with, assuming the bill to be true, was as to the statements in her inventory and her account when she resigned as administratrix, and her statement to appellant that if he conducted his father's business she would see that the proceeds from such business should ultimately accrue to his interest. We do not think these facts, as alleged in the bill, were such as to relieve appellant of the charge of negligence or laches in failing to investigate the record and find what had been done in the county court proceedings on the sale of the lands to pay debts. Where the facts stated in the bill are not such as to amount to fraud, a demurrer thereto does not admit fraud, and the allegations of fraud are to be construed most strongly against the pleader. We do not think, under the reasoning of this court in Stow v. Russell, 36 Ill. 18, Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 Ill. 557, 25 N. E. 660, and State v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814, that the specific allegations in this bill are of such a nature as to relieve appellant against the defense of laches. As Act June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744), providing that in all cases where a majority of the inhabitants of any contiguous and compact territory voted at any election called for that purpose in favor of organizing such territory into a high school district, and when, at a subsequent election similary called and held, a board of education has been chosen, each such election is made legal and valid, and such territory legally and validly organized and established as a high school district, and that all acts and proceedings theretofore done by such district and the persons from time to time elected and acting as board of education thereof are legal and valid in all respects, validated the high June 5, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505), and it also school district in question organized under Act validated a tax levied by its officers, where the proceedings for the assessment and collection of the tax had not been concluded by a judgment and sale of the property before the curative act became effective, as the validation of the district also had the effect of validating every act of the board of education which under the general school laws boards of education are empowered to perform. 2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 106 SCHOOL TAX ORGANIZATION OF ASSESSING BOARD-COLLATERAL ATTACK. [8] Counsel for appellees insist that no recovery can be had in this case because Otto W. Balgemann, administrator de bonis non, was not made a party, and that this question can be raised by demurrer. Flannery v. People, 225 Ill. 62, 80 N. E. 60; Conway v. Sex- In proceedings for the enforcement of deton, 243 Ill. 59, 90 N. E. 203. Appellant in-linquent taxes levied by a board of education, the contention that the board was organized be sists that Balgemann was not a necessary fore the time of the election of its members canparty, as no fraud was charged against him. not be urged against the legality of its organizaFrom the facts averred in the amended bill tion, where the board acted as thus organized after the election. it seems necessarily to follow that if there was any fraud in the sale of the land the administrator de bonis non must have been a party to such fraud, and therefore we think he would have to be made a party before said administrator's deed could be set aside and the sale declared for naught. In the state of this record we think the conclusion necessarily follows that the circuit court rightly dismissed the bill for want of equity. The decree of that court will therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed. On Petition for Rehearing. Petition for rehearing will be denied. Dunn, Cartwright, and Duncan, JJ., dissent. Appeal from Knox County Court; R. C. Rice, Judge. Application by the People, on relation of Henry G. Hawkinson, County Collector, for judgment and order of sale against the property of George S. Mathews, for delinquent taxes levied in a certain school district. From the judgment rendered, Mathews appeals. Affirmed. Fletcher Carney, James W. Carney, and Sig. B. Nelson, all of Galesburg, for appellant. A. J. Boutelle, of Galesburg, State's Atty. (Roy M. Marsh, of Galesburg, of counsel), for appellee. COOKE, J. The county collector of Knox county applied to the county court for judgment and order of sale against the property of George S. Mathews for delinquent taxes levied by township high school district No. 121, which was organized in 1916 under the Township High School Act of June 5, 1911. The objection made to the tax was that the act under which the pretended organization was had was unconstitutional, and the tax levied was therefore void. Pending the hearing in the county court, and before judgment was entered, the curative act of June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744), was passed and became effective. Being of the opinion that this act validated the organization of the district and the tax it had levied, the county court overruled the objection and entered judgment. From that judgment this appeal has been perfected. quiring the submission of the question of making such subscription to a vote of the people of the town, because the