against the laws, though civil in form, and whether in rem or in personam, is a "criminal case" within the ] rotection of this amendment. (Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616.) The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers, to be used in such a case, is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself. (Id.)

§ 6. Place of trial in criminal cases.The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. (U. S. Const. art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 3. See Rev. Stats. sec. 729.)

Trial for crimes.-This applies to proceedings in Federal courts (Murphy v. People, 2 Cowen, 815; Anderson v. Durin, 6 Wheat. 215; see Amend. arts. iv, v, vi), and is not suspended by the intervention of war. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 123.) A citizen in civil life in no wise connected with military service cannot be tried by a military commission where courts are open 10 hear criminal accusations and redress grievances. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 123.) As soon as it judicially appears of record that the party has pleaded not guilty, an issue has arisen which courts are bound to direct to be tried by a jury. (U. S. v. Gilbert, 2 Sum. 10.) The trial is the examination before a competent tribunal, according to the law of the land. (U. S. v. Curtis, 4 Mason, 232.) Congress must first make an act a crime, affix the penalty, and declare the court having jurisdiction (U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; U. S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415); and any law dispensing with the requisites to constitute a jury is unconstitutional. (Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296; State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436.) A crime committed against the laws of the United States out of the limits of a State is not local, but may be tried at such place as Congress shall designate by law. (U. S. v. Dawson, 15 How. 467; and

see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 215.) A statute which provides that a party may be tried by the court on a charge of libel is void, although it gives him a right of appeal to a court where trial may be had by jury. (Ex parte Dana, 7 Ben. 1.) A statute to confiscate the property of a person engaged in rebellion, in any district in which property may be found, is void. (Norris v. Domisshan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 346.) A proceeding to annul the license of a pilot for neglect of duty is not a criminal proceeding. (Low v. Commissioners, Charlt. R. M. 302.) This provision applies only to the Federal courts. (Re Smith, 10 Wend. 457.) The right of trial by jury is preserved to every one accused of crime who is not attached to the army or navy, or militia in actual service. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.)

§ 7. Jury trial in criminal cases.-In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. (U. S. Const. Am. art. 6.)

These prohibitions are exclusively restrictive on the Federal powers, to prevent interference with the rights of States and their c'tizens (Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410); it does not apply to acts of the legislatures of the several States (Twitchell v. Comnonwealth, 7 Wall. 321; Murphy v. People, 2 Cowen, 815; Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cowen, 819; Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353; Guillote v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 432; Ex parte Smith, 10 Wend. 449; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90), though it applies to the case of offenses committed within the limits of the State. (U. S. v. Dawson, 15 How.

2

467.) This article does not apply to the power to confiscate the property of public enemies (Miller v. U. S., 11 Wall. 268), nor to a proceeding to annul the license of a pilot for neglect of duty. (Low v. Commissioners, Charlt. R. M. 302.) The exception as to trial by military and naval courts, expressed in the Fifth Amendment, governs this amendment by implication. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 123; In re B gert, 2 Sawy. 402.) The guaranty of the right of trial by jury is intended for a state of war as well as for a state of peace, and is equally binding on rulers and people. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 119.) The indictment must set forth the offense with clearness and certainty. (U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; 1 Woods, 308.) Where the accused wrongfully kept away the witnesses, he waives his right to be confronted by them (Reynolds v. U. S., 8 Otto, 145); so, where he admits that absent witnesses will testify to the facts set forth in the affidavit produced on behalf of the United States. (U. S. v. Sacramento, 2 Mont. 239.) The jury are not constituted judges of the law in criminal cases. (U. S. v. Morris, 1 Curt. 23; U. S, v. Shive, Bald. 510; U. S. v. Battiste, 2 Sum. 243; Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151; Pierce v. State, 5 How. 504; 13 N. H. 336; Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. 268; Montee v. Comm., 3 Marsh. J. J. 150.) The provisions of this amendment are satisfied if the accused has been once confronted with and had opportunity to cross-examine the witness. (People v. Penhollow, 42 Hum. 103.) Such provisions do not apply to prosecutions under State laws, or prohibit States proceeding by information. (State v. Boswell, and Schular v. State, 111 Ind. 47; Re Smith, 10 Wend. 457.) A party has a right to judgment of his peers in only those cases in which it has immemorially existed, or in which it has been expressly given in law. (Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539.)

