harmony will be preserved. The parliament will legislate with freedom, and the executive will act with vigour. The executive can only obtain the immense supplies necessary for carrying on the government, by means of a vote of the house of commons. Therefore, when ministers cannot command a majority in that assembly, they are powerless, and the King must soon appoint successors who can, or in other words, whose principles and policy are approved by that majority. The King can only govern through his ministers. To be convinced that the popular branch of the legislature must triumph, in a contest with the executive, we need not go back to the days of Charles I., when the then great and arbitrary power of the monarch was annihilated, and the sceptre was broken by the giant mace of the house of commons; nor even to the time of his popish successor, James II., who was quietly deposed by a great and bloodless and glorious revolution. The events of our own times of greater freedom and tranquillity shew plainly what must be the inevitable result of every such conflict.

The royal veto on the proceedings of parliament has not been exercised since the revolution: the executive could not, by means of the veto, withstand the encroachments of the legislature. The power of the executive mainly consists in the influence of the crown, exercised through the minister and his adherents in the house of commons.

Prior to the reform bill it was exercised directly by the nomination of a certain number of members to represent treasury boroughs; and indirectly by the disposal of the honours and patronage of the crown, which influenced the nomination of other members representing limited constituencies, or attached them to the government. The influence of the crown did not enable the cabinet to command an absolute majority of

the house. When the great body of representatives were decidedly opposed to the measures of the cabinet, the measures, if obnoxious to the house and to public opinion, were abandoned, or the ministers were forced to resign. Before matters came to that issue, those proceedings were often modified by the views and opinions elicited by discussion. But when the majority of the house was decidedly with the minister, or when its unbiassed decisions would nearly hang in the balance, those votes on which every minister, at the formation of his cabinet, could depend, almost as certainly as on the votes of the cabinet itself, enabled him to carry through his measures, and to follow out the general plan of his government.

This was a very important power, and if wisely, honestly, and ably exercised, it afforded great advantages for the government of our empire, with its complicated and manifold interests, foreign, colonial, and domestic.

There were strong and very effectual checks to the improper use of this power of the minister. For he is generally a commoner, and with his colleagues depends on the Sovereign, the parliament, and the electors, for his continuance in office, and is liable to impeachment for any flagrant abuse of authority; his reputation for wisdom, integrity, and talent, are hourly at stake, in a country where public opinion has the greatest weight, and public men and measures undergo the strictest scrutiny. The house of commons would by itself be incompetent to the conduct of affairs in ordinary times, how much more so in those emergencies when the utmost dispatch, secresy, and energy, are necessary; when every thing may be marred by wasting time in the endeavour to sway a large and mixed assembly, by the motives and reasons that urge the ministers to a prompt and unanimous decision. At

such critical periods, the wisdom, the energy, the judicious, and consistent management of a cabinet of upright and able men, are invaluable. What confidence have the nation felt in times of foreign and domestic trouble, knowing that the strong hand of a minister, in whose integrity and skill they relied, firmly grasped the helm of affairs, that his undaunted eye was directed to the landmarks of our venerated institutions, and the polestar of our safety.

The electoral system was, doubtless, susceptible of much improvement, by transferring the franchise from some of the decayed boroughs to flourishing towns, and by obviating various abuses. Those ameliorations, too long delayed, were introduced by the reform bill, together with other changes, materially affecting the constitution of the legislature and its relations with the executive. It can no longer be truly affirmed " that the power of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." The constitution has rather been endangered from another quarter,-by a transference of power from the executive to the majority of the house of commons, which at all times can arrest the arm of the executive by causing the dismissal of ministers and effecting a change of policy. The ministers may be of first rate talent, and their plans and proceedings may be wise, comprehensive, and consistent. But when parties are nearly balanced, any particular class, interest, or faction, under an adroit and persevering leader, commanding a certain number of votes in the lower house, may seriously thwart the measures of government. Thus the cabinet, in order to gain the support of some adverse party and retain office, might be tempted to abandon or modify good measures, to concur in injurious ones, and to yield up the constitution, piecemeal, to skilful aggression. The faction thus made stronger by every concession, which weak

I

ened the executive, might repeat their assaults and conquer by instalments. A dispassionate consideration of the course of affairs during the last ten or twelve years may convince us that these dangers are not imaginary.

When the reform bill passed, the opinion prevailed that the treasury and nomination boroughs were a blemish, and they were abolished. Such is now the constitution, and in tracing its modern history I merely wish to shew the practical effect of their removal.

Some of the brightest ornaments of the senate and firmest friends of constitutional freedom, who might otherwise have been unable to enter parliament, were returned for close boroughs; and their distinguished services, formerly unknown to the public, were thus secured to their country in the prime of their manhood and their genius. That advantage at least could not be denied to the nomination boroughs, by the most fervent hater of Boroughbridge, or of Old Sarum,—

Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,

Wore yet a precious jewel in his head."

But now, the prime minister is actually restricted as to the choice of a cabinet, by the difficulty of finding seats in parliament for all whom he is desirous to have as members of his administration. Formerly there was no such difficulty, and he could also secure the aid of a few auxiliaries, to strengthen his position against any faction commanding votes enough to perplex and defeat the plans of the administration, by turning the scale when parties were nearly balanced. The legitimate use of that influence of the minister, in the lower house, was to render the government superior to cabals and particular interests, to enable it to be energetic, yet not arbitrary. It was a power somewhat liable to abuse. What power is not? But it was

entrusted to the chosen and responsible servants of the crown. Were it now to fall into the hands of factious leaders, it would be used wrongfully, irresponsibly, and with impunity.

If the preceding remarks have been sufficiently clear, it will be seen, that by the passing of the reform bill, a transference of considerable power has been made from the executive to the popular branch of the legislature, to be exercised by its fluctuating majorities.

Whether the executive shall be able to maintain even its present relative position, must depend on the future constitution of the house of commons. If the legitimate influence of property, character, and intelligence, in the electoral system, shall not be further and excessively diminished, then, through the good sense of the nation, their just ideas of liberty, and their strong and judicious attachment to the national institutions, our limited monarchy may continue to flourish-then the reciprocal influence of the three great powers of the state may yet be maintained-the executive may continue to act with vigour and the people to enjoy well regulated freedom.

It will tend to so desirable a result, if the old tory and the modern whig shall both abate their prejudices -if men of character and intelligence, to whatever sect or party they belong, shall happily learn to be more tolerant of each other, by respecting the rights of conscience, and making due allowance for the effect of circumstances and education on the minds of other men. Thus, without any compromise of truth, or any violation of liberty, Christian charity and mutual forbearance may subdue those discordant, imperious, and hostile feelings, by the indulgence of which, the permanent safety, peace, and happiness, of all, must be sacrificed to the bigotry of a few.

If, on the contrary, the parliamentary constituencies