losses incurred. In point of fact, he was allowed to recover, not the withdrawal value of his stock, but its par value as reduced. That this was error is too obvious to need an extended discussion. The plaintiff owned seven shares of stock in the first series. Upon five of these shares he had borrowed the full amount, $200 per share, and had given one or more judgments therefor amounting to $1000 with the seven shares of stock as collateral. Two of his shares were what is called free stock, that is, it had not been borrowed upon although pledged with the others. In 1877 the association, owing, it is stated, to the general depression of business, passed a resolution reducing the par value of the stock from $200 to $116 per share; that the stockholders pay in $20.20 per share, and that all of the stockholders in the first series who should comply with the resolution prior to the ensuing May meeting should "be entitled to the amount of their stock at $116 per share." The amount of plaintiff's assessments on his seven shares under this arrangement was $141.40, which was charged against his two free shares. He then procured satisfaction to be entered upon the judgments which the association had against him. No money was paid by the plaintiff, and the effect of the transaction was the satisfaction of the judgments which were only paid in part, and an advance to him by the association of $141.40 on the faith and credit of his remaining two shares of stock. As a result of this somewhat questionable proceeding, he held two shares of stock of the fixed value of $116 each-$232, upon which he owed the company $141.40, leaving an apparent balance due him of $90.60, which he would be entitled to receive upon the final winding up of the first series. That he was not entitled to sue for it at law was settled in O'Rourke v. West Pennsylvania Loan and Building Association, 12 Norris, 308. To meet this difficulty, on July 6, 1881, he gave notice of withdrawal, and subsequently commenced this suit, in which he was permitted to recover the above sum of $90.60 with interest. The result is to let him out as a withdrawal stockholder with a full share of the profits on the seven shares, and to avoid all losses in the winding up resulting from expenses, depreciation of property, etc. On the five shares he got his profit for the reason that his judgments were satisfied without payment, and on the two shares he gets the matured value of the stock. This result could not be reached without error somewhere. Upon the trial below, assuming that he was a withdrawal stockholder, he should have been confined to his notice, and permitted only to recover what he claimed therein, viz., “ to have returned to him the moneys paid in by him, and returnable to him as a withdrawing stockholder, under the provisions of the constitution and by-laws of the association." The par value of the stock has nothing to do with the case, and should not have been considered. Just what amount of fines, losses, and expenses the company were entitled to charge against him we are not called upon to say, for the reason that the plaintiff was not a withdrawing stockholder, and could not have been under the act of 1859, so long as his stock was held in pledge. Watkins v. Building and Loan Association, I Outerbridge, 514. It appears from the plaintiff's own testimony that the two shares for which this suit was brought were applied by his direction to his indebtedness or arrearages on the other five shares, as well as on the two shares in question. This, as before stated, was $140; no part of which has been paid. It was only charged. It would be further liable for all proper arrearages and charges, and for his proportion of losses which may have been incurred prior to his notice of withdrawal, conceding such withdrawal to be valid. For it is idle to say that, when stock, or a particular series of stock, matures, a holder is entitled absolutely to its par value. From such value must necessarily be deducted any expenses or losses incurred in winding up the association, or the particular series. Such losses may be trifling, or they may be serious. What the stockholders are entitled to under such circumstances is an equal division of the assets, less expenses and losses. Aside from this, assuming that the resolution of February 6, 1877, matured the stock of the first series, I am unable to see how a stockholder of that series can withdraw after such maturity.. The plain object of the act of 1859 was to permit a stockholder to withdraw during the active life of the association or the series. It makes no provision for a withdrawal after the stock has reached. par, and the association exists only for the purpose of liquidation. Nor can any object be perceived for such withdrawal except to gain the right to sue immediately for the value of the stock. This would be giving an unfair advantage which the law does not favor. The plaintiff has no right to recover in this action, and the court below should have so instructed the jury. This sustains the fourth and fifth assignments. The others are not in conformity with the rules of court. Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. STAUB 7. WOLFE. 1. A witness who testifies erroneously may explain and correct at any time during the course of the trial. 2. Whether a contract is obtained by fraud upon one of the parties is purely a question of fact. 3. Where a contract of accord and satisfaction calls for the performances of certain acts by one of the parties, non-performance of them remits the other party to an action as if the accord and satisfaction had not been attempted. 