vered, -it perceives that utter Incapacity it is under, of accounting for all the Works of infinite Wisdom and Power. Such is the Condition of Man, that while, he employs his Reason for useful Purpofes, he finds it a clear, ftrong, and every way fufficient Light; but when he endeavours to exceed his Sphere, when he would become more than a Man, when he emulates the next Order of reafonable Beings, and feeks the Privilege of Angels, his Reafon deceives him, he fickens like Phaeton at the Appearance of celestial Light, and tumbling from on high, teaches, by his hapless Fall, more Caution unto others. It is very poffible, our Author fays, that Libertines may think of oppofing to this Way of Reasoning Matters of Fact. He is ready to join Iffue with them upon this Head; and to convince them how little that is like to prove for the Advantage of their Caufe, he briefly runs over the History of the most eminent Free-thinkers, an *cient and modern, and remarks their Want of Steadinefs, Fortitude, and Conftancy, their frequent Defertions of their own Principles, and their finking in Conduct below even the ordinary Race of Mankind, whom they affect fo much to contemn.

He begins with Epicurus, the most celebrated Free-thinker of Antiquity, and proceeds fucceffively to Lucretius, Petronius Arbiter, Jerome Cardan, Jordanus Bruno, Lucilio Vanini, and, finally, Spinofa. I will mention a few of thofe Particulars which make up his Account of thefe famous Infidels.'

With regard to Epicurus he tells us, that he has read the principal Admirers of his Philofophy, and owns they have fully cleared him of the Calumnies of his Enemies; but that, notwithstanding, it is certain he was quite a different Perfon from what his own Difciples thought him, and these modern Apologifts reprefent him; far from being himself a

happy

happy Man, or capable of inftructing others in the Art of arriving at true Happiness.

He forefaw the Pleasures of his Garden would be imbittered, if his Scholars amufed themfelves with any Confiderations about their future State; he therefore taught, that Death was the abfolute Period of human Being, and that the Gods meddled not in the leaft with the Affairs of Mankind. But this, our Author fays, was teaching what could not answer his End of preventing Doubts and Fears; for, firft, this was a Doctrine which would not bear examining; and, fecondly, it left Men under the Dominion of blind Chance, instead of a wife Providence, which was furely a bad Exchange, and a very odd Way of procuring Quiet. If his Difciples believed this, they muft daily expect to fee the Firmament crack, the Sun lose half his Light, their Gardens hoifted into favage Mountains, or covered by invading Seas. These are all fit Works of Chance. But they lived chearfully and merrily, and therefore certainly they did not believe it: How then were they Philofophers? Or how did their Mafter's Wisdom (as he and they loudly boafted) deliver them from Fear? Inftead, therefore, of owing their Felicity to Free-thinking, these Epicureans must be indebted for what they enjoyed, to their not thinking at all.

But, further, Epicurus, who made fo free with all Authority whatfoever, who would fubmit neither to univerfal Reason nor Experience, was, himfelf, extremely dogmatical, and would bear not the leaft Contradiction. His Ipfe dixit was the Measure and Boundary of Science. Was Epicurus fkill'd in Freethinking? if he was, as our Author fays, then the only way to prevent Confufion, and fecure Happinefs, is to establish a certain Scheme of Doctrines, (no matter whether true or falfe) and forbid all Examination or Difpute about them, that is, exclude

D

Free

Free-thinking for ever, on the Word of one Freethinker.

But to carry the Matter ftill farther, and to prove Free-thinkers a restless fort of People, our Author having, as he thinks, fhewn, that implicite Faith was in Epicurus's Opinion the fole means of keeping up any Syftem deduced by Free-thinking, he proceeds to prove, that this great Philofopher was not a little irrefolute himfelf. He denied Providence, yet he worfhip'd the Gods, with all exterior marks of Fervency; nay, he carried this yet a greater Length, fince among his numerous Writings, there were many Treatifes of Devotion. What are we to think of all this? if we give Credit to his Doctrines, Prayer is nothing lefs than a Duty; if we yield any Faith to his Practice, then nothing appears of greater Importance.

As for Lucretius, our Author has the fame Objections to him, as to his Mafter Epicurus; that is to fay, he finds him vifibly uneafy, unsteady, and inconfiftent. He employs about feven Pages in the Proof of this Charge.

