Code of 1911 be and the same is hereby amend- | a separate fund for street or alley improveed to read as follows: ment or repair.

"Composition Roofing-License-Fee-BondPlates. Every person or corporation engaged in carrying on or conducting within the city the business of composition roofing buildings, and who shall use a wagon or wagons in and about such business, shall file with the commissioner of public works a bond to the city in the sum of $5000, which bond shall be approved by said commissioner of public works, conditioned to save the city harmless from all damages that may happen, accrue to or be chargeable against the city on account and in consequence of the use of the streets of the city in such business, and for the purpose of securing the immediate repair and clearing of any portion of the public streets incumbered by the employés of such person or corporation while engaged in the composition roofing business; and every such person or corporation owning or operating such wagon or wagons shall pay to the city an annual license fee of $10 for each wagon.

"Sec. 2. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval."

[1] The argument under the first proposition is based on a misconception of the nature of an amendment to an existing law. An amendment is a change or alteration of a law or of some of its provisions. It is an alteration, and merely continues a law or ordinance in a changed form. Bouvier's Law Dict.; Black's Law Dict.; 36 Cyc. 1053; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 703; People v. Zito, 237 Ill. 434, 86 N. E. 1041. An amendatory act or ordinance never purports to repeal an act or section as it previously existed but only changes or amends it to read as therein stated. The argument has no application to this case. The appellee admitted the validity of the ordinance in its original form by applying for a license under it, but now attacks the whole ordinance, because the power had once been exercised.

but that ordinance was not for the same purpose and did not cover the same ground as this ordinance, which was enacted to regulate the use of streets. The license was required of any person or corporation carrying on the occupation of composition roofing and using the streets of the city for that purpose. The ordinance was a proper regulation of the use of the streets, and the provision fixing the rate to be paid for the license by the number of wagons used in the business was a legitmate method of determining the amount of the license.

On December 15, 1916, the appellee was [2, 3] The city passed a wheel tax ordinotified that its license would expire on Denance under the authority to license wagons cember 31, 1916, and that the fee for a license and vehicles conveying loads within the city, would be $10 for each wagon used in the business. On January 22, 1917, the appellee applied for a license to engage in the business of composition roofing, paid $10, and received a license to engage in that business. On March 17, 1917, the appellant instituted a suit in the municipal court for the penalty provided by the ordinance for conducting the business and using therein two wagons without procuring a license, as required by the ordinance. The evidence was that the appellee used in its business two double horse trucks for hauling roofing material, and at times attached to the trucks twowheeled kettles and hauled the same through the streets. The kettles sometimes contained roofing material, and sometimes they were left standing in the streets until the job was finished, in the same way as other contractors use the streets in putting up buildings. The court decided that the section of the ordinance as amended was void, and found the defendant not guilty and entered judgment accordingly. An appeal was granted to this court in pursuance to a certificate that the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved.

The reasons alleged by counsel as grounds for the decision that the ordinance as amended was invalid are: (1) That the amended ordinance of December 13, 1916, did not repeal the same section of the Code as it existed prior thereto and did not so provide in its caption or preamble, and that there was no implied repeal; (2) that the ordinance was invalid because the city had exercised its power to require a license by the wheel tax ordinance set out in the opinion in Harder's Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85 N. E. 245, 14 Ann. Cas. 536; and (3) because the ordinance did not prescribe the width and tire of the wagons, or that the license fee, when collected, should be kept in

[4, 5] As the ordinance was not passed under the power to license wagons and vehicles for the privilege of carrying loads through the streets of the city, it was not necessary to prescribe the tire and width, or that the license fee should be kept in a separate fund and paid out only on the cost of the street and alley improvements.

