perpetuating and abusing its great power, as the Long Parliament did in the reign of Charles the First.

The President is personally responsible for the measures of his ministers. But in England, the person of the Sovereign is deemed sacred and inviolable, while his ministers are made responsible for their acts, done in his name.

The President cannot conclude treaties without the sanction of two-thirds of the senate. Like the British Monarch, he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy; but the American army consists only of about six thousand regular soldiers, and its navy is much less numerous than ours.

The President's veto is only suspensive. If he objects to any measure of Congress, he may send it back, with his objections, to the house where it originated, to be reconsidered. If two-thirds of that house agree to pass the bill, it is sent to the other house, and if there also it is approved by two-thirds, the bill becomes law.

It is consistent with the high dignity of the British Sovereign, that his veto should be absolute. But it is a power vested in him for extraordinary occasions, and in the admirable working of our constitution, the struggle is made in parliament, and is decided without having recourse to the royal veto.

The American President is elected for four years only. He is not directly chosen by the people, nor yet by Congress; but by delegates specially appointed, as follows.-The whole body of electors choose as many delegates as they return representatives to Congress: these delegates do not assemble together, but vote in their respective states. Three candidates may be proposed, and he who has the majority of votes is appointed the President. If no one candidate has a majority, the house of representatives at Washington determine which of the three shall be elected. This arrangement has

been admirably contrived, to produce the least possible excitement and delay in the choice of the supreme magistrate-for the President is only a chief magistrate, and the executive power is almost wholly absorbed by the representatives of the people in Congress. This evil was apprehended by the ablest and wisest of the statesmen who framed the constitution. General Hamilton, in the Federalist, a masterly work, to which he was the chief contributor, in treating of the tendency of the popular branch of the legislature to absorb every other, says, "In governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible." The history of his country, since the decease of that wise and patriotic statesman, has evinced his foresight.

The official authority of the American President is only the shadow of regal power. He must have respect to local and sectional interests, in the appointment of the ministers of state, and consequently is not free to choose the best. The ministers are jealously excluded from Congress.

But in England it is considered necessary that the cabinet ministers should sit in parliament, and be conversant with all its proceedings. They must be ready to explain and defend their measures, before a vigilant and active opposition, zealous to expose every error, fraud, and inconsistency of the party in power. Nothing but sterling talent and integrity-a wise, constitutional, and vigorous course of policy, can stand the test of this public scrutiny, which affords a most powerful motive to the faithful and laborious discharge of ministerial duties, and the best possible safeguard against corruption, negligence, and incapacity.

But the American ministers of state are required to burrow in their government offices. For high crimes and misdemeanours they may be impeached, while minor official delinquencies may escape detection and punish

ment. Mr. Fearon relates that his brother radical, the well known Wm. Cobbett, declared that during the several years which he resided near the Treasury, in London, he "did not witness so much bribery, corruption, and place hunting, as he had seen in one week in Pennsylvania." Mr. Fearon says, although he cannot go the length of Mr. Cobbett and his friend, in their wholesale censures, perhaps from not having had the same opportunity with them of forming a judgment, Yet I have become acquainted with facts in Washington, which no man could have induced me to believe without personal observation." And Mr. Buckingham, a very recent traveller, who has visited many other foreign countries, says, "In no country which I have visited, has such an array of delinquencies committed by men in confidential public situations been exhibited, as has met my eye since I came to the United States."

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The communications of the American ministers with Congress are not made orally, but in writing. Consequently, unprofitable debates often arise, for want of such immediate explanations as our ministers are called upon to give, in their places in parliament. And further, by a practical alteration of the American constitution, Congress has assumed in a great measure the power of the officers of state. The committees of the British house of commons do not exercise functions not properly belonging to the house itself. They are appointed to investigate various public questions and private bills, and they report to the house the result of their investigations. But the American Congress appoints committees for finance, for foreign affairs, and other departments of the executive government, from which the ministers who have charge of them are excluded. Those committees manage, in a great measure, the business of the country; and bills brought into Congress without their approbation, would probably

not pass. In the United States then, the President and his ministers are excluded from the legislature and its committees, which absorb the essential power of the executive.

But in Great Britain the ministers form the government,―are constitutionally checked by the parliament, and are responsible to the nation. To the scrutiny and decision of parliament-to the observation of the country, and the discussion of a free press-all their measures are openly submitted; and thus the executive and the legislature work together with fewer abuses, with more effect, and with greater harmony.

The President of the United States may be re-elected. To prohibit this would be to deprive the nation in many cases of the services of a man of talent, after they had become more valuable by his experience. But the defects of the American executive are still more obvious on the second election of the President, to secure which he is allured to mingle in the intrigues of his partizans to stoop to popular arts-to fetter himself with pledges and promises-to misemploy his power and patronage, and to govern with a view to gain the suffrages by which his term of authority may be prolonged. The constitution has placed him in the situation of a tenant at will, who is anxious to renew his lease of office; it tempts him to act in the spirit of the unjust steward in the sacred parable-"I am resolved what to do, that when I am put out of the stewardship they may receive me into their houses."

As regards the President, his ministers and the American statesmen generally, the tendency of this system is unfavourable to comprehensive and farsighted plans of government,-to an independent, generous, and noble course of conduct,―to legislation for the best and highest interests of the community and of posterity. Such is its tendency, though upright and distinguished men may resist it.

Long previous to the election of a President, the nation is occupied in preparing for the event, and the course of government is for awhile arrested. Mr. Jefferson wrote to a friend, about six weeks before the expiration of his term of office, that, beyond the expression of his opinion, he took no part in public affairs, deeming it right to allow his successor to begin those measures of which he must superintend the execution. And the ministers, and other officers appointed by the President, go out along with him. The President's is the most important and the most agitating of all the elections. The United States are convulsed every four years by that political earthquake, which in countries less favourably situated would be very disastrous in its effects, and is less injurious in America only in consequence of its immense extent, and its remoteness from Europe. The American chancellor Kent has observed that if ever the peace of the union is to be "jeopardised by the struggle for power, it will be upon this very subject of the election of the President."

But the annual and biennial elections of the representatives in Congress, and the members of the several state legislatures, keep up the excitement of party strife, whose concentrated violence bursts forth at that great political crisis. Here, therefore, I shall state all I have to say on the subject of the American elections generally.

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The President's election of 1828 was thus alluded to by Governor Clinton, in his annual message to the legislature, quoted in Captain Hall's Travels. Party spirit has entered the recesses of retirement, violated the sanctity of female character, invaded the tranquillity of private life, and visited with severe inflictions the peace of families. Neither elevation nor humility has been spared, nor the charities of life, nor distinguished public services, nor the fire-side, nor