motion. It commands the performance of ministerial acts, or, being addressed to subordinate judicial tribunals, requires them to exercise their functions, and render some judgment in cases before them. Ex parte Nash, 15 Ad. & Ellis, 15, 92; Chase v. Canal Co., 10 Pick. [Mass.] 244; Strong, Petitioner, 20 Pick. [Mass. ] 484. In the latter case the court say:

"In every well constituted government the highest judicial authority must necessarily have a supervisory power over all inferior or subordinate tribunals, magistrates, and all others exercising public authority. If they commit errors, it will correct them. If they refuse to perform their duty, it will compel them. In the former case, by writ of error; in the latter, by mandamus.'

"The office sought of the writ in this case is to restrain the defendants from doing certain things they are alleged to have in contemplation."

Also:

"Whether the decision of the agent is final or not, and in no way subject to revision, it is not necessary to determine. It is only necessary now to say the relator cannot obtain the relief he seeks under the writ prayed for."

This case hardly supports relator's claim, and unqualifiedly commits this court to the contrary doctrine. We may mention, in passing, that when a similar question arose recently the admonition of this case was heeded and relief was sought by injunction bill, and the jurisdiction was sustained and relief granted as prayed. See Manthey v. Vincent, 145 Mich. 327, 335 (108 N. W. 667). This demonstrates that there is another remedy, and, under innumerable cases in our reports, this should of itself preclude relief, if such is an adequate remedy.

People v. Insurance Co., 19 Mich. 393. In this case a mandamus compelled an insurance company to submit its books to an examination by the insurance commissioner, a duty prescribed by law. It was compelled by mandamus to do so. Apparently there was nothing in the nature of injunctive relief sought, and no such question was raised. It was claimed that indictment or quo warranto was an adequate remedy. The court held not,

upon the ground that such remedy was not adequate, as it clearly was not. This case is not in point on the question of injunctive relief, and in my opinion is distinguishable on the subject of other remedy.

In People v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 468, it was held that mandamus was the only safe remedy to compel a delivery of bonds of which the treasurer was the lawful custodian. The petition prayed action and not restraint.

In the case of Giddings v. Secretary of State, 93 Mich. 1 (52 N. W. 944, 16 L. R. A. 402), relator prayed both injunctive and active relief. The court compelled the respondent to give the notice required by law. That necessarily involved the omission to give another notice which the court restrained, and which would have been ineffective after the decision of the case had it been given. The court had jurisdiction to compel the giving of the notice required by law. We do not discover that the questions now under discussion were raised.

Elliott v. City of Detroit, 121 Mich. 611 (84 N. W. 820), came to this court on certiorari to the Wayne circuit. No opinion was filed. The reporter in his statement of facts said that the case was removed to this court by certiorari where the decision and opinion of the lower court were affirmed. It is impossible, at this time, to ascertain what authority there was for the statements of the reporter, as there is nothing, on file or of record, to show what the court said or did or that the cause was argued. An examination of the files, however, indicates that the question of the fitness of the remedy sought was raised in the circuit court. There is nothing to indicate that the question of injunctive relief was discussed or considered there or here. There is nothing to show what questions were discussed or waived here. If, therefore, this case is a precedent on these questions, it must be merely by force of the fact that the relief was granted. In my judgment this case should not be considered conclusive of the question, but should be treated as the misapplication of the rule through inadvertence. I cannot

conceive that the court intended to overrule the case of People, ex rel. Russell, v. Inspectors, supra, or that it would deliberately overrule any case without referring to it, and so stating. It is a significant fact that this is the only case that counsel have found where a writ of mandamus has issued to compel inaction alone, and it is also significant that applications of that kind have not been frequent, if it is a proper practice.

The cases of Maclean v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 52 Mich. 257 (18 N. W. 396), and Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich. 328 (48 N. W. 577), required the vacation of orders and involved affirmative action. Renaud v. Court of Arbitration, 124 Mich. 648 (83 N. W. 620, 51 L. R. A. 458, 83 Am. St. Rep. 346), was similar and included an order on application for a writ of prohibition, which alone was sufficient to dispose of that case.