4. That the court below erred in prescribing the order in which counsel should address the jury is not ground for reversal in the Supreme Court. Error to Common Pleas of Luzerne county. The opinion of the court was delivered April 28, 1884, by GREEN, J.-This action originated before a justice of the peace. The transcript shows that the plaintiff claimed two hundred and twenty-five dollars from the defendant as a balance due her for work and labor done by herself and her child. It also shows that she testified to that amount, and that a judgment was rendered in her favor for that sum by the justice. On her examination in chief, she said her claim was for four hundred and ninety-two dollars, and the next day, under objection and exception by the defendant, she said this was a mistake, and that her claim was for two hundred and twenty-five dollars. We are not able to perceive any legal reason for refusing to permit her to give this testimony. She is a very ignorant woman, did not understand the English language, and might easily have made a mistake in stating the amount of her claim when on the witness stand in a court of justice. The fact that she had before the justice presented a claim of two hundred and twenty-five dollars, and testified in support of it, is conclusive that there was a mistake somewhere; and that being so, there was certainly a right of explanation. The evidence as to the time over which her work extended, and the rate of wages paid for such labor corroborates the correctness of her explanation. Nor can we discover any error in the action of the court in reference to the written evidence of the settlement. The court charged the jury that on its face it was a full and final settlement between the parties, and amounted to an acquittance. The question whether it was obtained from her by fraud and deception was a pure question of fact, and was necessarily and very fairly submitted to the jury by the court. The jury found that it was so obtained, and we think there was sufficient testimony in the case both to justify the court in leaving the question to the jury and to warrant the jury in finding the verdict they did. No money or other thing of value was given to the plaintiff at the time the paper was signed. As the jury has found that she was then entitled to more than a hundred dollars, in addition to whatever she may have received before, we are bound to assume that the effect of the paper upon its face was to deprive her of that amount, which, irrespective of the paper, she had a right to demand of the defendant. A person in her situation and circumstances is entitled to perfectly fair and upright treatment in making a settlement and signing a paper such as this. She testified that she was induced to sign it by reason of promises made by the defendant to furnish her with a house and support. She was asked: "Q. State what the conversation was between Staub and you in Esquire Ziegler's office? A. That they had now settled, and everything was in the paper, and I would get just what was stated-I would get all that was stated." And again: "Q. State whether or not he made you any promises in 'Squire Ziegler's office? A. He told me all the time that I was provided for— that I would get it all. Q. In 'Squire Ziegler's office? A. Yes. Q. What promise did he make to you in 'Squire Ziegler's office ? A. He promised me a dwelling and all that I needed that was necessary." There was other testimony of a similar import in the case, and the court below, in dealing with this branch of the case, charged the jury that, if the plaintiff signed the paper understanding fully what she was doing, and if the representations about the furnishing a house and support for her were not the inducement for her signing, or if such representations were not made, then she was debarred by the paper and could not recover. But if, on the contrary, the jury believed such statements were made to her, and if they were the inducement and consideration for her execution of the paper, and it failed by the defendant refusing to perform his agreement, then if any money was due her and unpaid for her wages, she could recover notwithstanding the paper. In all this we think there was no error. It cannot be said there was no evidence, or only a scintilla, upon this subject. It is not difficult to understand that a woman situated as this one was, ignorant, in a strange land, unacquainted with the people around her, alone, friendless, in destitute circumstances, with an aged mother and two small children dependant upon her, without a home, without food or any provision for her support, and unable to speak our language, might very easily be induced to sign almost any paper upon a promise that if she would do so she should have a home and support provided for her. In such a case nice and critical discriminations upon the very words of the testimony are not requisite, nor are they conducive to the due administration of justice. It is the substance only of the language and statements employed that needs to be considered. Upon a review of the whole testimony, we are satisfied with the manner in which the subject was treated by the court below. This practically disposes of the case, as the several assignments of error raise only questions which relate to the matters we have considered. As to the ninth assignment, it is only necessary to say that the Supreme Court will not reverse a judgment because the court below erred in prescribing the |