legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force. It ignores such legislation, and assumes that the matter is one that belongs to the domain of national regulation. We have discussed the question presented by the law on the assumption that a right to enjoy equal accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, is one of the essential rights of the citizen which no State can abridge or interfere with. Whether it is such a right or not, is a different question, which, in the view we have taken of the validity of the law on the ground already stated, it is not necessary to examine. The Court then took up the thirteenth amendment, which abolishes slavery. Even admitting that this clothed Congress with power to pass laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery, it could not be held, the Court said, that deny ing to colored persons equal accommodations and privileges of hotels, public conveyances, and places of amusement, imposed upon them any badge of slavery or servitude. "Such an act of refusal," says the opinion, "has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought under the laws of the State; or if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of State laws, or State action, prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business. Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, amenable to the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment, Congress has full power to afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it." The grounds for setting aside the first two sections of the act of 1875, under the fourteenth amendment, do not apply to the fourth section, and this was conceded to be constitutional, as had been expressly held in the Virginia jury cases. The section prohibits any discrimination on account of color in the summoning or selection of jurors. Such discrimination, the Court points out, can be made only by law, for which the State is responsible. It can not be made by individuals without the authority of State laws. It may be made by statute, or, in the absence of any statutory disqualification on account of color, colored jurors may be excluded by a judge or some other officer of the law. In either case the discrimination is effected by the agency of the State. Eight of the nine justices concurred in the judgment of the Court. An elaborate dissenting opinion was rendered by Justice Harlan, of Kentucky, who maintained that the thirteenth as well as the fourteenth amendment conferred upon Congress the power which was exercised in passing the civil - rights act of 1875. "The opinion in these cases," he remarked, "proceeds, as it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. The substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtile and ingenious verbal criticism." He then pointed out that in the Dred Scott case the Supreme Court had held that negroes were not a part of the people of the United States; that they were not entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens; that, in the language of Chief-Justice Taney, "they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." He cited an earlier case-Prigg vs. Pennsylvania-to show that the Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the fugitive slave law, had conceded to Congress a power which was not expressly granted by the Constitution, but was derived from it by implication. The purpose of the thirteenth amendment, he said, was to abolish slavery with all its badges and incidents, and to establish universal freedom. There was a fixed purpose to place beyond doubt the power of Congress to legislate in furtherance of these ends. The power to enforce the provisions of the amendment was therefore expressly granted, and not left to implication. He said: The thirteenth amendment, my brethren concede, did something more than to prohibit slavery as an institution, resting upon distinctions of race, and upheld by positive law. They admit that it established and decreed universal civil freedom throughestablished, involve nothing more than exemption out the United States. But did that freedom, thus from actual slavery? Was nothing more intended than to forbid one man from owning another as property? Was it the purpose of the nation simply to destroy the institution, and then remit the race, such protection, in their civil rights, necessarily growtheretofore held in bondage, to the several States for ing out of freedom, as those States, in their discretion, choose to provide? Were the States, against whose solemn protest the institution was destroyed, to be left perfectly free, so far as national interference was that race, as such, in the enjoyment of those fundaconcerned, to make or allow discriminations against mental rights that inhere in a state of freedom? Had the thirteenth amendment stopped with the sweeping declaration, in its first section, against the existcrime, Congress would have had the power, by imence of slavery and involuntary servitude, except for plication, according to the doctrines of Prigg 28. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, repeated in Strander vs. West Virginia, to protect the freedom thus established, and consequently to secure the enjoyment of such civil rights as were fundamental in freedom. But that it can exert its authority to that extent is now made clear, and was intended to be made clear, by the express grant of power contained in the second section of that amendment. stitute badges of slavery and servitude, and that the express power delegated to Congress to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the thirteenth amendment, That there are burdens and disabilities which con may be exerted by legislation of a direct and primary character, for the eradication not simply of the institution, but of its badges and incidents, are propositions which ought to be deemed indisputable. They lie at the very foundation of the Civil-Rights Act of 1866. "I do not contend," continued Justice Harlan, "that the thirteenth amendment invests Congress with authority, by legislation, to regulate the entire body of the civil rights which citizens enjoy, or may enjoy, in the several States. But I do hold that since slavery, as the Court has repeatedly declared, was the moving or principal cause of the adoption of that amendinent, and since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races. Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect that people against the deprivation, on account of their race, of any civil rights enjoyed by other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States, their officers and agents, and also upon, at least, such individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield power and authority under the State. What has been said is sufficient to show that the power of Congress under the thirteenth amendment is not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the race, so liberated, against discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen, where such discrimination is based upon race." He then contended that the denial to colored citizens of the equal accommodations and privileges of hotels, public conveyances, and places of amusement, presents a discrimination on account of color, which is a badge of servitade whose imposition Congress is empowered by the thirteenth amendment to prevent. "They are burdens which lay at the very foundation of the institution of slavery as it once existed. They are not to be sustained, except upon the assumption that there is still, in this land of universal liberty, a class which may yet be discriminated against, even in respect of rights of a character so essential and so supreme that, deprived of their enjoyment, in common with others, a freeman is not only branded as one inferior and infected, but, in the competitions of life, is robbed of some of the most essential means of existence; and all this solely because they belong to a particular race which the nation has liberated. The thirteenth amendment alone obliterated the raceline, so far as all rights fundamental in a state of freedom are concerned." Justice Harlan proceeded to maintain that power was given to Congress by the fourteenth amendment also to enact such a civil-rights law as that of 1875. He said: The assumption that this amendment consists wholly of prohibitions upon State laws and State proceedings in hostility to its provisions, is unauthorized by its language. The first clause of the first section-all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside"-is of a distinctly affirmative character. ated, it created and granted, as well citizenship of the In its application to the colored race, previously liberUnited States as citizenship of the State in which they respectively resided. It introduced all of that race whose ancestors had been imported and sold as slaves, at once, into the political community known as the "people of the United States." They became, instantly, citizens of the United States, and of their respective States. Further, they were brought, by this supreme act of the nation, within the direct operation of that provision of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States" (Art. IV, sec. 2). The citizenship thus acquired, by that race, in virtue of an affirmative grant by the nation, may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the Governdirect character; this, because the power of Congress ment, but by congressional legislation of a primary is not restricted to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action. It is, in terms distinct and positive, to enforce "the provisions of this hibitive character, but the provisions-all of the proarticle" of amendment; not simply those of a pro visions-affirmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. It is, therefore, a grave misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the amendment has reference exclusively to express prohibitions upon State laws or State action. If any right was created by that amendment, the grant of power, through appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions, authorizes Congress, by means of legislation, operating throughout the entire Union, to guard, secure, and protect that right. tempt, by a comprehensive definition, to indicate all Although this Court has wisely forborne any atof the privileges and immunities to which the citizens of each State are entitled, of right, to enjoy in the several States, 1 hazard nothing, in view of former denial to colored citizens of other States, while within adjudications, in saying that no State can sustain her her limits, of privileges or iminunities, fundamental in republican citizenship, upon the ground that she accords such privileges and immunities only to her citizens. The colored citizens of other States, within white citizens and withholds them from her colored the jurisdiction of that State, could claim, under the Constitution, every privilege and immunity which that State secures to her white citizens. No State may, by discrimination against a portion of its leges and immunities fundamental in citizenship, imown citizens of a particular race, in respect of privipair the constitutional right of citizens of other States, of whatever race, to enjoy in that State all such privileges and immunities as are there accorded to her most favored citizens. A colored citizen of Ohio or Indiana, being in the jurisdiction of Tennessee, is entitled to enjoy any privilege or immunity, fundamental in citizenship, which is given to citizens of the white race in the latter State. It is not to be supposed that any one will controvert this proposition. United States-as between them and their respective But what was secured to colored citizens of the States-by the grant to them of State citizenship? With what rights, privileges, or immunities did this grant from the nation invest them? There is one, if there be no others-exemption from race discriminaof the white race in the same State. That, surely, is tion in respect of any civil right belonging to citizens their constitutional privilege when within the juris diction of other States. And such must be their constitutional right in their own State, unless the recent amendments be "splendid baubles," thrown out to delude those who deserved fair and generous treat ment at the hands of the nation. Citizenship in this country necessarily imports equality of civil rights among citizens of every race in the same State. It is tundamental in American citizenship that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no discrimination by the State, or