in the upper part of the hold may still be used with as much advantage as ever, while the water is flowing through the valve to prevent the fire from extending into the lower hold. By means of this valve a vessel may be washed out every day or two, and kept free from the stagnation and offensive smell of the bilge water, which is so prejudicial to the health and comfort of the passengers and crew. The awful diseases which sometimes originate and rage on shipboard, may be mostly prevented by such facilities for promoting cleanliness and comfort-for the preservation of health, life and property.

The fire-engine provided by law for steamers, can only work while the steam-engine works, and the stream of water which it may discharge cannot be pointed at the fire or discharged directly on it, if in the hold of a vessel filled with suffocating smoke in which no human being can live. A fire-engine with suction hose may be serviceable if kept on deck, and would there assist in extinguishing a fire between decks, while the water valve prevented its extension downwards into the hold.

It is common for merchant vessels to have a freight of gunpowder. If that vessel be furnished with a water valve, the powder may be all stowed near it, and on an alarm of fire, the water may be instantly turned upon the powder, and the immediate abandonment of the vessel be prevented -the preservation of the lives and property be probably secured. A case of fire which lately occurred in Charleston, will show the feeling of our fellow men on such occasions. A fine new schooner arrived in the harbor from Philadelphia. While steering up to the wharves, the captain ordered the hatches to be opened, and immediately fire appeared in her hold. Signals of distress were made, and aid called for from the city. Two of the engine companies went off immediately in steamers provided for the occasion, but on going near her they first hailed her and inquired of the captain whether there was gunpowder on board. When assured that there was not, they went alongside and soon extinguished the fire. Had there been powder on board, they would only have removed the crew and left the vessel to her fate. Let us suppose a cry of fire on board of a manof-war, and that the gunner who has charge of the magazine sees that it is near him. If the magazine be furnished with a water valve, he swamps instantly the powder which surrounds it, saves the ship and her crew from certain destruction, and leaves a probability of extinguishing the flames. Ships of war should always be supplied with such a valve in the magazine.

I will not endeavor to excite your feelings as to the deplorable loss of your late noble packet, the Ocean Monarch. I cannot pretend to say that she and the perishing hundreds on board might have been saved by having a supply of such water valves through her bottom, but I think so. Neither can I pretend to assert that the more recent total loss of lives and property in the lamented steamer Goliah, on Lake Huron, could have been prevented by these water valves; but if she had powder on board as reported, I cannot doubt for a moment that all might have been saved by means of water let in by such valves. Jos. JOHNSON.

represents a section of a vessel with the water valve entire.

2 represents the lower piece of the valve separate.

3 represents the upper piece of the valve, with the shank.

4 represents the plate within the planks, to which the lower piece is secured by bolts or other fastenings.

5 represents the collar fitting the shoulder of the third or upper piece, and secured to the ceiling by wood screws or nails.

A the shank.

E the wrench by which it is turned.

C the screw bolts.

MERCANTILE LAW CASES.

CASES UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF NEW YORK.*

THIS is the first volume of a series of the Reports of our Supreme Court under the new Constitution, and in the language of the reporter we remark, that the decisions contained in this volume convey a very favorable impression of the learning and ability of the judges, and demonstrates the soundness of the principle which gave to the people the power of electing their judges.

By this volume we are made acquainted, not only with the judicial talent of our judges, but are also instructed in the method of conducting business under our new constitution. There are no cases vet reported containing the practice under the code of procedure, but many questions that arise under the recent organization of the judiciary, are discussed in the volume before us. The judges of our Supreme Court have decided many cases which are interesting, not only to the lawyer, but also to the general reader, besides some questions of international law.

