2. SAME RIGHT OF LICENSOR TO RAISE QUESTION OF POWER OF LICENSEE TO OPERATE OTHER ROADS. One who grants to a railroad company a license to use a patented invention on roads "that may hereafter be owned or operated by said company," cannot subsequently, upon a bill to restrain the company from the use of the invention, call in question the legal right of the company to operate other roads. Hearing on Bill and Plea. The bill was filed to restrain the use of the invention embraced in letters patent No. 22,439, issued to complainant for an improvement in locomotive axle bearings. The bill admitted the purchase by defendants, in 1861, of a license to use said invention, but alleged that defendants had used it in locomotives acquired since the date of the license, and under chartered rights and privileges acquired since that date as lessee of several railroads not contemplated or embraced in said license. Defendants filed a plea, setting up the license referred to, the material part of which was as follows: "The Pennsylvania Railroad Company is * * * hereby authorized and licensed to make and use all of said improvements and inventions so patented as aforesaid, for and during the several terms of the patents, and any extension of either of the same, in, upon, and about the locomotive engines used by the said The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, or any road or roads now owned, or that may hereafter be owned or operated by the said company." Complainant claimed that the license embraced only locomotives in use at its date, and, further, that defendants had no legal right to operate the other roads on which it was using the invention. William W. Hubbell, for complainant. Andrew McCallum and David W. Sellers, for respondents. BUTLER, D. J. The license pleaded covers the use complained of. The terms: "Upon and about the locomotive engines used by the said The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, or any road or roads now owned, or that may hereafter be owned or operated by said company," are of the broadest signification, and very plainly embrace, not only locomotive engines in use at the date of the license, upon roads then owned or operated by the company, but also such other engines as it may thereafter use, and other roads which it may thereafter operate. The contracted interpretation claimed by the plaintiff, is not justified by any rule of construction, or any special circumstances appearing in the case.-Nor can the plaintiff call in question the defendant's right to operate the roads on which the engines are employed. The license was intended to cover all use which the defendant might, at any time, have for the inventions. Whether the defendant can lawfully obtain the right to operate other roads, is unimportant. The plaintiff supposed it could, and conferred the privilege of using his inventions on such roads. The statement in the bill, that the inventions are used "under chartered privileges acquired since the date of the license," is also unimportant. It does not follow that the use has been extended or increased, by reason of such subsequently-acquired privileges. The plea is sustained. THE ALIDA.' (District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. June 22, 1881.) 1. ADMIRALTY-LIBEL FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT-EVIDENCE FOUND TO SUSTAIN ALLEGATION OF RESPONDENT THAT BREACH WAS CAUSED BY LIBELLANT'S FAILURE TO PERFORM VERBAL AGREEMENT MADE AT THE TIME OF THE CHARTER, AND NOT INCONSISTENT THEREWITH. Libel against a Tug for Breach of Contract. Libellant, by a written agreement, chartered the tug for use in certain dredging operations at the price of $500 per month. He averred that the tug failed to perform the work. Respondents averred that, by a verbal agreement made at the same time as the written charter, libellant agreed to furnish the provisions and pay the current expenses of the tug in part payment of the $500 per month; and that he failed to do this, whereby the tug was unable to perform the work. Various question of law, affecting the validity of the lien claimed by libellant, were raised upon the argument. Theodore M. Etting and Henry R. Edmunds, for libellant. Henry Flanders, for respondent. I BUTLER, D. J. Accepting the libellant's view, of the several important questions of law discussed, he is still not entitled to recover. find the facts to be, substantially, as stated by the respondent. The verbal agreement respecting supplies, and the time and manner of paying for the vessel's services, is fully proved by the master and pilot, is principally admitted, on cross-examination, by the libellant, and is not inconsistent with the written memorandum. The agreement is, furthermore, reasonable, and, therefore, probable. It avoid sthe necessity of making advances, or subjecting the vessel to the danger of liens and attachments. That it was not complied with is proved by the same witnesses, the master and pilot,-who *Reported by Frank P. Prichard, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar. in this, as in the other point, are supported by surrounding circumstances, the master's repeated complaints and demands; seeking supplies on the libellant's credit, leaving the work only when they could not be obtained without pledging the vessel; and the absence of any other apparent motive for leaving. The failure of the libellant to keep his contract justified the respondent's withdrawal. The legal questions raised need not, therefore, be considered at this time. A decree will be entered for the respondent, with costs. BARGE No. 6.* (Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. July 5, 1881.) 