The court erred in holding the ordinance void and of no effect. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS mm 63(2)
BUILDING ORDINANCES REASONABLENESS.
The extent to which the public safety re-
quires the construction of buildings of certain
materials is a matter for the city council, and
the courts will not interfere, unless the exercise
of discretion is manifestly unreasonable.
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
BUILDING ORDINANCES

63(2)

story brick building, the first floor to be occupied as a store, and the second as a dwelling, and presented to the commissioner of buildings the plans, indicating that the ceiling and walls of the first floor would be covered with a metal ceiling without any lath or plaster behind or above it. The commisA court will not hold an ordinance void assioner of buildings refused to issue the buildunreasonable, where there is room for a fairing permit because the plans did not conform difference of opinion on the question, although to the ordinance. An answer was filed to the correctness of the legislative judgment may be doubtful, and the court may regard the ordi- the petition, and the court, hearing the cause nance as not the best which might be adopted without a jury, found the issues for the defor the purpose. fendants.

- REASONABLENESS.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar E. Heard, Judge.

Petition for mandamus by A. B. Hartman against the City of Chicago and others. Petition dismissed, and petitioner brings error. Affirmed.

A. G. Dicus, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (Leon Hornstein, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants in error.

[1] The plaintiff in error in the opening of his argument states that:

better fire retarder than plaster over wooden "If metal plates of 29-gauge are as good or a lath, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus in this case to compel the building permit to issue."

He states that ten witnesses for the plaintiff in error testified that 29-gauge metal ceilings or side walls were better retarders of fire and better fire preventives than plaster over wood lath, and that three witnesses for the respondents testified to the contrary, and his entire argument is devoted to con

nesses and the establishment of this proposition of fact. This is not, however, the question for our decision.

as well as their property against destruction by fire. If the requirements of an ordinance having this end in view are adapted to that purpose, a court cannot interfere with their enforcement unless they are manifestly unreasonable. City of Chicago v. Mandel Bros., 264 Ill. 206, 106 N. E. 181.

DUNN, J. The circuit court of Cook county dismissed a petition for mandamus against the city of Chicago and its commis-sideration of the testimony of these witsioner of buildings to require the issuance of a building permit, and, the validity of a municipal ordinance being involved, the petitioner sued out a writ of error from this [2] It is clearly within the police power court; the trial judge having certified that which may be exercised by a city to regulate in his opinion the public interest so required. the construction and use of buildings for the The only question in the case is the rea-protection of the lives and safety of citizens, sonableness of section 605 of the Chicago Code of 1911. That section, so far as material here, provides that in all buildings of ordinary construction, where the use of wood lath and plaster is permitted, such wood lath and plaster shall be done in accordance with certain specifications contained in the section, and that in every such building containing one or more rooms used for habitation or living purposes the walls and ceilings of all rooms, including stores (except basement and attic rooms not used for habitation or living purposes), shall be covered with not less than two coats of plaster of the thickness and quality prescribed in the section, provided that, where such building of ordinary construction containing one or more living rooms is more than one story and basement in height and contains a room or rooms used for the purpose of class I as defined in the ordinance, a metal ceiling may be installed in such room according to certain specified provisions, which require the ceiling of the room to be first plastered with a coat of plaster on wood lath, the material, dimensions, and manner of application being specified, as well as the means, material, and manner of application of the metal ceiling. The petitioner proposed to erect a two

[3] The extent to which the public safety requires the construction of buildings to be regulated, the materials which may be used and the method of construction are questions which are left to the judgment and discretion of the city counsel to determine, and unless the exercise of such judgment and discretion is manifestly unreasonable the courts will not interfere with it.

[4] A court will not hold an ordinance void as unreasonable where there is room for a fair difference of opinion on the question, even though the correctness of the legislative judgment may be doubtful, and the court may regard the ordinance as not the best which might be adopted for the purpose. The evidence is not convincing that the ordinance is manifestly unreasonable, and it does not appear upon its face to be so. The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(282 Ill. 408)

were sustained, and an order entered abat

PEOPLE ex rel. LITTLE, County Collector, v. ing the tax. This appeal followed.
ST. LOUIS MERCHANTS' BRIDGE

CO. (No. 11767.)