its officers, or by individuals or corporations exercising public functions or authority, against any citizen because of his race or previous condition of servitude. After repeating that the opinion of the majority proceeds on the ground that the power of Congress to legislate for the protection of the rights and privileges secured by the fourteenth amendment can not be brought into activity except with the view, and as it may become necessary, to correct and annul State laws and State proceedings hostile to such rights and privileges, and that, in the absence of State laws or State action adverse to such rights and privileges, the nation may not actively interfere for their protection and security, Justice Harlan adds: If the grant to colored citizens of the United States of citizenship in their respective States, imports exemption from race discrimination, in their States, in respect of the civil rights belonging to citizenship, then, to hold that the amendment remits that right to the States for their protection, primarily, and stays the hands of the nation, until it is assailed by State laws or State proceedings, is to adjudge that the amendment, so far from enlarging the powers of Congress as we have heretofore said it did not only curtails them, but reverses the policy which the General Government has pursued from its very organization. Such an interpretation of the amendment is a denial to Congress of the power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce one of its provisions. In view of the circumstances under which the recent amendments were incorporated into the Constitution, and especially in view of the peculiar character of the new rights they created and secured, it ought not to be presumed that the General Government has abdicated its authority, by national legislation, direct and primary in its character, to guard and protect privileges and immunities secured by that instrument. Such an interpretation of the Constitution ought not to be accepted if it be possible to avoid it. Its acceptance would lead to this anomalous result: that whereas, prior to the amendments, Congress, with the sanction of this court, passed the most stringent laws-operating directly and primarily upon States and their officers and agents, as well as upon individuals-in vindication of slavery and the right of the master, it may not now, by legislation of a like primary and direct character, guard, protect, and secure the freedom established, and the most essential right of the citizenship granted, by the constitutional amendments. I venture, with all respect for the opinion of others, to insist that the national Legislature may, without transcending the limits of the Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship what it did, with the sanction of this court, for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves. If fugitive-slave laws, providing modes and prescribing penalties, whereby the master could seize and recover his fugitive slave, were legitimate exertions of an implied power to protect and enforce a right recognized by the Constitution, why shall the hands of Congress be tied, so that-under an express power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce a constitutional provision, granting citizenship-it may not, by means of direct legislation, bring the whole power of this nation to bear upon States and their officers, and upon such individuals and corporations exercising public functions as assume to abridge, impair, or deny rights confessedly secured by the supreme law of the land? Justice Harlan further maintained that the decision of the Court was erroneous, even conceding that Congress has power to legislate only against hostile State action. He pointed out that the court had held, in Ex-parte Virginia (100 U. S. Reports), that the fourteenth amendment means that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its authority is exercised, shall deny to any person equal protection of the laws, and then said: "In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the fourteenth amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement, are agents of the State, because amenable, in respect of their public duties and functions, to public regulation. It seems to me that, within the principle settled in Ex-parte Virginia, a denial, by these instrumentalities of the State, to the citizen, because of his race, of that equality of civil rights secured to him by law, is a denial by the State within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. If it be not, then that race is left, in respect of the civil rights under discussion, practically at the mercy of corporations and individuals wielding power under public authority." Justice Harlan conceded that Congress has no authority to regulate the social rights of men and races in the community, but he claimed that the rights covered by the law of 1875 were not social but legal. He set forth his views on this point as follows: I agree that Government has nothing to do with social, as distinguished from technically legal, rights of individuals. No government ever has brought, or ever can bring, its people into social intercourse against their wishes. Whether one person will permit or maintain social relations with another is a matter with which government has no concern. I agree that if one citizen chooses not to hold social intercourse with another, even upon grounds of race, he is not and can not be made amenable to the law for his conduct in that regard; for no legal right of a citizen is violated by the refusal of others to maintain merely social relations with him. What I affirm is that no State, nor the officers of any State, nor any corporation or individual wielding power under State authority for the public benefit or the public convenience, can, consistently either with the freedom established by the fundamental law, or with that equality of civil rights which now belongs to every citizen, discriminate against freemen or citizens, in their civil rights, because of their race, or because they once labored under disabilities imposed upon them as a The rights which Congress by the act of 1875 endeavored to secure and protect are legal, not social, rights. The right, for instance, of a colored citizen to use the accommodations of