act of the General Assembly attempting to validate the subscription would have the effect of creating a debt against the town, in violation of the Constitution of 1848. In the other cases we held that a void tax cannot be validated after the proceedings for the assessment and collection of the tax have been concluded by a judgment and sale of the property. In this case the curative act was passed and became effective before judgment was entered, and it did not have the effect of creating a debt against any municipal corporation. The act therefore applied, and determined the judgment to be entered. [2] The point is made that it appears from the record of the board of education that the board met and organized before the time of the election of its members. This is undoubtedly a clerical error, as counsel for appellee contend; but in any event the board acted as thus organized after the members were elected, and appellant cannot urge this ground against the legality of the organization in this proceeding. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. The two principal questions urged, and the ones which are decisive of the case, are that the curative act of June 14, 1917, is unconstitutional, and that a void tax cannot be validated by legislative act. We have heretofore considered the question of the constitutionality of the curative act of June 14, 1917, and have held the act to be valid. People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96, 117 N. E. 493; People v. Dix, 280 Ill. 158, 117 N. E. 496; People v. Howell, 280 Ill. 477, 117 N. E. 793; People v. Fifer, 280 Ill. 506, 117 N. E. 790; People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, 117 N. E. 784. [1] By the act of June 14, 1917, it was provided that in all cases where a majority of the inhabitants of any contiguous and compact territory voted, at any election called for that purpose, in favor of organizing such territory into a high school district, and when, at a subsequent election similarly called and held, a board of education has been chosen for such district, each such election is made legal and valid, and such territory is declared legally and validly organized and established as a high school district, and a valid and existing school district and body politic and corporate of the state DUNN, CARTWRIGHT, and DUNCAN, for the purpose of establishing and main- JJ. (dissenting). Sections 9 and 10 of article taining a high school. The board of educa- 9 of the Constitution provide that the Gention levied the tax in question prior to the eral Assembly may vest the corporate aupassage of the curative act. That act vali- thorities of cities, towns, and villages with dated the organization of the district, and power to make local improvements by spethe tax in question was thereby necessarily cial assessments, or by special taxation of validated. The act specifically provides, fur- contiguous property, or otherwise, and that ther, that all acts and proceedings thereto- for all other corporate purposes all municifore done, had, or performed by each such pal corporations may be vested with authordistrict, and the persons from time to time ity to assess and collect taxes, and that the elected and acting as the board of educa- General Assembly shall not impose taxes tion thereof, such as are authorized to be upon municipal corporations, or the inhabidone, had, or performed by school districts tants or property thereof, for corporate puror boards of education thereof by the gen- poses. These sections prohibit the General eral school laws of this state, are declared Assembly from imposing taxes on the people to be legal and valid in all respects. As of any district or granting power to do so held in the cases above cited, the General to any other than corporate authorities of Assembly had the power to validate such the district to be taxed, and the corporate high school districts. The act validating the authorities intended are such municipal offidistrict also had the effect of validating ev-cers as have been elected directly by the peoery act of the board of education which, un-ple of the district or appointed in some mode der the general school laws, boards of edu- to which the people of the district have givcation are empowered to do and perform. en their consent. Updike v. Wright, 81 Ill. In support of the contention that this tax 49; Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372; Wetherell is void, and cannot be validated by legisla- v. Devine, 116 Ill. 631, 6 N. E. 24; Herschtive act, appellant relies upon Marsh v. bach v. Kaskaskia Island Sanitary District, Chesnut, 14 Ill. 223, Billings v. Detten, 15 265 Ill. 388, 106 N. E. 942. Since the act of Ill. 218, Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82, 87 Am. 1911 was unconstitutional, the attempt to Dec. 240, and Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. organize township high school district No. 218. In the last-mentioned case we held 121 was ineffectual, and did not establish a that the General Assembly could not vali- high school district. Since there was no indate the subscription of a town to the cap- corporation there could be no corporate auital stock of a railroad corporation where thorities. The supposed board of education the subscription had not been