It is natural to mention next a Free-thinking Martyr Such a one was Petronius Arbiter, one of the most applauded among the Epicureans, and efpecially commended by the Moderns, as one furperior, while living, to all the Wits of his Time, and equal, in his Death, to M. A. Seneca, the moft dittinguished of the Philofophers. But in the midft of thefe Praifes, it is not denied, that he was the moft inconfiftent Man ever drew Breath. He had great Talents for Bufinefs, with a ftrong Propenfity to Idlenefs; no-body better understood the Folly of being wicked, no-body ran deeper into Wickedness, than he. Abfurdity in Pleafure his nice Tafte could not endure, but an immodeft and luxurious Life hit this Tafte exactly. His Thoughts were often impious, rarely modeft, but ... his Latin pure to a Proverb. To fum up all, he thought

thought the Day fit for nothing but fnoring, for which Cause he indulged his Pleafures during the Night.

There is a deal more which our Author alledges in Difparagement of Petronius, and to fhew with how little Reafon he is fet up to rival Seneca in the Article of dying.

These three Free-thinkers which have been mentioned make fo great a Figure amongst thofe of Antiquity, that our Author thinks he needs fay nothing more on this Subject: But judges it very expedient, a few of the Moderns fhould be run over, that it may be feen, Time has made no Alteration in this Matter, but that all Free-thinkers have continued uneafy, inconftant, vapourish, full of Flights, and in a word, perfect Self-Tormentors.

He begins with the celebrated Jerome Cardan: The rather, as this man, he says, methodized and fuggested Arguments in fupport of certain Notions which to this Day are Favourites with Free-thinkers; nay, are laid up among their Arcana, and are, when produced, held the highest Flights of human Intelligence, and irrefragable Bars against believing. With regard then to him, he first recounts a few Circumftances of his Life (as they were recorded by his own Pen) and then goes on to confider fome of his extraordinary Opinions: his History enlightening his Doctrines, as thofe again appear to take Rife from his Constitution or his Circunftances; an Obfervation, he says, too often verified in the Broachers of new Notions or Revivers of ancient Herefies.

There are many Singularities in our Author's Account of this philofophical Coxcomb, but I have not room for their Reciral; and for the fame Reason I pafs over all he relates of Jordanus Brunus, Lucilio Vanini, and Spinoza. The Reader who would or needs to be acquainted with them, muft have recourfe to the Original. I will conclude this Article with

the Subftance of those Obfervations which, our Atthor fays, naturally fpring from thefe Men's Characters, and with which he fhuts up this Treatise.

First then, it seems to him plain, that none of thefe eminent Free-thinkers have done much Service to the World. Epicurus led with his Friends an indolent Life in his Gardens. Lucretius lived distracted, therefore he could not benefit Society. Petro nius made a Figure, as a Man of Pleasure, in, the Court of Nero; but that was making no very amiable Figure in Life. Cardan's whole Business was to abuse others, and to defend himself from the Abufes fuch a Conduct induced. Jordano Bruno ran up and down the World, teaching the Lullian Art, and the reft of his Chimera's. Vanini publifhed nothing which can be called of publick Utility. And as for Spinoza, making Spectacles is the best thing we know of him.

But next, they did little or no Good to themfelves. This, he thinks, he has proved at large in the forepart of this Difcourfe. Here he only fays, that Imagination on the Stretch, boundless Speculations, everlafting Doubts, and ever varying Ideas, are so great Additions to the inevitable Labours of human Life, and the Anxieties which neceffarily attend it, that we neednot stand amazed at the Perplexities of Free-thinkers, or pretend to wonder at their stepping now and then after Lucretius's Mode into the other World. On the contrary, we ought rather to admire their Conftancy when they decline this Remedy, and bear up against the Storms of Fortune.

Take them in any Light whatsoever, consider their Lives, contemplate their Deaths, view their Doctrines, ftill, as our Author goes on, there is nothing lovely in the Profpect. Can we compare Epicurus to Socrates, or Spinoza to Grotius? can we, without departing from common Senfe, applaud the Lives of any of thefe Sages? If we cannot do this,

why