tain whether the proceeding has been taken in good faith, and whether there is respectable evidence, which, if believed, would warrant a jury in finding a verdict for the plaintiffs. In this case there is such evidence, and the plaintiffs are entitled to have the sole issue between the parties decided by a jury. 2. EQUITY-IN AID OF ATTACHMENT-FRAUD - INJUNCTION-STAYING PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURTS-AFTER REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT -SECTIONS 640 AND 720, REV. ST., CONSTRUED-REMEDY AT LAW-PRACTICE. On the same day on which the foregoing action at law was begun, the plaintiffs filed in the same court a petition against the same defendants, praying for an injunction and other equitable relief. The petition reiterated the allegations made in the action at law, and set out additional circumstances of the alleged fraud, and charged that S. was about to sell P.'s entire stock of goods to satisfy his levy, and that it was not more than sufficient to do so; that P. was insolvent and had no other means of payment. It also set out the bringing of the action at law, and levy of an attachment upon the same stock of goods; but that the same will be of no avail, unless S.'s levy be postoned, as in equity it ought, to complainant's attachment. The plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the levy of S. may be declared fraudulent and void as against them, and be postponed to their attachment, and that S. be enjoined from making any sale under his levy; for a receiver to sell said property, and bring the proceeds into court; and for general relief. A restraining order was granted by a judge of the Fairfield common pleas, as prayed for. S. filed his motion to dissolve the injunction; and thereafter, on petition of plaintiffs, the cause was removed to this court. On the motion to dissolve the injunction

Held, (1) that, by section 640, Rev. St., (act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 4; 18 St. 471,) an injunction granted by a state court before the cause was removed to this court, is continued in force until otherwise ordered by this court; and the question of dissolving or continuing the injunction is not affected by the prohibition contained in section 720, Rev. St., but is to be disposed of by this court, upon its merits, precisely as it ought to have been disposed of by the state tribunals if the cause had not been removed. The prohibition of section 720 is confined to cases where the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is originally invoked for the very purpose of staying proceedings in the state courts.

(2) The complainants have no adequate and complete remedy at law, and the case is a proper one for equitable interference by injunction.

(3) That if it be true that, by the fraudulent misrepresentations alleged, the complainants were induced to sell to P. upon credit, then the arrangement between S. and P.,-by which the former procured $25,000 of notes falling due at short intervals, with warrant of attorney attached, authorizing judgments by confession, and the subsequent entry of judgments, and issue and levy of executions thereon, seizing and selling the stock of goods, a large part of which consisted of merchandise sold by the complainants to P.,-is undoubtedly an injurious fraud upon the complainants, for which they are entitled to redress, or, so far not as consummated, to prevent; and reasonable grounds being shown in the affidavits, the determination of the truth or falsity of these charges must be postponed until the final hearing.

In Equity.

Tenneys, Flowers & Cratty, of Chicago, and Hoadly, Johnson & Colston, of Cincinnati, for plaintiffs.

Gunckel & Rowe, of Dayton, Ohio, for defendants.

MATTHEWS, Justice. On November 27, 1880, the plaintiffs filed in the court of common pleas for Fairfield county, Ohio, a petition. in a civil action, under the Code of Civil Procedure in that state, for the recovery of money only.

