that, so far as power is concerned, the beneficent Creator has made no distinction amongst men, that all are upon an equality, and that the only legitimate right to govern is an express grant of power from the governed.

.......

It is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit the service of that officer, at least, to whom she has entrusted the management of her foreign relations, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to a period so short, as to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not the principal-the servant, not the master. Until an amendment of the constitution can be effected, public opinion may secure the desired object. I give my aid to it by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will I consent to serve a second term."

"The pledge heretofore given," is an expression to be particularly observed. Hence it appears that the Presidents, as well as the representatives, give pledges prior to their election; submit to be interrogated by the electors, as to their opinions and future policy, and even make proposals for the surrender of a part of their official authority. This, doubtless, is to be "the servant, not the master."

But when the British Sovereign ascends the throne of his ancestors, and is crowned with sacred solemnity, he receives his great power and dignify with none other than its constitutional rights and limitations. He may resign the crown, but he cannot abdicate the monarchy. Neither can he extend or limit its prerogatives.

He is our's
T'administer, to guard, t' adorn the state,
But not to warp or change it.
We are his,
To serve him nobly in the common cause,
True to the death, but not to be his slaves.

It would be unconstitutional, therefore, and undignified

in the British monarch, to expostulate with his subjects, in long argumentative addresses. It is also unnecessary, because his ministers sit in parliament.

There is an essential difference between the position of the British Sovereign and that of the American President, as regards the connection of each with the legislature; and it is important to observe it narrowly, and to trace its consequences.

By the American constitution, "all the legislative powers are vested in Congress;" and General Harrison remarked, in the address already referred to, that " the President is not a part of the legislative power; and his privilege to recommend measures to the legislature, he holds in common with every other citizen; the only difference being, that there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended by the President; but in the obligation of ultimate decision there can be no difference." In short, if after he has published his address, or made any other recommendation to the legislature, some citizen should reply to it by a pamphlet, or a letter in the newspapers, and Congress should prefer the recommendations of the citizen to those of the President, they will adopt the one and reject the other.

If the views of the President and his ministers, on any important question, are opposed to those of the majority of Congress, and if the President exercises his veto, an open collision takes place between the executive and the legislature, as in the case of President Tyler's repeated refusals to assent to bills sanctioned by them. Several American statesmen have proposed to alter the constitution, by enabling a bare majority to set aside the President's veto, which would render it almost nugatory, and would practically amount to this, that the bill must be read again in Congress, where the same majorities that

passed it before, would generally repeat their former decision, and complete their triumph.

In England the ministers cannot long continue to conduct the affairs of the nation, in opposition to a majority of the house of commons, especially if they are unsupported by a majority of the peers. The legislature does not, as in America, absorb the executive. The relative powers of the estates of the realm are so admirably adjusted, that when they cease to act together in harmony, if a change be not made in their mutual relations, the government cannot be carried on—the machine stops.

It seems paradoxical, but it is just, because the executive has influence in the legislature, that the legislature, and through its popular branch, that the people can react on the executive, so as to determine by what party, and on what principles, the country shall be governed.

Before illustrating this beautiful and important result of the practical working of our constitution, I would dispose of an obvious objection to an hereditary monarchy,—namely, that whatever be the age, the sex, or the

character of the heir to the throne, there is no deviation from the order of succession. The force of the objection is admitted; but the reply is, that both the conduct of human life and of national affairs often present only a choice of difficulties. The objections to an elective monarchy in this country are insuperable. The other alternative is an hereditary monarchy, and how are its lesser and incidental evils compensated?

Let it be supposed, that instead of a man of mature age and experience, and of superior talent, the British Sovereign, on succeeding to the throne, should be young and amiable, but inexperienced. In the old

*See page 101.

feudal times, it is probable that one or more powerful barons would virtually have ruled the kingdom. But now, the young monarch would be surrounded by the ministers that were in office at the time of the royal demise, and must at first be guided by their counsels. The parliament and the nation would jealously watch their conduct. Supposing their measures to be impolitic and injurious, the Sovereign might be kept in ignorance of their evil tendency. The just complaints of faithful statesmen and loyal subjects might seldom penetrate the guarded avenues of the palace, or might be represented there as the cry of a faction. Must the nation hopelessly submit to a long period of misrule? If the legislature were in the main sound and uncorrupted, and the people not besotted and blind to their real welfare, the remedy would not be long delayed, and it would be effectual. Parliament would modify or reject the bad and unconstitutional measures of the ministers, and forewarn them that their power was on the wane. Perseverance in their disastrous policy would involve defeat on some important cabinet question. The voice of the constitution, echoed by the country, would proclaim and repeat the unwelcome word,"resign." If deaf to the call, opposing parliamentary majorities would resist their progress, and compel them to advise the Sovereign to dissolve parliament. The prevailing sentiments of the nation would then be expressed in a general election, and if that public verdict were condemnatory of their policy, the ministers would be forced, however reluctantly, to quit their places, and surrender their misused power.

it

The case supposed is not an improbable one, though may be of rare occurrence in our modern history. It well illustrates the power of the constitution to rectify incidental evils. Or if a King, more skilled by age and experience to govern the empire, should perceive that

his ministers were steering the vessel of the state on a wrong and perilous tack, it would be his prerogative at once to appoint others to take the helm.

What better proof can there be of the admirable manner in which the British monarchy is both upheld and limited by constitutional right and liberty, than the quiet succession, the peaceful and happy reign of our young and beloved Queen? In any but the best ordered state, how perilous would be the devolution of the sovereignty of an immense empire into the hands of a minor and a female. But here, the throne, sustained by justice and righteousness, stands firm on the broad and stable foundation of wise institutions, and is guarded by the best affections of a free people. The coward's villainous attempt to harm the sacred person of his Sovereign, or to hurt her feelings, only serves to display her noble heroism, and to strengthen our attachment the more, while it draws down upon himself a nation's indignant resentment. Whether she passes through the crowded streets of her capital, or among the mountain wilds of Caledonia, her glad subjects welcome her with chivalrous loyalty and love. The storms of party strife, that sometimes shake the vigorous boughs of our deeply-rooted oak, stir not that slender stem, on which England's queenly rose blooms gracefully, unruffled, and secure.

But dangers may lurk even here, and let us mark from what quarter they are most likely to come.

The two branches of the British legislature check each other by the mutual right of rejecting the bills which originate in either house,—both are influenced, and may be checked by the executive, and the executive is checked by the legislature. Owing to this admirable contrivance, none of the powers of the state is absolute, and they can only move together and in concert. While each retains its due share of authority,