The appellee, the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Company, is the owner of a bridge which crosses the Mississippi river between St. Louis, Mo., and Venice, in Madison county, this state. The east half of the bridge and approaches belonging to appellee is situated in the town of Venice. In the year 1915 the local assessor for that town assessed the full value of the portion of the property

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 20, 1918.) 1. VENUE 36 CHANGE OF VENUE-PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH AUTHORIZED -"CIVIL PROCEEDING AT LAW." Though a proceeding for the collection of a tax by application for judgment and order of sale is a special statutory proceeding, it is a "civil proceeding at law" for the collection of the tax, and is a suit or proceeding within Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 146, § 1, authoriz-in that township at $1,500,000 and the asing a change of venue in any suit or proceeding at law or in equity where the judge is a party, or interested, or where his testimony is material, or where he is related to or has been counsel for either party, especially as chapter 120, § 230, authorizes an action of debt for the collection of taxes due on forfeited property in which a change of venue would be authorized.

[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Civil Proceedings.]

2. VENUE 49(1)-CHANGE-DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE-BIAS OR PREJUDICE OR IN

TEREST.

On an application for judgment for taxes against a bridge company whose assessment had been increased by the board of review, a change of venue was imperative, where it was shown by affidavit that the county judge had urged one of the members of the board to vote against the increase in the assessment, and that he and others were under indictment for conspiracy in attempting to prevent the board from raising such assessment, as it is a universally recognized principle that no person should sit as judge in his own case, or one in which he is materially interested, and that bias or prejudice disqualifies a judge. 3. TAXATION

469-ASSESSMENT-Board of

REVIEW-POWERS.

Though the board of review of Madison county revised and reduced an assessment at its quadrennial session in 1915, and there had been no change in the value of the property by reason of alterations or additions, it had power to increase the assessment in 1916, on due notice to the property owner. Appeal from Henry B. Eaton, Judge.

Madison County Court;

Proceeding for judgment for taxes by the People, on relation of George E. Little, County Collector, against the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Company. From an order sustaining objections and abating the tax, the collector appeals. Reversed and remanded, with direc

tions.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., and Joseph P. Streuber, State's Atty., of Highland, for appellant. Hiles & Simpson, of Edwardsville, and Kramer, Kramer & Campbell, of. East St. Louis (T. M. Pierce, of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for appellee.

CRAIG, J. This was an application by the county treasurer and ex officio county col·lector of Madison county for judgment and order of sale against the property of the appellee, the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Company, for delinquent taxes for the year 1916. Due notice of the application was given, and appellee appeared and filed objections, which

sessed value at $500,000. Objections were filed by appellee to the assessment with the board of review of Madison.county, alleging the assessment as made by the local assessor such board at its quadrennial session for was excessive. A hearing was had before 1915, and an order entered, revising and reducing the assessment, by which the full value of the property was fixed at $700,005 and the assessed value at $233,335. Thereafter, in the year 1916, complaint was filed before the board of review by Joseph P. Streuber, who has since been elected state's attorney of that county, representing that appellee's property was improperly and incorrectly assessed too low, and asking that a hearing be had upon the question of revising and correcting the assessment of the property. Due notice was given of the hearing, at which appellee appeared by its attorneys and protested against such hearing on the ground that the board of review had no jurisdiction to revise an assessment which had been made and fixed at the prior quadrennial session of the board of review, as no changes had taken place in the value of the property subsequent to the valuation as fixed at such quadrennial session. was overruled, and the board of review proThe protest ceeded with the hearing, at the conclusion of which it again fixed the full value of appellee's property at $1,500,000 and its assessed value at $500,000. The taxes were extended against the property of appellee accordingly.

taxes assessed against its property based It is conceded that appellee has paid all upon an assessed valuation of $233,335, as fixed by the board of review for the year 1915, and that it has refused to pay the balance of the tax assessed on its value as fixed by that board at the hearing held in 1916. The substance of the objections upon which it based its refusal to pay the balance of the tax is: (1) That its property was duly and legally assessed in the quadrennial year 1915; that no improvements have been made on the property since that date or change made in its value by reason of alterations in or additions to the improvements, and that the board of review for the year 1916 had no jurisdiction or authority to increase the assessment upon the complaint of the taxpayer after the same had been fixed by the board