It alleged, in substance, that the plaintiffs are citizens of the state of Massachusetts, and partners in trade; that the defendants are citizens of Ohio; that on October 20, 1879, the defendants applied to the plaintiffs to grant a line of credit to the defendant Pierce, who was without means or responsibility, but familiar with the dry goods business, to sell him dry goods such as he might desire, to establish and conduct a retail dry goods store at Lancaster, in Fairfield county, Ohio; that, as an inducement thereto, the defendants represented and stated that the defendant Sharpe owned a large and magnificent farm of 720 acres of land three and a half miles from Hartford City, in Blackford county, Indiana; that the same was in a high state of cultivation, and one of the best farms in the county; that the defendant Sharpe had, within the few years that he had owned it, expended $9,000 in permanent improvements on it; that it was worth $25,000 and upwards, and would be fine security for $15,000, and the defendant Sharpe proposed to plaintiffs that he would convey said farm to the defendant Pierce in fee and allow him to execute to plaintiffs a mortgage thereon for $15,000 as security for a line of credit to that amount with plaintiffs, stating that he had not sold and would not sell said farm to Pierce at any price, but would loan it to him as a basis of credit to help him into business, and that he (said Sharpe) would never claim anything from said Pierce in respect to said farm as long as he (said Pierce) desired to hold it; that thereupon the plaintiffs, relying upon said statements and representations of the defendants, and believing them to be true, agreed to extend to defendant Pierce the line of credit aforesaid upon said land being conveyed to him as aforesaid, and upon his mortgaging the same to the plaintiffs, and the same was accordingly done on the same day, October 20, 1879, and the plaintiffs thereupon, in pursuance of said scheme, sold and delivered to said Pierce goods at the dates and of the value therein stated, viz.: from October 27, 1879, to November 3, 1880, amounting in all to $30,902.50, on account of which they acknowledge to have received payments from Pierce for which he is entitled to credit amounting to $12,449.47, leaving an unpaid balance of $20,455.03, for which Pierce is indebted to them; that the representations and statements so made by the defendants were false v.8,no.1-2

and fraudulent when made, and well known by each of them to be so false and fraudulent, and that they were made with intent to deceive and cheat the plaintiffs out of the value of all goods which they might sell the defendant Pierce, less the net value of the farm aforesaid; that, in truth and fact, said farm was then chiefly a marsh, little better than a frog pond, being for a large part of the year under water; that there was very little of it under cultivation, and very little of it capable of cultivation, and that it is one of the poorest farms in the county; that it lies six miles by road from Hartford City; that said Sharpe had not in fact spent over $1,500 in improvements on it, and that principally in constructing a ditch, which is wholly inadequate and almost useless in draining said farm; that it was then worth, and is not now and never was worth more than $7,000, and is not good security for more than $5,000, all which the defendants then well knew, but concealed from the plaintiffs and falsely represented as aforesaid; that in fact Sharpe had, on October 1, 1879, already made a fictitious sale of said farm to Pierce for $25,000, for which Pierce had agreed to give Sharpe his judgment notes, payable within one year, at 8 per cent. interest, whenever Sharpe should ask for them, all which was fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff; that as soon as said Pierce had executed to the plaintiffs his mortgage for $15,000, on October 20, 1879, he also immediately executed and delivered to Sharpe five judgment notes for $5,000 each, due respectively in three, six, seven, eight, and nine months, with 8 per cent. interest, as he had previously agreed, all which was fraudulently concealed from plaintiffs and not known to them until said Sharpe, on November 15, 1880, caused five judgments to be entered upon said notes by confession in the superior court of Montgomery county, and executions aggregating about $27,000 to be levied upon the stock of goods of Pierce at Lancaster, Ohio; that said stock is not in value exceeding the amount of said executions, and the chief portions thereof consist of goods bought by said Pierce of the plaintiffs under the false representations aforesaid; that as soon as they learned of the fraud aforesaid, viz., on November 24, 1880, they notified the defendant Pierce that the contract of sale and credit in respect to said goods was rescinded, tendered to him the note and mortgage on said farm for cancellation, and offered to cancel and discharge the same, and demanded the return of said goods so sold, or payment for the same, which was refused. Wherefore, they demand damages for said deceit in the sum of $20,455.03, with interest, and for all other proper relief. This petition was duly verified by the oath of one of the plaintiffs,

who also filed his affidavit for an order of attachment, setting out in substance the allegations of the petition, and stating that "the said defendants fraudulently and criminally contracted the debt, and fraudulently and criminally incurred the obligation, for which the said action has been brought;" and also that "the said defendants are about to dispose of the property of the said defendant George W. Pierce, with the intent to defraud the creditors of him, the said George W. Pierce;" and also "that the said George W. Pierce has disposed of a part of his property with intent to defraud his creditors."

