from the testimony that plaintiffs in error were as fully authorized, by the section above quoted, to seize the gambling apparatus and arrest the proprietor thereof, as if they had been armed with a warrant for that purpose. The question, therefore, was not whether they were guilty of an assault and battery in making the arrest, but whether they were guilty of the offense for which they were indicted by reason of their having used more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances; and, in the main, that question was fairly submitted to the jury. The first assignment of error is not sustained. In charging as therein specified, the learned judge expressed a decided opinion as to the effect of the commonwealth's testimony, but the jury could not have been unduly influenced thereby for the reason that in the very next sentence he said to them, "If, on the other hand, you believe the evidence of the defendants and their witnesses, that they exercised no more force than was necessary to vindicate the law and protect themselves from injury, they should be acquitted." The question of fact was thus left to the jury without anything more than a mere expression of opinion as to the effect of the testimony, if believed. One of the questions involved in the second specification is, whether an officer, authorized to arrest without warrant, is bound before doing so " to give the party to be arrested clear and distinct notice of his purpose to make the arrest, and also of the fact that he is legally qualified to make it;" in other words, may the officer be convicted of assault and battery for making the arrest without first giving such notice? While, in most cases, it may be prudent for the officer to give the notice before making the arrest, it is going too far to say in effect that he is required to do so; and, therefore, we think the learned judge erred in charging the jury as he did on that subject. In considering the question, as presented by the undisputed facts of this case, it is fair to assume that the constable and his assistants, plaintiffs in error, were authorized to make the arrest; that the authority with which the constable was expressly clothed by the act was, at least, equivalent to a warrant. It is doubtless the duty of an officer who executes a warrant of arrest to state the nature and substance of the process which gives him the authority he professes to exercise, and, if it is demanded, to ex hibit his warrant, that the party arrested may have no excuse for resistance. 1 Chit. C. L. 51. On the other hand, as is said in Commonwealth v. Cooley, et al., 72 Mass. R. 350, 356, "the accused is required to submit to the arrest, to yield himself immediately and peaceably into the custody of the officer, who can have no opportunity until he has brought his prisoner into safe custody, to make him acquainted with the cause of his arrest, and the nature, substance, and contents of the warrant under which it is made. These are obviously successive steps. They cannot all occur at the same instant of time. The explanation must follow the arrest, and the exhibition and perusal of the warrant must come after the authority of the officer has been acknowledged, and his power over his prisoner has been acquiesced in." The general principle thus stated is equally applicable to arrest without warrant under authority of the statute. The second asssignment of error is sustained. Judgment reversed, and it is ordered that the record, with copy of the foregoing opinion setting forth the cause of reversal, be remitted to the court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne county for further proceedings. Q. A. Gates, John T. Lenahan, and T. R. Martin, for commonwealth. H. W. Palmer and John McGahren, contra. Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. ZEIS v. LUZERNE COUNTY. Defendant was convicted of seduction and sentenced to pay fine and undergo imprisonment. Having served his term and paid the fine he was discharged on habeas corpus; the record of the sentence and the commitment showing no sentence for costs. Held, that the county was liable for the costs. The opinion of the court was delivered October 13, 1884, by RICE, P. J.-This case is without reported precedent, and the question involved is not likely ever to arise again. The question is, whether the county is liable for the costs of prosecution in the case of Commonwealth v. Hadfield. See In re. Hadfield 13 Luz. Leg. Reg. 265, 3 Kulp 135. The case differs from an indictment quashed, or ended by nolle prosequi, in neither of which cases is there a conviction or discharge. Neither of these cases comes within the terms of any of our statutes relating to the liability of the county for costs in criminal cases. In the present case there was a conviction, a sentence, and, presumably, a discharge according to law. The discharge was not under the insolvent laws, it is true, but nevertheless it was held that the defendant, Hadfield, could no longer be held on the commitment. The case seems to us to be analogous to the case of a pardon after conviction and before sentence, in which it is held that the. county is liable. York County v. Dalhousie, 9 Wr. 372; Commonwealth v. Hitchman, 10 Wr. 357. And now, October 13, 1884, judgment is entered for the plaintiff on the case stated. W. R. Gibbons, for plaintiff. Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. LUZERNE COUNTY 7. CAMP MEETING ASSOCIATION. Under the act of May 14, 1874, and section 2, article IX., of the constitution, only that part of the property of a camp meeting association that is actually used for the purpose of religious worship is exempt from taxation. The opinion of the court was delivered August 16, 1884, by RICE, P. J.-We are of opinion that only the one acre and a half, with the pulpit, auditorium, and tabernacle thereon are exempt from taxation under the act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 158. The section of the act incorporating the defendant association which exempts all its property from taxation, was repealed by section 2, article IX., of the constitution, and the act of 1874, supra, and the latter is, therefore, the law governing the case. Lehigh Iron Company v. Lower Macungie Township, 31 Sm. 485, 486; Londonderry v. Berger, 2 Pears. Dec. 230; Moore v. Williams, 1 Kulp 256. It is positively decided in Summit Grove Camp Meeting Association v. School District, etc., 12 W. N. C. 103, that under the act of 1874 the residue of the property described in the case stated is subject to taxation. And now, to wit, August 16, 1884, in accordance with the stipulations of the case stated, judgment is entered thereon in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of thirteen dollars. W. S. McLean, for plaintiff. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. FRAUENTHAL V. DERR & BRO. 1. A suit cannot be maintained against a person merely for undertaking to get a property insured where he was paid nothing, and where the premium had not been paid. 2. That is a mere non-feasance of an executory promise. Error to the court of Common Pleas of Luzerne county. The opinion of the court was delivered October 3, 1883, by GREEN, J.-It is not very easy to determine the precise character of the contract upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover. The narr is not printed and is not before us. The history of the case does not define the contract, nor does the argument. It is alleged that certain facts recited in the history and argument constituted a valid contract, but a contract for what is not stated. The plaintiff's first point claims that if the defendants agreed to furnish to the plaintiff insurance upon his stock and furniture, in consideration of his agreement to pay them for so doing a premium upon such insurance, such an agreement would constitute a valid contract. The substance of this point seems to be treated, by the counsel on both sides and the court, as the test of the plaintiff's case, and as such it seems to us perfectly clear that the answer of the learned judge of the court below to the point was He said the point would be well taken if the contract was that the defendants would insure the plaintiff, or if the rate correct. of premium was to be paid to them as consideration for their service in procuring the insurance. But the court proceeds to say, under the testimony this was not the contract, and the point was inapplicable. It appears to us the learned judge was entirely correct in this statement. The plaintiff was examined as a witness and he made no pretence that the defendants undertook to insure him themselves, or that the premium was to be paid to them for insurance by them. On the contrary, the plaintiff testified that the defendants were to obtain policies of insurance for him in certain companies, and the premium was to be paid to the companies. In other words, the actual insurance contracts were to be made with other parties than with the defendants, and those insuring parties were to receive the premiums. This being the case there was no contract of insurance between the plaintiff and defendants, and hence there could be no recovery upon the theory of such a contract. If it was a contract to procure insurance, then, as there was no stipulation for the payment of any compensation by the plaintiff to the defendants for their services in procuring the insurance, there was no consideration for the contract on their part. Of course the premium to be paid was no consideration money to the defendants, because it was to be paid for the insurance itself, and not for procuring it. Moreover, it was to be paid to the insurance companies as the consideration of the contracts with them, and not to the defendants, except only as the agents of the companies. It is suggested that part of the premiums was to go to the defendants, and therefore there was sufficient consideration for their engagement. But, as the learned judge of the court below very well says, the commission to be paid to the defendants was derived from the companies, and was the consideration money from the latter to the defendants as their agents in effecting policies, and if the defendants are to be regarded as the agents of the companies in the transaction, the cause of action would be against the companies for failure to deliver the policies, and not against their agents. The present action regards the defendants only, and in their individual capacity, and proceeds upon the idea that they failed to procure insurance, but are nevertheless, liable as effectively as if policies had been executed and premiums paid. But it is evident that |