Several cases were cited where circuit judges have been compelled to vacate orders for preliminary injunctions. That is a common practice where they are issued contrary to law. If we follow the practice indulged in in Elliott v. City of Detroit, supra, it is obvious that we cannot refuse it in any mandamus case where there is another remedy by bill in chancery, if the refusal will be followed by greater expense or inconvenience. We have seen that there is a remedy in equity in this controversy, and that remedy is still available. We have refused to grant this writ in innumerable cases where an action at law or suit in chancery was available, and we have endeavored to be consistent in our adherence to this fundamental rule relating to the remedy by mandamus, as we should be to the companion principle that injunctive relief is contrary to the very nature of the writ. We should not allow the former rule to be overturned by the one inadvertent violation of that rule, shown to have occurred in the Elliott Case. The same identical thing happened in the case of Carpenter v. St. Clair Circuit Judge, 122 Mich. 323 (81 N. W. 95), and the case of Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co.

v. Charlevoix Circuit Judge, 133 Mich. 122 (94 N. W. 1134), corrects the practice; the opinion saying:

"It seems that these cases were overlooked at the time of the decision of Carpenter v. St. Clair Circuit Judge."

Other similar instances might be mentioned. It is equally true of the other point so clearly covered in People, ex rel. Russell, v. Inspectors, supra.

In my judgment this should result in a denial of this writ, and the relator should be left to the remedy afforded by chancery. However, in view of an exigency which appeals strongly to my Brethren, and in deference to their view thereof, I have considered the merits of this case.

I am of the opinion that this act, which I consider to be clearly constitutional, has pointed out a way that amendments may be submitted, and that, the council having adopted and voted to submit this amendment, it may be considered as proposed by it, whether we go to the extent of saying that the act points out a practical method of procedure, by petition merely, without any legislative deliberation or action by the council in framing an amendment according to the prayer of the petitioner. That question is set at rest, so far as the submission of the preliminary question of revision is concerned, by the case of Common Council of City of Jackson v. Harrington, 160 Mich. 550 (125 N. W. 383), and it may be that it should govern in cases of amendment, where no provision is made for a preliminary vote, though possibly a distinction might be made were the question a crucial one in this case. I concur, however, with Mr. Justice BLAIR's conclusion that the charter of the city of Detroit must be revised under the provisions of Act No. 279, Pub. Acts 1909, before amendments can be made in accordance with its provisions. I agree with Mr. Justice BLAIR in regard to the subject of the bonds.

I concur in granting relief, in view of the unexplained action of the court in the Elliott Case, and the reliance naturally placed thereon by counsel. The case should be

overruled as out of harmony with the authorities generally, including our own cases.

BIRD, MOORE, BROOKE, and STONE, JJ., concurred with HOOKER, J.

BLAIR, J. This is an application for a review by certiorari of the order of the Wayne circuit court dismissing a petition filed by the attorney general on the relation of taxpayers to restrain the common council of Detroit from submitting to a vote of the electors of that city a proposal to amend its charter. The petition sets out, briefly, the facts, and the answer of the council admits them. A hearing was had upon undisputed facts, and the court below considered the whole matter as involving only a question of law.

The facts, in brief, are these: In March of the present year a petition signed by more than 20 per cent. of the electors of the city was filed with the city clerk, asking for the submission to a vote of the electors at a general or special election of a proposed amendment to the charter, which would give the city the right to own and operate the street railroads. The council, without acting on the matter, transmitted it to the governor, who approved and returned the same. Thereupon the council took into consideration, the matter of calling a special election. Pending such consideration, application for mandamus was filed and argued. After the decision of the lower court, the council called such election for the 15th day of August. Prior to that date this writ of certiorari issued. The application for mandamus was based on three principal grounds, viz.:

(I) Act No. 279 of the Public Acts of 1909, under which, if at all, the proceedings taken can be upheld, is unconstitutional.

(II) The proceedings taken have not been in accordance with said act.

(III) The proposed amendment, if adopted, would be unconstitutional and invalid