forget that the defendant had the verdict. The jury have found that the fund in court belonged not to G. M. Black, but to his son, Frederick G. Black, the claimant. To relieve the unsuccessful party from the payment of the costs, because there was probable cause for believing, as he did, that this money was the property of his debtor, and to put them upon the successful party, whose theory of the case has been adopted and approved by the verdict of the jury, would seem to be anomalous and arbitrary. The true view of the case would seem to be this: The issue was directed by the court, for the purpose of ascertaining the real ownership of the money in the hands of the garnishees. The witnesses who were sworn were called for the purpose of affording the necessary information on this question. A comprehensive view of all the testimony results in the conviction that, while the plaintiff had abundant reason for believing that the fund was the property of his debtor, it was, in point of fact, as legally ascertained by the jury, the money of another. Under these circumstances, it seems to us equitable that the costs and expenses should not be borne exclusively by either party, but should be divided equally between them. It is therefore ordered that one-half the costs, including the witness fees on both sides, be paid by the plaintiff, and that the other half thereof be paid by the defendant, and the rule is discharged. W. H. McCartney, for plaintiff. John Lynch and J. T. Lenahan, for defendants. Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. IN RE ANTHRACITE BASE BALL ASSOCIATION. The opinion of the court was delivered January 14, 1884, by PERSHING, P. J.-To avoid the expense of an audit, the question involved in the distribution of the small fund realized from the Sheriff's sale on the above stated fi. fa. has been amicably submitted to the decision of the court. To quote from the case stated: "The question being for the court to decide is, whether the claim of those who earned their money in the employ of Mr. Sullivan as base ball players are entitled, as wage claimants, to priority on the fund, either under the act of 1862 (P. L. 479) or under the act of 1883 (P. L. 116). It is further agreed that the claimants played base ball under contracts made prior to the act of June 15th, 1883." The counsel for the claimants conceded that the act of 1862, which is local to Schuylkill county, gives them no support, and rested his case on the later act of 1883. This act amended the first section of the act of April 9th, 1872, "for the better protection of the wages of mechanics, miners, laborers, and others," so as to make it include servant girls, or other servants or helpers in hotels, restaurants, boarding houses, or private families, porters, hostlers, laundrymen and washerwomen, seamsters and seamstresses employed by merchant tailors, milliners, dressmakers, clothiers, shirt manufacturers, and clerks employed in stores, hands, laborers, mechanics, printers, apprentices hired for wages or salary, giving to these a preference for wages earned for any period not exceeding six months, and to an amount not exceeding two hundred dollars, immediately preceding the sale of the works, mines, manufactories, or business, or property connected with the carrying on of the business, in or by which the wages were earned. In Sullivan's appeal, 27 Sm. 107, it was decided that, under the act of 1872, a servant girl, cook at a hotel, was not entitled to the preference for wages due, given by that act. It was, doubtless, to remedy this, and like cases decided under that statute, that the amended act of 1883 was passed. Much as it has extended the scope of the act of 1872, we think it overlooks base ball playing as an employment entitled to special legislative protection. Without giving extended reasons for our conclusion, or further referring to the language of the act of 1883, we think, and so decide, that the word "business" does not refer to nor include the carrying on or management of a base ball club, nor the word "laborer" apply to the players of base ball, in the sense in which these words are to be interpreted as employed in the act of 1883. The persons therefore named in the case stated are not entitled to priority on the fund for distribution. Besides this, the notice of claim served on the Sheriff in this case comes far short of the requirements of the statute. Upon this point, as well as the other question before us, we refer to Millen v. Bank of Corry, 1 W. N. C. 55; Allison v. Johnson, 11 Nor. 314; Pardee's Ap., 4 Out. 408; Llewellyn et al. Ap., 16 W. N. C. 69. Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. T. P. MORGAN v. E. C. TRESCOTT. Where exception is taken to the bail entered for an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, before the appeal has been actually entered in the Common Pleas; the proper practice is for the justice to grant a rule on the appellant, to justify, or enter new bail. Motion to strike off appeal. The opinion of the court was delivered February 11, 1884, by WOODWARD, J.