authorized by in levying taxes was acting without authora vote of the people of the town at an elec-ity of law, and the tax which it purported !c tion held in accordance with a statute re-levy was void, and imposed no liability on the people of the district. Such supposeding cases, the court announced its conclusion board of education having no power to levy that: a tax, the Legislature was without power, "These cases show it to be the settled docunder the Constitution, to pass a law render- trine of this court that under the Constitution ing the void proceeding by which it attempt-nicipal corporation to incur a debt for merely of 1848 the Legislature could not compel a mued to do so, valid. The power of the Legis- local purposes against its own wishes, and this lature to validate by a curative law any pro- doctrine, as already remarked, has received the ceedings which it might have authorized in sanction of express enactment in our existing advance is limited to cases of the irregular tive act under consideration, and it was thereConstitution. That was the effect of the curaexercise of power. It cannot cure the want fore void," of authority to act at all or confirm what it In our judgment the act of June 14, 1917, could not originally have authorized. People so far as it purports to legalize and validate v. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co., 219 Ill. the proceedings of the board of education, 94, 76 N. E. 80. Since the supposed board whose members have not been elected by the of education was not the corporate authority people of the district or appointed in any of a high school district it had no power to manner to which they have consented, in levy a tax, and the Legislature had no power levying taxes, is beyond the legislative powto validate its void attempt to do so. Sec-er, and imposes no liability upon the taxtion 1 of the act of 1917 provides that "the payers of the district, and the judgment of board of education acting for each such dis-the county court should be reversed. trict is hereby declared to be the duly constituted corporate authority thereof," and it is by this legislative declaration only, and not by an election by the people of the district, or in any other mode to which they have given their consent, that such corporate authorities have been appointed. The situation here is not different from that in the case of Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218. There an election to vote upon the question of subscribing for $15,000 of stock in a railroad company and issuing bonds to pay for it was held in a township without authority of law. It was held that this was an utterly void proceeding. After the election the Legislature passed an act which purported to legalize and confirm the election and declared it to be binding upon the township. The court said that this law, if valid, had the effect of creating a debt of $15,000 against the township, and that the subscription to the bonds, if binding, became so for the first time at the passage of the law and was so solely by force of the law. It was stated that the real question did not depend merely upon whether the Legislature could pass a retrospective law, but upon whether it could create a debt against a town. The court said: The so "It cannot be said that the town has ever conIsented to the creation of this debt. called vote was an idle form. Persons opposed to the subscription were under no necessity or obligation to vote against it because they had a right to regard the entire proceeding as a nullity. The vote can no more be accepted as the action of the town, or as giving the consent of the town to the creation of this debt, than would a resolution adopted by the same number of persons at one of their dwellings or in a casual encounter at a street corner." Coming to the question whether the Legislature could create a debt against a municipal corporation for municipal purposes, the court held that the Constitution of 1870 expressly prohibits this, and that the decisions of the court substantially held that it could not be done under the Constitution of 1848. After quoting the latter Constitution and cit (282 I11. 16) PEOPLE ex rel. FLICK, County Collector, v. KESSLER et al. (No. 11762.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 19, 1917.) EVIDENCE 29-JUDICIAL NOTICE-LAW OF STATE. Though the only reason urged for reversal of the judgment holding void the tax of a high school district sought to be enforced is that the district was a corporation de facto, and that its corporate existence could not be questioned in such a collateral proceeding, the court will take judicial notice of the act (Laws 1917, p. 744) passed and becoming effective pending the application below, validating the organization; and so validating the tax. Cartwright, Dunn, and Duncan, JJ., dissent ing. Appeal from La Salle County Court; Henry Mayo, Judge. Proceeding by the People, on the relation of William C. Flick, County Collector, against Walter Kessler and others. From an adverse judgment the People appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions. George S. Wiley, State's Atty., of Ottowa (George W. Hunt, of Hennepin, and Butters & Clark, of Ottowa, of counsel), for the People. COOKE, J. The application of the county collector of La