a public highway, upon the same terms as are permitted to white citizens, is no more a social right than his right, under the law, to use the public streets of a city, or a town, or a turnpike-road, or a public market, or a post-office, or his right to sit in a public building with others, of whatever race, for the purpose of hearing the political questions of the day discussed. Scarcely a day passes without our seeing in this court-room citizens of the white and black races sitting side by side, watch race. ing the progress of our business. It would never occur to any one that the presence of a colored citizen in a court-house, or court-room, was an invasion of the social rights of white persons who may frequent such places. And yet, such a suggestion would be quite as sound in law-I say it with all respect-as is the suggestion that the claim of a colored citizen to use, upon the same terms as is permitted to white citizens, the accommodations of public highways, or public inns, or places of public amusement, estabfished under the license of the law, is an invasion of the social rights of the white race. gress, Senator Wilson, of Iowa, proposed this constitutional amendment: Congress shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to protect citizens of the United States in the exercise and enjoyment of their rights, privileges, and immunities, and to assure to them the equal protection of the laws. The New York Penal Code contains these provisions concerning civil rights: The opinion of Justice Harlan closes with count, or as agent or officer of a corporation, carries on the expression of these views: My brethren say that, when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws. What the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race, iswhat had already been done in every State of the Union for the white race-to secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens, nothing more. The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens. The difficulty has been to compel a recognition of their legal right to take that rank, and to secure the enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government is ordained. At every step in this direction the nation has been confronted with class-tyranny, which a contemporary English historian says is, of all tyrannies, the most intolerable, "for it is ubiquitous in its operation, and weighs, perhaps, most heavily on those whose obscurity or distance would withdraw them from the notice of a single despot." To-day it is the colored race which is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public authority, rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship At some future time it may be some other race that will fall under the ban. If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the intent with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there can not be in this republic any class of human beings in practical subjection to another class, with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such privileges as they may choose to grant. The supreme law of the land has decreed that no authority shall be exercised in this country upon the basis of discrimination, in respect of civil rights, against freemen and citizens because of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude. To that decree for the due enforcement of which, by appropriate legislation, Congress has been invested with express power every one must bow, whatever may have been, or whatever now are, his individual views as to the wisdom or policy, either of the recent changes in the fundamental law, or of the legislation which has been enacted to give them effect. The decision of the Court, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, gave rise to much discussion throughout the country. By some the opinion of the majority was freely criticised, but it appears to have been generally accepted as a sound as well as a final interpretation of the Constitution. The fact was recognized that the Court simply reaffirmed a principle which it had more than once previously affirmed, and had advanced as far back as the session of 1875-'76. On the meeting of Con SECTION 381. A person who either on his own acbusiness as innkeeper, or as common carrier of passengers, and refuses, without just cause or excuse, to receive and entertain any guest, or to receive and carry any passenger, is guilty of a misdemeanor. SEC. 383. No citizen of this State can, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, be excluded from the equal enjoyment of any accommodation, facility, or privilege furnished by innkeepers or common carriers, or by owners, managers, or lessees of theatres or other places of amusement, by teachers and officers of common schools and public institutions of learning, or by cemetery associations. The violation of this section is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars. CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM BILL. See CONGRESS and REFORM in the CIVIL SERVICE. COLENSO, John William, an English clergyman and colonial bishop, born in St. Austell, Cornwall, Jan. 24, 1814; died in D'Urban, or Port Natal, South Africa, June 20, 1883. He entered St. John's College, Cambridge, and in 1836 was graduated as second wrangler and Smith's prizeman, and became a fellow of his college. Two years later he was appointed assistant-master of Harrow School, which post he held until 1842. During these years he prepared books on arithmetic and algebra, which, being adopted as text-books in schools and universities, yielded him a handsome income. From 1842 to 1846 he resided at his college, and then became rector of Forncett St. Mary, Norfolk. Besides giving due attention to his parish work and duties, Colenso published other mathematical works, a volume of Village Sermons," and a treatise on the communion service in the Prayer-Book, with selections from the writings of F. D. Maurice. On the 30th of November, 1853, Dr. Colenso being the first to occupy that see. was appointed Bishop of Natal, South Africa, His "Ten Weeks in Natal" was published two years after he left England, and his "Translation of the Epistle to the Romans, commented on from a Missionary Point of View," appeared in 1861. It is not known clearly how long Bishop Colenso had