One case is an exceedingly important one to our commercial community, and contains an extended commentary upon the law abolishing imprisonment for debt, and to punish fraudulent debtors. His Honor, Judge Edmonds, in delivering his opinion, says that this act has a double aspect, one as a civil remedy, and the other as a criminal proceeding. That the proceedings under the act are never for the benefit of creditors at large of the debtor, except in the single instance of an assignment after the debtor has been convicted of a misdemeanor. That the prosecuting creditor is entitled to a preference over the creditors generally, either for himself alone, or for himself and others of a certain class.

That after the rendition of a judgment against a defendant, it is not necessary that he should be guilty of any fraudulent or criminal conduct to entitle a plaintiff to a process of arrest; but that if the defendant, in violation of law or in contravention of the statute, withholds payment of a judgment or decree rendered against him, though he may make an assignment of all of his estate, bona fide, to all of his creditors, yet the plaintiff is entitled to a prior claim over creditors who have not obtained a judgment, and the debtor will be committed unless he yields possession of his property to the plaintiff in payment of his judgment. We notice, also, another decision in the matter of Bruni.

This was a case arising under the treaty between France and the United States, in relation to the apprehension and delivery of deserters from French vessels in ports of the United States.

The defendant or prisoner was arrested upon the request of the French Consul in New York, as one of the crew and as a deserter from the French steam vessel called the Philadelphia, then in port, on a voyage from Havre to New York and to return. The defendant had been committed by one of the police justices of this city, and sued out a certiorari to the Supreme Court to review and quash the proceedings of the committing magistrate.

The Supreme Court decided, on argument, that no court, judge, justice or other magistrate of this State, can lawfully assume to execute the laws of the United States under this treaty, or those with other foreign nations in regard to the apprehension and delivery of deserters from foreign vessels in the ports of the United States; and that the Act of Congress in relation to this subject, passed March 2d, 1829, confers no power upon any but courts and officers of the United States. The prisoner was discharged.

The next case in this volume of Reports which we will notice is that of Metyzen, a prisoner who was arrested as a fugitive from justice from France, and was

* Reports of Cases in Law and Equity in the Supreme Court of New York. By OLIVER L. BARBOUR, Counsellor at Law. Vol. I. Albany: Gould, Banks, & Gould. New York: Banks, Gould, & Co., 144 Nassau-street.

accused of embezzling money to a large amount while he held the office of a public notary in one of the departments of that country, and was demanded by the French minister at Washington to be arrested and surrendered under the treaty with France of 1843.

The prisoner had been arrested on application to a police magistrate in this city, and been discharged on appeal to the Circuit Court of the United States, and then an application was made to the District Judge of the United States Court, in the city of New York, and on hearing, had been adjudged a fugitive from justice. A warrant of commitment had been signed by the District Judge, and thereupon the President of the United States had issued his mandate to the marshal of New York, commanding him to surrender the prisoner to the diplomatic agents of the French government.

Before the surrender had been actually made, a writ of habeas corpus issued, directed to the marshal, returnable before Edmonds, a judge of the Supreme Court of this State. The Supreme Court, on a review of all the proceedings, held that the President of the United States has no authority, by virtue of a mere treaty stipulation, and without an express enactment of the national Legisla ture, to deliver up a resident of this country to a foreign power.

That under the treaty of 1843, the President cannot execute the power of extradition without both legislative and judicial sanction, previously obtained. The prisoner was accordingly discharged.

This case affords a striking illustration of the benign power existing in our State governments to check the action of the national government when its officers exceed their jurisdiction. Our country is a land of laws, and no part of the law affords the citizen greater security than that which is within the legitimate exercise of State authority.

There are many other subjects contained in this volume which we would be glad to notice, but our limits admonish us to close.

ACTION TO RECOVER EXCESS OF DUTIES PAID UNDER PROTEST.

In the United States District Court, (November, 1848.) Charles Kentgen vs. Cornelius W. Lawrence, Collector of the port of New York.