Salle county for judgment against the lands of appelles for the taxes of township high school district No. 535 of Putnam county was denied, and the People appealed. The high school district was organized under the unconstitutional act of 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505), and the objection was made that it had no authority to levy taxes. While the only reason urged by counsel for appellant for a reversal of the judgment is that the high school district was a corporation de facto, and its corporate existence could not be questioned in a collateral proceeding to collect taxes levied by it, we will take notice of the curative act of June 14, 1 CARTWRIGHT, DUNN, and DUNCAN, (282 III. 22) CARTER, C. J. In 1914 Palestine Township high school district No. 202 was organized. In 203 was organized. Both of these districts were 1915 Oblong Township high school district No. organized under the law of 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505). Thereafter each proceeded to elect a president and board of education, each procured a site and erected a high school building, each issued bonds and made levies to pay the bonds, and each employed teachers and had schools during one school year. This was an application to collect taxes to pay the expenses of each of these high, schools of said school districts. objections were overruled in the county court, and judgment entered against the property of appellant. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted. The There seems to have been no proceeding started to test the validity of either of these districts before the passage of the so-called cura PEOPLE ex rel. PATTERSON, County Col-tive act of June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744). lector, v. WABASH RY. CO. (No. 11728.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 19, 1917.) Appeal from Livingston County Court; B. R. Thompson, Judge. Application by the People, on relation of W. A. Patterson, County Collector, for judgment and order of sale against the property of the Wabash Railway Company for delinquent taxes levied in a certain school district. From the judgment rendered, the Railway Company appeals. Affirmed. Bert W. Adsit, of Pontiac (N. S. Brown, of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for appellant. J. H. McFadden, State's Atty., of Pontiac, for appellee. COOKE, J. The county collector of Livingston county made application to the county court for judgment and order of sale against the property of the Wabash Railway Company for delinquent taxes levied for high school district No. 190, in Livingston county. This high school district was organized under the act of June 5, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505), and objection was made to the taxes on the ground that that act was unconstitutional and void. During the pendency of the application, and before the entry of judgment, the curative act of June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744), was passed and became effective. Regarding that act as decisive, and as having legalized the organization of the district, the county court overruled the objection and entered judgment and order of sale against the property of the Wabash Railway Company. This appeal is from that judgment. The questions presented here are the same as chose presented in People v. Mathews (No. 11785) 118 N. E. 491, and for the reasons there given the judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. It is argued at length by appellant that the curative act is unconstitutional. All the questions so raised by counsel have been passed on adversely by this court in several cases. People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96, 117 N. E. 493; People v. Fifer, 280 Ill. 506, 117 N. E. 790; People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, 117 N. E. 784; People v. Mathews (No. 11785) 118 N. E. 491. Under these decisions the curative act was held to validate high school districts organized, as these were, under the act of 1911. The judgment of the county court must therefore be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. CARTWRIGHT, DUNN, and DUNCAN, JJ., dissent. (282 111. 25) PEOPLE ex rel. PATTERSON, County Col- Application by the People, on the relation of W. A. Patterson, County Collector, for judgment against the lands of E. P. Colravy and others for certain taxes. The court sustained objections to the application, and relator appeals. Reversed and remanded with directions. J. H. McFadden, of Pontiac (H. G. Greenebaum, of Pontiac, of counsel), for appellant. Thomas Kennedy, of Minonk, and F. A. Ortman, S. R. Baker, and Bert W. Adsit, all of Pontiac, for appellees. CARTWRIGHT, DUNN, and DUNCAN, JJ., ty collector for judgment against their lands for dissent. (282 III. 23) PEOPLE ex rel. HOLMES, County Collector, Application by the People, on relation of Orlin G. Holmes, County Collector, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, to collect taxes of a certain school district. From the judgment rendered, the Railroad Company appeals. Affirmed. John G. Drennan, of Chicago, and Parker & Crowley, of Robinson, for appellant. Charles E. Jones. State's Atty., Newlin, Parker & Newlin, and Jones & Lowe, all of Robinson, for appellee. COOKE, J. The county court