for the immediate exercise of his vocation. But law, medicine, divinity, mechanics, strategics, and navigation, are not education. A man may possess any one of them and be well-nigh illiterate, though of course some can more possibly co-exist with want of education than others. One can conceive that a man may have a profound practical acquaintance with law, and be an uneducated person. Again, to quote an instance, the first Duke of Marlborough was one of the most skilful generals ever known, but he could not spell, and hardly write. Some men who have had the most marvellous aptitude and quickness in mechanical science, have been unable, from sheer ignorance, to sustain a common conversation. Education, on the other hand, deals with formalities. It does not so much aim at setting the mind right on particular points, as on getting the mind into the way of being right. It does not deal with matter, but with method. It purposes to train the thinking powers of man, not to fill the mind with facts. Hence, were it perfect, it would cultivate the intelligence so largely as to render easy the acquisition of any knowledge. It deals, in short, either directly or indirectly, with logical order and the reasoning powers. That it falls short of effecting what it purposes, is due to defects in its system, to defects in man's mind, to defects in this or that man's mind. As, however, its operation is not immediate, but only indirect, its best methods are frequently cavilled at as useless. It may teach logical method of

thinking and reasoning. This, however, is generally too abstract for most minds, except they be more or less matured, and more or less informed on some one or two subjects. In place of this, then, it teaches ordinarily something, which is as exact an illustration of logical method as can be, and which, being unfailing in its inferences, trains the mind in method, and often stores it with facts. In a greater or less degree, but in some degree at least, this inculcation of an abstract method is necessary for any kind of education, and even, except it be a mere knack, for information. (Rogers, Education in Oxford, pp. 1-3. London, 1861.)

8. In the following quotation the extension of the term education is limited substantially to the work of the teacher. This limitation is unusual, and the advantages gained by it are hardly evident : First, let me quote the definition (of Education) embodied in the ideal of the founders of the Prussian National System. It is given shortly as the harmonious and equable evolution of the human powers;' at more length, in the words of Stein, by a method based on the nature of the mind, every power of the soul to be unfolded, every crude principle of life stirred up and nourished, all one-sided culture avoided, and the impulses on which the strength and worth of men rest, carefully attended to.' (Donaldson's Lectures on Education, p. 38.) This definition, which is pointed against narrowness generally, may have had special reference to the many omissions in the schooling of the fore

gone times the leaving out of such things as bodily or muscular training; training in the senses or observation; training in art or refinement. It farther insinuates that hitherto the professed teacher may not have done much even for the intellect, for the higher moral training, nor for the training with a view to happiness or enjoyment.

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"In the very remarkable article on education contributed by James Mill to the Encyclopædia Britannica, the end of education is stated to be to render the individual, as much as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other beings.' This, however, should be given as an amended answer to the first question of the Westminster Catechism-' What is the chief end of man?' The utmost that we could expect of the educator, who is not everybody, is to contribute his part to the promotion of human happiness in the order stated. No doubt the definition goes more completely to the root of the matter than the German formula. It does not trouble itself with the harmony, the manysidedness, the wholeness, of the individual development; it would admit these just as might be requisite for securing the final end.

"James Mill is not singular in his over-grasping view of the subject. The most usual subdivision of Education is into Physical, Intellectual, Moral, Religious, Technical. Now when we inquire into the meaning of Physical Education, we find it to mean the rearing of a healthy human being, by all the arts and devices of nursing

feeding, clothing, and general regimen. Mill includes this subject in his article, and Mr. Herbert Spencer devotes a very interesting chapter to it in his work on Education. It seems to me,

however, that this department may be kept quite separate, important though it be. It does not at all depend upon the principles and considerations that the educator, properly so called, has in view in the carrying on of his work. The discussion of the subject does not in any way help us in educational matters, as most commonly understood; nor does it derive any illumination from being placed side by side with the arts of the recognized teacher. The fact of bodily health or vigor is a leading postulate in bodily or mental training, but the trainer does not take upon himself to lay down the rules of hygiene.

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The inadvertence, for so I regard it, of coupling the Art of Health with Education is easily disposed of, and does not land us in any arduous controversies. Very different is another aspect of these definitions: that wherein the end of Education is propounded as the promotion of human happiness, human virtue, human perfection. Probably the qualification will at once be conceded, that Education is but one of the means, a single contributing agency to the all-including end. Nevertheless, the openings for difference. of opinion as to what constitutes happiness, virtue or perfection, are very wide. Moreover, the discussion has its proper place in Ethics and in Theology, and if brought into the field of Education, should be received under protest.

"Before entering upon the consideration of this difficulty, the greatest of all, I will advert to some of the other views of education that seem to err on the side of taking in too much. Here, I may quote from the younger Mill, who, like his father, and unlike the generality of theorists, starts more scientifico with a definition. Education, according to him, 'includes whatever we do for ourselves, and whatever is done for us by others, for the express purpose of bringing us nearer to the perfection of our nature; in its largest acceptation, it comprehends even the indirect effects produced on character and on the human faculties by things of which the direct purposes are different; by laws, by forms of government, by the industrial arts, by modes of social life; nay even by physical facts not dependent on the human will; by climate, soil, and local position.' He admits, however, that this is a very wide view of the subject, and for his own immediate purpose advances a narrower view, namely, the culture which each generation purposely gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to qualify them for at least keeping up, and if possible for raising, the improvement which has been attained.' (Inaugural Address at St. Andrew's, p. 4.)

"Besides involving the dispute as to what constitutes' perfection,' the first and larger statement is, I think, too wide for the most comprehensive Philosophy of Education. The influences exerted on the human character by climate and geographical position, by arts, laws, govern