§ 8. Trial by jury in civil cases.-In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall le preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be o herwise re-examined in any

court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. (U. S. Const. Am. art. 7.)

Trial by jury.-This provision relates to trials in the United States courts, and not to trials in State courts. (Livingston v. Moore, 7 Peters, 400; Cox v. Ohio, 5 How. 434; Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 92; 28 La. An. 14; Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510; Dawson v. Shaver, 2 Blackf. 204; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Foster v. Jackson, 57 Ga. 206; Railroad Co. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558: State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57; Huntington v. Bishop, 5 Vt. 186; Livingston v. Mayor, 9 Wend. 85; Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 337.) It does not extend to suits against the government. (McElrath v. U. S., 12 Ct. of Cl. 312.) The restriction is general and applies to all the departments of government alike. (Kleinschmidt v. Dunphy, 1 Mont. 118), the governor as much as any other department (Claim of Reside, 9 Op. Att.-Gen. 200), and to the legislative and judiciary of the territories (Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; Morris, 487; Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109), and to tribunals established under a provisional government. (Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119.) The phrase "common law" is used in contradistinction to equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, and embraces all suits at common law, whatever may be their peculiar form, brought to settle legal rights. (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 483; Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 358; United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; Bains v. The James & Catherine, Bald. 554.) The "trial by jury" means a trial by a tribunal of twelve men acting only upon a unanimous determination: hence, a territorial statute allowing a verdict upon agreement of three-fourths of the jury is void (Kleinschmidt v. Dunphy, 1 Mont. 118); but it does not prevent such legislature from extending the right to cases involving less than twenty dollars. (Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109.) The benefit of the right herein securel may be waived, but the act of waiver should be plain and explicit. (Bank v. Okley, 4 Wheat.

235; Parsons v. Armor, 3 Peters, 415; U. S. v. Fathbone, 2 Paine, 578.) The inhibition contained in this article refers to suits at common law alone, and not suits in admiralty, although the courts of common law have a concurrent jurisdiction (Warring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 89; U. S. v. Bright, Bright. N. P. 19; Bains v. The James & Catherine, Bald. 544), in which suits in admiralty the trial is never by jury (U. S. v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Margaret, 9 Wheat. 421; The Betsey, 4 Cranch. 443; Whelan v. U. S., 7 Cranch, 112; U. S. v. The Queen, 4 Ben. 237; Clark v. U. S 2 Wash. C. C. 519; U. S. v. Irma, 12 Int. Rev. Rec. 42), nor does the provision embrace the established ex· clusive jurisdiction of courts of equity (Shields v. Thoma, 18 How. 353; Woodworth v. Rogers, 3 Wood. & M. 135; Ely v. M. & B. Manuf. Co., 4 Fish. 64; Scott v. Bilgerry, 40 Miss. 199; Motts v. Bennett, 2 Fish, 642), nor to a proceeding under statutory provisions and forms specially provided (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 3 Wis. 157; Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean, 469; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348); or a proceeding to assess damages. (Bonaparte v. Camden R. R., Ball. 205.)

The first clause of this amendment relates only to United States courts. The States are left free to regulate trials in their own courts. (Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294; McLane v. Leicht, 39 Iowa, 401; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90.) The Constitution does not confer, but simply preserves inviolate where it existed already, the right of trial by jury. (McBride v. Stradley, 103 Ind. 465; Seeley v. Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 1.) The wager of law, if it ever had a legal existence in the United States, is completely abolished by the constitutional provisions for trial by jury. (Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheat. 642.) The right to trial by jury thus secured by the Constitution cannot be impaired by blending with a claim cognizable at law a demand for equitable relief. (Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106.) The remission of a part of the verdict, followed by a judg ment for the remainder, as a condition of the denial of a new trial, does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to have the question tried by a jury in violation of this amendment. (Arkansas Valley Lan 1 &