of Livingston county on June 16, 1917, sustained the objections of appellees to the application of the countaxes levied in 1916 by high school district No. 250, on the ground that the district was not a corporation de jure or de facto, having been or- . ganized under the unconstitutional High School Act of 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505). During the pendency of the application, and before the entry of judgment, the curative act of June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744), was passed and became effective. The questions presented here are the same as those presented in People v. Mathews (No. 11785) 118 N. E. 491, and for the reasons there given the judgment of the county court is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to overrule the objections. Reversed and remanded, with directions. (282 III. 17) Dec. 19, 1917.) PEOPLE ex rel. HAUGENS, County Collec- CURATIVE STATUTE Act June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744), validating school districts organized under Act 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505), which was unconstitutional, is constitutional. election called for the purpose by the county superintendent of schools, in favor of the organization of such territory into a high school district, and boards of education elect22-ed at an election subsequently called for the purpose of electing boards of education were declared to be valid boards, and their acts legal and valid in all respects. We have held that enactment valid as to all districts coming within its provisions. People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96, 117 N. E. 493; People v. Fifer, 280 Ill. 506, 117 N. E. 790; People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, 117 N. E. 784. Whether this high school district came within the provisions of the act of 1917 cannot be inquired into in this proceeding. Trumbo v. People, 75 Ill. 561; People v. Dyer, 205 Ill. 575, 69 N. E. 70; Evans v. Lewis, 121 Ill. 2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 24 (2)— VALIDITY OF ORGANIZATION COLLATERAL ATTACK. Whether the high school district in question comes within Act June 14, 1917, validating organization of school districts, cannot be inquir ed into in a proceeding to enforce school taxes levied in such district. Cartwright, Dunn, and Duncan, JJ., dissent ing. Appeal from Marshall County Court; D. 478, 13 N. E. 246. H. Gregg, Judge. Application by the People, on the relation of Bernard Haugens, County Collector, for a judgment against Edwin R. Leigh and others, for certain taxes. Judgment on the application, and objectors appeal. Affirmed. Barnes & Magoon, of Lacon, for appellants. Andrew Tracy, Acting State's Atty. (Clarence W. Heyl, Quinn & Quinn, and Charles V. O'Hern, all of Peoria, of counsel), for appellee. FARMER, J. The county court of Marshall county overruled objections filed by a large number of landowners to judgment for school taxes levied in township high school district No. 19, in Marshall county, and rendered judgment on the application of the collector for said taxes. The objectors prayed and were allowed an appeal, but, a large number of them not having joined in the appeal bond, a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal as to those not joining in the bond was allowed. The sole objection to the tax preserved for our review is that the high school district was organized under the act of 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 505) which was held unconstitutional in People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581, 114 N. E. 331, and that therefore the district is neither a de facto nor a de jure corporation, and the persons assuming to act as members of the board of education of said district are neither de jure nor de facto of ficers. [1, 2] Proceedings had been instituted and were pending to test the validity of the organization of said high school district at the time of the hearing in the county court upon the application of the county collector for judgment, but had not been disposed of. By an act approved and in force June 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 744), the Legislature declared legal every high school district formed of contiguous and compact territory where a majority of the inhabitants of said territory voting on the proposition had voted, at an The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. CARTWRIGHT, DUNN, and DUNCAN, JJ., dissent. (282 111. 29) PEOPLE ex rel. JOURDAN, County Collector, v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. (No. 11663.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 19, 1917.) 1. HIGHWAYS 127(1)-ROAD AND BRIDGE TAX ASSESSMENT-AGREEMENT AS TO DAMAGES. Where damages had been agreed upon for the purpose of changing the channel of a river to protect the road and bridge across the river, the purpose for which the damages were agreed upon was sufficient to authorize the levy of a tax under Road and Bridge Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 121) § 58, authorizing a levy when damages have been "agreed upon, allowed or awarded for laying out, widening, altering or vacating roads or for ditching to drain roads." 2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS ~~99 DOUBLE TAXATION. |