been engaged in studying the Old Testament, with reference to critical points at issue; but it is quite likely that the matter had been before him for years. At any rate, he considered it a duty, as appears from his course, to put forth views which at once excited severe animadversion and astonishment at his lapse from Anglican orthodoxy, and his adoption of German rationalism and neology. The first part of "The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined" appeared in 1862. As was to be expected, this assault on the accuracy, veracity, and authorship of the books of Moses was at an early day brought before the authorities of the Church in England, and both Houses of Convocation of the Province of Canterbury condemned it in 1864, as containing " errors of the gravest and most dangerous character." That work was reviewed in several of the prominent organs of free thought and of orthodox religion (chiefly the "Westminster" and "Quarterly" Reviews). On the one hand, Colenso was praised without stint, as a noble champion of truth and a fearless critic of the Old Testament; on the other, he was censured with corresponding severity, as one who showed himself ignorant and presumptuous beyond all excuse; and it was urged that no honorable and upright man would be willing to continue to minister at the altars, or receive emoluments from a church, whose doctrines on inspiration and other fundamental points he denied and was holding up to public odium. The next step on the part of the Church in South Africa was the presenting and summoning Bishop Colenso for trial, and, on his refusal to appear, the deposing him from his bishopric by the metropolitan, Bishop Gray of Cape Town. Dr. Colenso resolved not to submit to the ecclesiastical authorities in the colony, and the result was that this case was brought on appeal before the courts in England. The matter was argued at length, and it was decided by the Privy Council, in March, 1865, that the deposition was "null and void in law," the ground of the decision being that the crown has no legal power to constitute a bishopric, or to confer coercive jurisdiction within any colony possessing an independent legislature; and that, as the letters- patent purporting to create the sees of Cape Town and Natal were issued after these colonies had acquired legislatures, the sees did not legally exist, and neither bishop possessed in law any jurisdiction whatever. Notwithstanding this decision, the bishops forming the Council of the Colonial Bishopric's Fund refused to pay Dr. Colenso the income of the see of Natal. He accordingly appealed to the Court of Chancery, and the Master of the Rolls delivered a judgment, Oct. 6, 1866, ordering the payment in future of his income, with all arrears and interest. Thus the income was secured to him for life, and, so far as the decision of the civil courts could affect it, he remained in possession of the see as its bishop. The Church in South Africa, however, held that he was lawfully and fully deposed, and would have no intercourse or fellowship with him. Dr. Colenso ministered to those who thought him right and supported him; while the orthodox portion of the church community looked upon him as one deprived of all power lawfully to exercise the functions of the episcopal office. Nevertheless, the occupant of the see of Natal had numerous sympa thizers in England, and in the summer of 1865 a meeting of the subscribers to the "Colenso fund" was held in London, when £3,300 were presented to him, as a token of respect and good-will, on his going back to Africa. Ten years later he made another visit to England, in order to report to the proper authorities the condition of church affairs in Cape Colony; to ascertain, if possible, his relationship to the new Bishop of Cape Town; and to arrange other matters in the existing anomalous condition of church life and work in that distant field. During his stay in England, the Bishops of Oxford, Lincoln, and London inhibited him from preaching in their respective dioceses, as one having no lawful authority to preach. Dr. Jowett, however, whose sympathies doctrinally were with Colenso, invited him to preach in the chapel of Balliol College, that chapel not being within the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Oxford. Dr. Colenso's later life was passed quietly in Natal. He was noted for his kindly interest and zeal in behalf of the Zulus and Boers. He published at intervals the remaining parts of his work on the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua. In 1866 a volume of discourses appeared, entitled "Natal Sermons." Besides these he prepared and had printed a Zulu grammar and Zulu dictionary, a Zulu translation of the New Testament and other parts of the Bible and Prayer-Book, with several educational works for the instruction of the Zulus. His latest publications were, "The New Bible Commentary, by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church, critically examined" (1871); the sixth part of "The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua critically examined" (1872); and "Lectures on the Pentateuch and the Moabite Stone "(1873). COLLISIONS, MARINE. The increasing frequence of marine disasters with the extension of steam navigation leads to a general demand for more effective precautions against collision. Proposed Navigation Laws.—Since quick passages attract more custom to navigation companies than a reputation for safety, it has been proposed to sharpen the penalties for infringing the maritime laws against rapid sailing in bad weather. In Germany, where the laws are already exceptionally stringent, the suggestion is made to bring such infraction within the provisions of the statutes against murder and attempted murder. The captain only would be liable to indictment, although the ship-owner is primarily and principally responsible. A remedy would be found in making them liable in cases of disaster to pecuniary damages, in the same manner as railroad companies. It is equally desirable to restrict the rate of speed. The terms "half-speed " and "slow" are indefinite, owing to the difference in the speed of different vessels. To insure the highest degree of safety, steamers should be prohibited, in fogs, driving snows, and on dark nights, from going faster than |