are made aware of by merely hearing the name, are included in the definition, if complete, and may be evolved from it without

the aid of any other premises; whether the definition expresses them in two or three words, or in a larger number. It is, therefore, not without reason that Condillac and other writers have affirmed a definition to be an analysis. To resolve any complex whole into the elements of which it is compounded, is the meaning of analysis and this we do when we replace one word which connotes a set of attributes collectively, by two or more which connote the same attributes singly, or in smaller groups.

QUOTATIONS ON ABSTRACTION.

APPENDIX F.

230. From Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION (abstractio, from abs traho, to draw away from. It is also called separatio and resolutio). Dobrisch observes that the term abstraction is used sometimes in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the former we are said to abstract the attention from certain distinctive features of objects presented. In the latter, we are said to abstract certain portions of a given concept from the remainder. (Mansel.)

"ABSTRACTION (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart, "is the power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it." Perhaps it may be more correctly regarded as a process rather than a power-as a function rather than a faculty. Dr. Reid has called it an operation of the understanding." The chemist separates into their elements those bodies which are submitted to his analysis. The psy

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