-It seems from the papers before us, that judgment was entered by the justice in this case, on the 11th June, 1883, in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $43.55. On the 19th June, 1883, an appeal was entered by the defendant, and bail was given in the usual form; and on the 20th June, 1883, a transcript was made out by the justice. It does not appear, however, when this transcript showing the appeal was delivered to the defendant. It was filed in the prothonotary's office on 27th September, 1883. On the 11th October, 1883, the plaintiff filed in the prothonotary's office a transcript showing the following proceedings before the justice: "June 21st inst., the plaintiff appears and takes exexceptions to the appeal, the bail or bondsman not being the owner of any real estate in Luzerne county. After the plaintiff excepted to the bail, the defendant was notified that the bail was excepted to, and was held by the justice to be not good, and that he must put in new bail, and that he neglected to do so. Consequently the appeal was stricken off." The proper practice in cases like this, where the appeal has not yet been actually entered in the Common Pleas, is for the justice to grant a rule on the appellant to justify his bail, or enter new bail. This may have been what the justice in this case intended to do, although his statement of the facts is by no means clear. See Cummins v. Forsman, 6 Barr. 195. We will give the defendant thirty days within which to perfect his appeal. If this is done, we will then discharge the rule to strike off the appeal. E. A. Lynch, for defendant. A. Ricketts, for plaintiff. Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 7. CONRAD SCHAUB. 1. It is a general rule in criminal pleading, that two distinct offences cannot be charged in one, and the same count, of the indictment. 2. The act of 26th February, 1855 (Pur. p. 946, pl. 38), so far as it was intended to apply to, and forbid the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday, was repealed by the act of 12th April, 1875 (Pur. 2031, pl. 16). 3. An indictment which charges in the same count, the offence of selling liquor on Sunday, and also the offence of allowing liquor to be drank "on or within the premises," on Sunday, is bad for duplicity, and will be quashed. Motion to quash indictment. The opinion of the court was delivered February 11, 1884, by WOODWARD, J.-The indictment in this case charges that the defendant did, on the twenty-first day of October, A. D. 1883, the said twenty-first day of October being then and there the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, "sell, trade and barter in vinous, spirituous, malt and brewed liquors, the same being wine, brandy, gin, whiskey, rum, porter, ale and beer, and did then and there sell and cause to be sold to John G. Davis and Philip Price, and knowingly allowed and permitted vinous, spirituous, malt and brewed liquors to be drank on and within the premises and house occupied by the said Conrad Schaub, the * same being wine, brandy, etc., contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and provided, etc." The act of 26th February, 1855 (Pur. p. 946, pl. 38), provides that "it shall not be lawful for any person to sell, trade or barter in any spirituous or malt liquors, wine or cider, on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, or for the keeper or keepers of any hotel, inn, tavern, ale house, beer house, or other public house or place, knowingly to allow or permit any spirituous or malt liquors, wine or cider, to be drank on or within the premises or house occupied or kept by such keeper or keepers, his or their agents or servants, on the said first day of the week." The act of 12th April, 1875 (Pur. 2031, pl. 16), is in these words: "It shall not be lawful for any person, with or without license, to sell to any person any intoxicating drink, on any day on which elections are now or hereafter may be required to be held, nor on Sunday, nor at any time to a minor, or to a person visibly affected by intoxicating drinks." The penalty provided in the act of 1855 is fifty dollars for each and every violation of the section which prohibits the sale of liquors on Sunday. The penalty under the act of 12th April, 1875, for a violation of any of its provisions, is "a fine of not less than two hundred, nor more than five hundred dollars, with the costs of prosecution, and to stand committed until the sentence of the court is complied with, not exceeding ninety days, etc." It is a noticeable fact, that, while the act of 1875 makes selling liquor on Sunday a serious offence, and materially increases the penalty and punishment, it entirely omits the provision contained in the act of 1855, relative to allowing liquor to be drank "on or within the premises," on "the said first day of the week." The indictment before us contains but a single count, and seeks to convict the defendant, not of one offence, but of two offences, which, under the statutes to which we have called attention, are entirely distinct and independent of each other, and the penalty and punishment of which are entirely diverse. Can such an indictment be sustained? It seems to us that the present case falls within the general rule of criminal pleading, that two distinct offences cannot be |