128 Opinion of the Court. We assume that petitioner's tariff was properly filed pursuant to a lawful authorization by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In Stopher v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 246 I. C. C. 41, 44-47 (1941), the Commission determined that an interstate railroad's redcap services constituted railroad transportation as defined by the Act, and directed that a tariff covering service charges be filed. See also Dayton Union R. Co. Tariff for Redcap Service, 256 I. C. C. 289 (1943); Redcap Service, Cincinnati, Columbus, Indianapolis, 277 I. C. C. 427 (1950). Petitioner railroad participated in filing New England Joint Tariff RC No. 3-N with the Commission. Cf. American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 588-589 (1923). In addition to listing a schedule of charges per piece and truckload of baggage, that tariff de to criminal prosecution under section 10 of the act to regulate commerce. The committee does not agree with the commission in the interpretation so placed upon the proviso, but there is no way in which to remedy the matter except to make the intent of Congress so clear that it is impossible to misunderstand it. Further, the commission has held that baggage carried on passenger trains upon the ticket of a passenger is within the terms of the law. Whether this construction is correct or incorrect, it is palpable that baggage so transported on a passenger fare ought not to be subject to the rule which controls ordinary freight, and in the bill now reported it is excepted in express terms." Congress eliminated the 1915 proviso, therefore, and explained the aim of the 1916 legislation "to restore the law of full liability as it existed prior to the Carmack amendment of 1906, so that when property is lost or damaged in the course of transportation under such circumstances as to make the carrier liable recovery is had for full value or on the basis of full value. From this general rule there is excepted, first, baggage carried on passenger trains. This is done for obvious reasons. Second, other property .., with respect to which the Interstate Commerce Commission has fixed or authorized affirmatively a rate dependent upon value, either an agreed or a released value." (Emphasis added.) S. Rep. No. 394, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 8 See 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (1), 1 (3), 1 (5) (a), 6 (1). Opinion of the Court. 346 U.S. clares that "Carriers will not accept a greater liability than Twenty-five (25) Dollars per bag or parcel . . . handled by Red Caps under the provisions of this tariff, unless a greater value is declared in writing by the passenger. If a greater value is so declared in writing by the passenger, an additional charge of Ten (10) Cents per bag or parcel will be made for each One Hundred (100) Dollars or fraction thereof above Twenty-five (25) Dollars so declared. Any bag or parcel which is declared by the passenger to have a value in excess of Five Hundred (500) Dollars will not be accepted for handling by Red Caps under the provisions of this tariff." Clearly that limitation of liability is voided by the Act unless saved by the statutory proviso. Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U. S. 265 (1924); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97 (1920). The excepted "baggage carried on passenger trains" refers solely to free baggage checked through on a passenger fare. See, e. g., Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 117 (1914). It cannot apply to redcap service for which the carrier exacts a separate charge because the cost of providing that facility is not an element in the determination of passenger rates. Redcap Service, Cincinnati, Columbus, Indianapolis, 277 I. C. C. 427, 436 (1950).1o The limitation must therefore qualify under 9 9 Cf. 49 U. S. C. § 22, referring to "free baggage" carried on passenger tickets. See also notes 7, supra, and 10, infra. 10 That distinction has long been recognized by the Commission. National Baggage Committee v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 32 I. C. C. 152 (1914); In re The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682, 696 (1915); Ellison-White Chautauqua System v. Director General, 68 I. C. C. 492, 495 (1922). In fact, only recently the Commission disallowed a proposed tariff of charges for passenger baggage because of "the long and universally established practice of permitting a reasonable amount of a passenger's baggage, whether in the baggage 128 Opinion of the Court. the proviso as part of an authorized schedule of rates graduated according to property valuations in writing. Petitioner's tariff on its face does not deviate from the statutory standard, and it may be read as complying with the law. Cf. American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, supra; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 327 (1916). But the facts here do not bring the case within the statutory conditions. There was no "value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing"; in fact, not even a baggage check reciting a limitation provision changed hands."1 Moreover, the actual value of respondent's baggage exceeded $500; the tariff itself deems such highly valued property unacceptable for handling by redcaps. But only by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to an amount less than the actual loss sustained. Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 444 445 (1918); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 321-323 (1921); cf. The Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S. 494, 497-498 (1935). Binding respondent by a limitation which she had no reasonable opportunity to discover car or in his personal possession, to be carried as a part of the passenger-fare contract, and the apparently uniform sanction of such a practice by the courts and the regulatory bodies." Service Charges for Checking Baggage, 288 I. C. C. 691, 695 (1953). 11 See Caten v. Salt City Movers & Storage Co., 149 F. 2d 428, 432 (1945). We need not now consider whether an inscribed baggage receipt would constitute a sufficient writing to satisfy the statute, compare American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 590-591 (1923), or whether a carrier's refusal to handle property above a certain value is permissible at all. 275520 O-54--14 Opinion of the Court. 346 U.S. 12 would effectively deprive her of the requisite choice; such an arrangement would amount to a forbidden attempt to exonerate a carrier from the consequences of its own negligent acts. Ibid.; cf. Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Feinberg Co., 193 F. 2d 283, 286 (1951). "The great object of the law governing common carriers was to secure the utmost care in the rendering of a service of the highest importance to the community. A carrier who stipulates not to be bound to the exercise of care and diligence 'seeks to put off the essential duties of his employment.' It is recognized that the carrier and the individual customer are not on an equal footing. "The latter cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek redress in the courts.'' Sante Fe, P. & P. R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Construction Co., 228 U. S. 177, 184-185 (1913). In sum, respondent cannot be held bound by petitioner's limitation, and the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors must be Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 12 Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 (1914), and New York Central R. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U. S. 148 (1916), cannot control this case. Neither decision involved the Act as amended by the 1915 and 1916 legislation; both dealt with free baggage checked through on a passenger ticket; the carrier in both cases had supplied some notice of its limitation of liability. In Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357 (1920), the sole issue raised or considered related to the interstate nature of the passenger's journey. Syllabus. BURNS ET AL. v. WILSON, SECRETARY CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 422. Argued February 5, 1953. Decided June 15, 1953. Tried separately by courts-martial, petitioners were found guilty of murder and rape and sentenced to death. After exhausting all remedies available to them under the Revised Articles of War, 62 Stat. 627, petitioners applied to a Federal District Court for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that they had been denied due process of law in the proceedings leading to their convictions by the courts-martial. Respondents denied these allegations and attached to their answer copies of the records of the trials and of all proceedings by the military reviewing authorities, which showed plainly that the military courts had heard petitioners on every significant allegation urged before the District Court. After satisfying itself that the courts-martial had complete jurisdiction, the District Court dismissed the applications without hearing evidence and without further review. The Court of Appeals gave petitioners' allegations full consideration on their merits, reviewed the evidence in the record of the trial and other proceedings before the military courts, and affirmed. Held: Judgment affirmed. Pp. 138-146. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 208, 202 F. 2d 335, affirmed. The District Court dismissed petitioners' applications for writs of habeas corpus. 104 F. Supp. 310, 312. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 208, 202 F.2d 335. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 903. At the time of the argument, February 5, 1953, Wilson, present Secretary of Defense, was substituted for Lovett, former Secretary of Defense. Affirmed, p. 146. Robert L. Carter and Frank D. Reeves argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were Thurgood Marshall, Charles W. Quick and Herbert O. Reid. |