This was an action to recover an excess of duties paid under protest on a quantity of patent leather, or varnished calves' skins, imported by the plaintiff, and which were charged by the custom-house authorities with 30 per cent duty under the schedule C, of the tariff of 1846, as embraced in the clause "manufactures and articles of leather, or of which leather shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for;" while the plaintiff claimed that they were subject to 20 per cent duty under schedule E, under the clauses "leather, upper of all kinds," or "skins, tanned and dressed, of all kinds; skins not otherwise provided for." The only other special provision in relation to skins is in schedule I, subject to 5 per cent duty, which includes "raw hides and skins of all kinds, whether dried, salted, or pickled, and not otherwise provided for."

The plaintiff claimed that this patent leather was known in commerce as "upper leather," solely being used for the uppers of shoes and boots, and occasionally for the uppers of harness. The defence contended that the Tariff of 1842 had put a legal definition as a "manufacture of leather" upon this article in the following clause: "leather bottles, patent leather, and all other manufactures of leather, &c. ;" and that as the Tariff of 1846 only repeated "all acts and parts of acts repugnant to the provisions of this act," this legal definition of patent leather as a manufacture of leather was still in existence, and must be applied in levying the duty.

The jury, under the charge of the Court, returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant taking exceptions so as to carry up the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE TARIFF-GARden seeds, ETC.

In the United States District Court, (November, 1848,) Judge Nelson, presiding. H. Boving & M. Witte vs. C. W. Lawrence, Collector.

This was an action to recover back a duty of 20 per cent which had been charged on mustard, cardamom, fenugreek, and caraway seeds. On the part of the plaintiffs, it was contended that those seeds were free, as coming under that clause of the Act which provides that garden and all other seeds not otherwise enumerated, shall be free. On the part of the defence, it was contended that the clause which provided that garden and all other seeds shall be free, embraced only such seeds as are imported for the purpose of gardening or agriculture, and that those seeds did not therefore come under that clause; and secondly, that the seeds in question came under the clause which imposes a duty on medicinal drugs, roots, or leaves in a crude state; and that those articles were used and known as drugs. In support of this proposition, two witnesses testified that those articles were used as drugs, and known to druggists under the name by which those articles were now designated. On the other hand, several witnesses, who are commercial men, and in the habit of dealing in those articles, testified that they are universally called seeds, in the language of commerce, and are considered to be such.

The Judge in his charge inclined to the opinion that the articles came under the clause of the Act which provides that garden and other seeds not otherwise enumerated are free, and the jury, without leaving their seats, brought in a verdict for plaintiffs for $365, being the amount claimed.

INSURING AGENTS.

Fourth District Court-Insurance Decision. Thomas W. Woodland vs. Kellog & Clark.

In this case the plaintiff set forth in his petition that the defendants had in 1847, in their capacity of forwarding and commission merchants in New Orleans, shipped several lots of western produce for him, and had also (for him) insured such lots of produce in the Sun Mutual Insurance office of New York, whereof L. Mathews is agent in New Orleans. Petitioner further sets forth that premiums paid into said office on such insurances amounted to $950 95, and that by the charter of the company the insurer is entitled to a certificate of stock in the company to the extent of the premiums paid in. Petitioner averred that defendants, Kellog & Clark, although they had acted as his agents, in effecting the insurances above named, refused to give him an order for a certificate of stock in the insurance company, and withheld the same for their own benefit. The case came up for trial before Judge Strawbridge. The Judge decided that defendants deliver to plaintiff a certificate of stock in the insurance company above mentioned, to the amount of $150, and pay the costs.

LIABILITY OF COLLECTORS OF CUSTOMS.

In the United States District Court, Felix Brisac and Edward De Fontaine vs. C. W. Lawrence, Collector.

This was an action to recover the value of a case of goods, bonded at the custom-house, and not forthcoming when called for. The goods remained in the custom-house about a month, when the duty was paid on them, and a demand made for the delivery, but they could not be found. For the defence, it was contended that the Collector was not personally responsible for the negligence of his subordinates. Verdict for plaintiffs, $452, being the amount claimed.