would be immaterial whether the search and seizure proceedings were regular and valid or not. 23 Cyc. pp. 250, 251; State v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 479; Commonwealth v. Welsh, 110 Mass. 359.

2. It is contended that a demand in open court by the prosecutor for the production of a revenue receipt, and the remark of the court that "unless time is asked it will be presumed that the request is refused," were prejudicial, and in violation of respondent's right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Upon this question this court has already held against the contention of respondent. People v. Moore, 155 Mich., at page 114 (118 N. W. 742). The language of the court in that opinion leaves no doubt but that the demand of counsel and the remark of the court were not prejudicial to respondent. And in this case respondent later testified fully relative to this matter, giving his reasons for procuring such revenue receipt.

3. Proof of the chemical analysis was objected to and an exception to its introduction taken, because it was done without the authority of the court which issued the search warrant, and without authority of law. The evidence is clear that the identical liquor seized was analyzed, and the accuracy of the analysis is not questioned. The objection is not tenable. The rights to the property seized and the regularity of the seizure are not before the court. The statute provides the procedure for seizure and forfeiture, and remedies are open to respondent for redress if any wrong or injury was committed by the sheriff. This evidence was material and admissible upon this prosecution.

4. The prosecution undertook to show shipments and delivery of beer and whisky to this place of business conducted by respondent and his partner, Pratt, by the original shipping bills receipted by respondent's agent, and other evidence. These bills were produced by the freight agent of the railroad company, who had orders from respondent to deliver his freight to R. L. Mosher, a dray

man, and all of the shipments were receipted for either by R. L. Mosher or his drivers. His son testified that he personally delivered two barrels which were billed as beer, and receipted for them. His father was in New Mexico when the case was tried. The son testified that his father had the delivery of respondent's goods which came by rail. The receipts by the accredited agent, Mosher, at least tended to show a delivery to respondent, and the testimony of the drayman's son showed an actual delivery of one consignment. This evidence was admissible for the purpose offered. 25 Cyc. pp. 249, 250, and cases cited. The court was not in error in refusing to strike out this testimony. The verdict of the jury is supported by the evidence.

We find no error in the case.

The conviction is affirmed, and the court below directed to proceed to judgment.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, HOOKER, and MOORE, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. FISCH.

1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PUBLICATION OF RESOLUTION-BOARD OF SUPERVISORS-LOCAL-OPTION LAW.

The designation either of every newspaper in the county or of a paper named and every other newspaper, was a sufficient designation of the paper in which to publish the resolution of the board of supervisors declaring the adoption of prohibition in the county, under Act No. 207, Pub. Acts 1889 (2 Comp. Laws, § 5412 et seq.).

2. SAME-RESOLUTION OF SUPERVISORS-CLERK'S DUTIES. Evidence that the clerk of the board received the affidavit of publication and on May 2d spread it on the record by pasting the same in the record, and certifying the date thereon, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute requiring him to spread it on the record.

3. SAME.

That the certificate of the clerk merely gives the date of affixing the affidavit instead of the date of filing, does not invalidate the record where it appeared that the same was not in his office on the preceding day.

Error to Presque Isle; Emerick, J. Submitted January 20, 1911. (Docket No. 196.) Decided March 13,

1911.

Fred Fisch, Sr., was convicted of violating the localoption law. Affirmed.

Dafoe & Johnson, for appellant.

Franz C. Kuhn, Attorney General, and George A. Morris, Prosecuting Attorney (Henry & Henry, of counsel), for the people.

HOOKER, J. Defendant was convicted of violating the local-option law, and has appealed, claiming that it does not appear that such law was in force in the county.

The errors alleged and relied on appear to be that the resolution of the board as to publication was invalid, in that:

1. It omitted to name and designate a newspaper. We understand the admitted fact to be that, as originally adopted, the resolution required "publication in every newspaper within the county." This was amended the following day to read "in the Presque Isle News and all the other newspapers in the county.". Either was a sufficient designation to comply with the law. See Madill v. Midland Common Council, 156 Mich. 56 (120 N. W.

2, 3. That the clerk failed to indorse the filing and fact of filing on the affidavit of publication on the day of its delivery to him, and that he did not spread the affidavit of publication on the records of the official proceedings of the board. The law (2 Comp. Laws, § 5425) provides:

"Such original affidavit of publication shall be filed with the clerk of the board of supervisors and he shall spread the same on the records of the board, following the record of the adoption of the resolution of prohibition, and the said clerk shall state next on the record the date when said notice and affidavit of publication was entered for record, and shall sign the record officially.'

This is what was done: The affidavit was delivered to the clerk, and on May 2d the original affidavit was posted upon the record of the board of supervisors following the record of the adoption of the resolution of prohibition. This was done on the 2d day of May; the affidavit having been sworn to before a notary on April 30th. It is evident that this affidavit was delivered to the clerk on or before May 2d. That was a sufficient "filing with the clerk" under the statute, which does not in express terms require him to indorse anything upon it. Moreover, an examination of the record at the hearing showed that the filing was indorsed on the affidavit, being concealed by pasting. It was then his duty to spread the same upon the records, etc. He did literally spread the original affidavit on the record by pasting it there, and this was in exact compliance with the exact terms of the statute, which requires that such original affidavit * shall be filed with (not by) the clerk and he shall spread the same (i. e., the original affidavit) on the records," etc. We do not mean to imply that a transcription of said affidavit would not have been a compliance with the law, but we hold that the course taken was valid.

*

4. The further contention is made that the clerk failed to comply with the requirement that

"The said clerk shall state next on the record the date

when said notice and affidavit of publication was entered for record, and shall then sign the record officially." What was done is shown by the entry:

"The above proof of publication was affixed to this page on the 2d day of May, A. D. 1910."

We must necessarily infer from this record that the affidavit was entered on or before May 2d, and after April 30th. Respondent's brief states that it was not in the clerk's office on May 1st. It certainly appears that it was not received after May 2d, and we are of the opinion that this was sufficient. It was filed May 2d. See Madill v. Midland Common Council, 156 Mich. 61, 62 (120 N. W. 355); Bauer v. Township Board of Denmark, 157 Mich. 395 (122 N. W. 121); Wightman v. Village of Tecumseh, 157 Mich. 330 (122 N. W. 122); People v. Hamilton, 143 Mich. 1 (106 N. W. 275).

It is unnecessary to refer to other questions raised, as they are covered by what has been said.

We find no error, and the judgment is affirmed.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, and MCALVAY, JJ., concurred.

MOCAIN v. SMITH.

WORK AND LABOR-IMPLIED CONTRACTS-PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATIONS, LIMITED.

Testimony tending to show that defendant was secretary and treasurer of a limited partnership association, that plaintiff's testator was private secretary of defendant's father and occupied the same offices with defendant, that he was some