of review in the quadrennial year 1915, and that the fixing of the value of its property at such time was a full and complete determination and adjudication of the value of the property for taxation for the year 1915 and the succeeding three years, unless some change was made in its value by reason of alterations or additions to the improvements; (2) that if the board of review had the right to change and revise the assessment in 1916, the revision was made in such an arbitrary manner as to amount to a fraudulent assessment of its property, and that the assessment as made was not based upon any rea-tory proceeding, it is also true that it is a sonable valuation of its property, but upon an arbitrary and unreasonable valuation, and is so grossly excessive as to amount to fraud. When the matter came on for hearing before the court the state's attorney moved the court for a change of venue from the county judge on the ground of the prejudice of said judge, and because his interest in the subject-present statute, which provides for the instimatter involved in the suit was such as to disqualify him from hearing the cause. In support of his motion he filed his affidavit, from which it appears that the trial judge,

the judge is a party to or interested in the suit or his testimony is material to either party or he is related to or shall have been counsel for either party to the controversy, in any of which cases a change of venue may be granted, either with or without the application of either party. As the statute makes no mention of proceedings for the collection of a tax, appellee insists that the people are not entitled to a change of venue in such a proceeding under the showing made in this case. While it is true that this proceeding. for the collection of a tax is a special statu

Henry B. Eaton, and Christ H. Kunnemann,

civil suit or proceeding for the collection of a debt, for which an action of debt would lie at common law before the adoption of our present Constitution. Ryan v. Gallatin County, 14 Ill. 78; Town of Geneva v. Cole, 61 Ill. 397; People v. Davis, 112 Ill. 272. Such action may still be maintained under our

tution of a suit by the county board in an
action of debt for the collection of taxes due

on forfeited property. Hurd's Stat. 1916, c.
120, § 230. The proceeding by the county col-
lector for judgment and order of sale is a
civil proceeding at law for the collection of
such tax. There can be no question but that
had the people proceeded in an action of debt
they would have been entitled to a change of
venue on the showing made. We can see no
in this case.
reason why the same rule should not apply
The same reason would exist

for granting a change of venue in one case
that would exist in the other. Where the

same reason exists the same rule should be applied.

were indicted by the grand jury of Madison county, at the January term, 1917, of the circuit court of that county, for the crime of conspiracy in attempting to prevent the board of review of such county, in the year 1916, from raising the assessed value of appellee's property, and that such indictment was still pending and undisposed of in the circuit court of that county at the time this cause came on for hearing. He also filed the affidavit of Joseph Heiens, who was a mem[2] In People v. Smith, 281 Ill. 538, 118 N. ber of the board of review of that county for E. 61, we held that a proceeding for the conthe year 1916, from which it appears that firmation of a special assessment is a civil while such board was in session Eaton urged proceeding at law, and that a change of venand requested affiant, as a member of such ue might be granted from the county in a board, to vote against the proposition of proper case. We there pointed out that the raising the assessed valuation of the prop-judge before whom the proceeding was penderty of appellee as fixed by the board of ing might be a party to such litigation, inreview of said county for the year 1915, terested in the suit as a party or witness, or and that he had also read the affidavit of otherwise, because of having been of counsel the state's attorney, and that the statements for one of the parties to such litigation, and therein made were true. A proper petition therefore disqualified from hearing the cause. for change of venue was also filed, subscrib- What is there said is applicable here. It is ed by the county collector of that county. now a universally recognized principle of The motion was denied, and the cause pro-law that no person should sit as judge in his ceeded to trial before the judge whose impartiality was challenged by such motion and affidavits.

own case or one in which he is materially interested, and that bias or prejudice is ground for disqualifying a judge from hearing a cause. Even in those states in which prejudice does not constitute a ground of disqualification, where the charge is made and the facts alleged indicate the existence of prejudice, the court will carefully scrutinize the record to see that no injustice has been done.

[1] Appellee insists that there was no error in refusing the change of venue for the reason that a proceeding for the collection of a tax is a special statutory proceeding, and not a suit either at law or in equity, within the terms of the provisions of section 1 of chapter 146 of the statutes of this state, en-23 Cyc. 583. Statutes of this character are titled “Venue.” That section provides, among other things, that a change of venue may be granted in any suit or proceeding in law or in equity, including proceedings for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, where

designed to afford every litigant a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased judge. The spirit of our laws demands that every case should be fairly and impartially tried, and no judge should think of presiding at the