These are palpable instances of democratic violence and caprice of the instability and weakness of the federal government. It may continue to exist, while the interests of the different states essentially harmonize with each other, and so long as they are enabled to avoid long and expensive wars. But if circumstances should arise to produce a collision between the states, and if one or more of them should determine to prosecute their own plans and interests in opposition to the rest, it may be inferred from what has formerly happened, that the central government would be unable to controul them, and to prevent a virtual or actual dissolution of the union. That result, in M. De Tocqueville's opinion, would very probably occur, in the event of a protracted war. "The United States," he observes, "are singularly happy, not in having a federal constitution which enables them to carry on great wars, but in a geographical position which renders war improbable." And after admiring the enviable lot of nations that can avail themselves of the advantages of a federal government, he adds:-"I do not believe,

standing a declaration that she repudiates them? No, gentlemen, repudiation can do nothing but add disrepute to an acknowledgment of inability to pay. It is our duty to arouse the public mind to this subject. People say that the Europeans ought to make a distinction between the states and the general government. Very true-so they ought; but what then? Are not they all emanations from the same source? And if the states repudiate, may not a European well ask, how long before the general government, the work of the same hands, will do so likewise? Fellow-citizens, this is a stain which we ought to feel more than a wound, and the time has come for the people to address themselves soberly and seriously to the removal of the disgrace. If the doctrine preached in Congress be true, that the public lands are the property of the states-then we have a spot of beginning, then we have a chance by law to induce the states to save their credit and honour."

however, that a union of states could maintain a long contest with a nation of similar resources, whose government ruled with concentrated authority. A nation which in the presence of the great military monarchies of Europe should subdivide its sovereignty, would in my opinion by that very act abdicate its power, and perhaps its existence and its name."

The Americans, like all free nations, are capable of very great warlike efforts, of which they gave proof during their struggle for independence. But a democracy is ill adapted to sustain such exertions with constancy, and for a length of time. The sovereign people are most reluctant to impose upon themselves the heavy burdens and severe privations of protracted warfare. "The relative weakness of democracies in critical periods," observes M. De Tocqueville, "is perhaps the greatest obstacle to the establishment of a republic in Europe. It could only hope to preserve its independence, by the surrounding states becoming democratic likewise. If a republic could prolong its existence for a century, it would probably become at last more wealthy, more populous, and more prosperous than the neighbouring kingdoms; but (and here the monosyllable is all-important) but it would be in danger all the while of being subdued by them." In short, when this fair and flourishing young republic had grown to a proper size and condition, the French or the Russian eagle would probably seize and devour the tempting prey.

If since the American constitution was remodelled and re-established in the year 1789, Great Britain had been a republic, how different now might have been her condition, and also the destiny of the other nations of Europe. When we review the history of that eventful period, and trace the desolating course of the French armies, under the reign of the Jacobins and

the military tyranny of Napoleon Buonaparte, through Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal, to the banks of the Nile, and to burning Moscow; when we remember the strenuous efforts of that ambitious conqueror to destroy British commerce, and to plant his standard on the shores of this island, sacred to liberty, and long unpolluted by the feet of hostile armies; when we recollect how that invader, thirsting for universal dominion, trampled upon the rights of sovereigns and subjects, and disposed of crowns and sceptres at will; and when we turn again to behold our country collected, enduring, undaunted, while nations sank around her, exhausted, in the bloody fray-till at length she drove the tyrant's host from Spain, and with victory on her helm, led the embattled ranks of freedom to the gates of Paris; when we see her once more, defeating the imperial armies, and their chief returned from exile; hurling him from an usurped throne, and securing glorious and lasting peace for the world, at Waterloo;— after reviewing these so memorable events, who can doubt, that if the characteristic fickleness and insubordination of democracy had then divided the councils and enfeebled the energies of our country, Great Britain would have become a French province, and Europe would have been enslaved.

A gracious Providence has clothed this highly favoured nation with the complete armour of a constitution, which combines the greatest freedom of the subject with the utmost energy in the executive government; which gives full scope to the indomitable spirit of a free people, and wields the concentrated power of a mighty monarchy. Thus liberty and right have triumphed, under the British banner; and if ever we surrender that constitution, at faction's bidding, we shall throw away the ample shield of our defence, and yield the glorious ensign under which our fathers conquered.

ELECTIVE FRANCHISE-LEGISLATIVE

ASSEMBLIES.

LECTURE III.

Instability of laws in America-Equality-The ballot-Universal suffrage-Pledged delegates and free representatives -House of Representatives-House of Commons-Senate -House of Lords.

FOR the important function of making laws, the British constitution aims to employ the collective wisdom and authority of the state, under such checks and safeguards as are admirably calculated to prevent rash and arbitrary legislation. Every law must receive the independent approbation and assent of the house of commons, of the house of lords, and of the sovereign. It must be introduced into both houses of parliament with due notice; the bill must be read a first, a second, and a third time, in both houses; subject to debate, amendment, or rejection, at any stage of its progress. The art of man has not contrived any thing superior to this system, for the preservation of just prerogative and genuine liberty, and the enactment of wise and salutary

measures.

The important business of legislation requires to be conducted deliberately, dispassionately, with knowledge, wisdom, and talent; and that would be impossible in

promiscuous and irresponsible assemblies of the people. Hence the necessity for the representative system, an improvement so manifest and so generally acknowledged in modern times, that it has been adopted even in democratic states.

The character of the representative assembly must depend in a great measure on the period for which the members are elected, and on the manner of their election.

In this country the parliament is generally dissolved shortly before the expiry of the statutory period of seven years. Of late, owing to the frequent changes of ministry and other causes, the actual duration of parliaments has been much abridged.

According to the theory of the constitution, the members of the house of commons are the representatives of the various classes of the community. The duration of parliament is such as to enable them to become conversant with public affairs, and accustomed to the forms and business of the house. They enjoy perfect liberty of speech, and are entitled to give an honest vote, after debate and according to their own judgment.

In these respects they are distinguished from mere deputies or delegates influenced by popular passions and prejudices, and pledged beforehand to vote as certain electors have dictated.

The nature and extent of the elective franchise, and the manner of voting for members of parliament in this country, are too well known to require explanation.

In the United States the houses of representatives of the several states and of Congress are chosen annually or biennially, and for the most part by universal suffrage and by ballot. Let us consider the effect of this system in America.

M. De Tocqueville has observed that owing to the