Writs of summons were issued,—one against Pierce, directed to the sheriff of Fairfield county; the other against Sharpe, to the sheriff of Montgomery county,-and both were returned served.

Orders of attachment were also issued,-one against each defendant. That against Sharpe was issued to the sheriff of Montgomery county; was levied by him upon personal property of Sharpe, valued at $20,505.63, which was released to him on the execution and delivery of a forthcoming bond. The order of attachment against Pierce was directed to the sheriff of Fairfield county, and was by him levied upon goods and personal property of Pierce, which were already in his hands, under executions levied thereon upon the judgments entered against him by confession in the superior court of Montgomery county, in favor of his co-defendant, Sharpe.

On December 14, 1880, the plaintiffs filed their petition for a removal of said cause to this court, and tendered a bond, conditioned as required by law, which petition was granted, and the cause removed and certified into this court accordingly.

On November 27, 1880, the same day on which the civil action at law was begun, as above recited, the plaintiffs filed in the same court of common pleas for Fairfield county, Ohio, a petition against the same defendants in a suit praying for an injunction and equitable relief.

This petition recites, in substance, the allegations in that in the action at law, setting out in addition that the defendant Sharpe had for many years been a retail dealer in dry goods at Dayton, Ohio, and elsewhere, and that the defendant Pierce had been in his employment as managing clerk, and that they had sustained relations of the closest confidence, intimacy, and friendship; that Pierce was entirely irresponsible, and known to be so by Sharpe; that on October 1, 1879, they entered into a collusive agreement for the sale by Sharpe to Pierce of the Blackford county farm for $25,000, which it is alleged was worth not more than $5,000 cash, which agreement was in writ

ing, and a copy of which is exhibited with the petition. This agreement provides for the sale of the farm at $25,000—

"The said Pierce issuing for the payment of same notes falling due within one year, at intervals, at such time as the said Sharpe may prescribe the said Pierce to pay 8 per cent. interest annually; and the said Sharpe further agrees to not push the payment of said notes at any time unless the said George W. Pierce at any time should be sued; or if at any time suits should be threatened against the said Pierce, then the said Sharpe will be free to act in any manner he may choose for the recovery of his notes or money. The said Pierce agrees to give the said Sharpe judgment notes authorizing any attorney at law to confess judgment in favor of the said Sharpe, whenever the said Sharpe deems it his interest so to do."

It is alleged in this petition that, for the purpose of evading the provision in this agreement providing that Sharpe would not push the payment of said notes unless Pierce should be sued, Sharpe caused and procured the firm of H. B. Claflin & Co., of New York, to whom he was largely indebted, to sue Pierce upon a claim for $1,100, which would not become due for nearly three months thereafter, and then Sharpe caused judgment to be entered by confession against Pierce on said notes, and executions to issue thereon, and to be levied upon the entire stock of goods of said Pierce at Lancaster, which he is about to sell for the satisfaction of the same, being not more than enough therefor, and the said Pierce being insolvent and having no other property or means of payment. The petition then sets out the bringing of the action at law for the recovery of damages for the deceit, and the issue and levy on the same stock of goods; of the order of attachment against Pierce, but that the same will be of no avail unless Sharpe's levy should be postponed, as in equity and good conscience it ought, to the levy by complainants of their order of attachment. The plaintiffs therefore pray that the claim of Sharpe against Pierce, and the levy of the executions on said judgments upon said stock of goods, be adjudged fraudulent and void as against the plaintiffs, and be postponed in payment to the attachment of the plaintiffs, and that the defendant Sharpe be enjoined from making any sale of said property under said executions, and praying for a receiver to sell said property and bring the proceeds into court to abide the judgment in the cause, and praying also for general relief.

On the day of filing this petition a restraining order was granted by a judge of the court of common pleas, as prayed for, and the summons and restraining order were served upon the defendants, as in the other case in Montgomery and Fairfield counties, respectively.

On December 8, 1880, Augustus Sharpe filed in this suit his mo