1. BILL OF SALE-INVALIDITY OF, WHEN SIGNATURE OBTAINED BY FRAUDDECREE OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. Appeal from Decree of the District Court in Admirality. The facts of the case are fully reported in 6 FED. REP. 732. Walter George Smith and Francis Rawle, for appellant. MCKENNAN, C. J. The libellant is entitled to the relief which he seeks, if the bill of sale signed by him of date March 20, 1880, is not valid and binding upon him. While he admits the signing of it, he denies that he was acquainted with or informed of its contents, and says his execution of the paper was procured deceptively and fraudulently. If this be so, the bill would be totally ineffective as a transfer of the ownership of the vessel, whose possession he now seeks to recover. While the proofs are conflicting, the preponderance is in favor of libellant's hypothesis, that the bill of sale is invalid because of the circumstances touching the execution of it, and the subsequent use of it, not contemplated or intended by both the parties when it was signed. The opinion of the learned judge in the court below, sufficiently indicates the reason for such a conclusion, and it is not necessary to collate and discuss the evidence to show that such a conclusion of fact is maintainable. The libellant is entitled to a decree for the delivery of the vessel, etc., to him, and for the payment of the agreed amount of damages, to wit, $275, and costs, and a decree will be entered accordingly. *Reported by Frank P. Prichard, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar. WINTER v. SWINBURNE and others. (Circuit Court, E. D. Wisconsin. July 8, 1881.) 1. JURISDICTION-CREDITORS' BILL-DECREE IN ADMIRALTY. The circuit court of the United States has not jurisdiction to entertain a creditor's bill filed in that court, and based on a judgment or decree in admiralty recovered in the district court, all the parties to the bill being citizens of the same state. Jurisdiction in such a case is not maintainable on the ground that the bill in the circuit court is ancillary to the judgment or decree in the district court; nor is the case one arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, so as to give the court jurisdiction under the first clause of the first section of the removal act of March 3, 1875. In Equity. Winfield Smith, for complainant. George D. Van Dyke, for defendants. DYER, D. J. In effect, this is an application for an attachment of certain of the defendants for contempt, because of their refusal to submit to examination, on oath, before a master, pursuant to an interlocutory decree heretofore entered in this cause. It appears that in 1880 a money decree was recovered against the defendants for the sum of $2,148.71, in the district court of the United States for this district, in a cause of collision in admiralty, wherein the present complainant was libellant and the defendants were respondents. There was no appeal to the circuit court, and the decree in the district court became final. Execution was issued thereon and was returned nulla bona. Thereupon the libellant in that case and complainant here, filed the present creditors' bill in the circuit court to reach assets, effects, and equitable interests of the defendants in satisfaction of the decree in the district court. The defendants not appearing, the usual orders were duly entered, referring the case to a master to appoint a receiver of the property, things in action, and effects of the defendants, and requiring the defendants to make conveyances to the receiver, and to submit to examination on oath before the master. On the return-day of the master's summons, the defendants appeared specially, and by their counsel objected to the proceedings as not within the jurisdiction of the court, and declined to be sworn and examined. Whereupon the record was certified to the court for its action thereon, and argument has been had on the question of jurisdiction. The grounds of objection to jurisdiction are that both the comv.8,no.2-4 plainant and the defendants are citizens of this state, and that therefore this suit cannot be maintained in this court. The precise question is, can a creditors' bill be prosecuted in the circuit court in aid of an execution on a money decree recovered in the district court in admiralty, or for enforcement or collection of such a decree, all the parties to the bill being citizens of the same state? The question is a novel one, and no decided case covering the precise point involved has been found. It is first contended by counsel for the complainant that jurisdicțion may be derived from the subject-matter of the controversy, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties. This is upon the theory that the creditors' bill is ancillary to the decree or judgment in the district court and a continuation of that proceeding, and that therefore the case is within the rule or principle laid down by the authorities, that where a bill filed on the equity side of the court is not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent, jurisdiction is maintained without regard to the citizenship of the parties. I have always supposed that this principle was only applicable where the ancillary bill was filed in the same court in which the original suit was brought,, and it may not be unprofitable to notice with some care the authorities bearing on the question, most of which were cited on the argument. In Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, it was held that where property of A. is wrongfully seized under a writ of attachment against B., a petition for relief by the rightful owner may be heard and relief granted without regard to the citizenship of the parties. The court say that "The principle is that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, * * * * is not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties." In Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain, 6 Wall. 748, a bill was filed by a Wisconsin railroad company to set aside a judgment and a lease to secure the same, and another railroad corporation of the same state, having become the equitable owner of the lease, was admitted as defendant, and also filed a cross-bill to have the judgment enforced. The circuit court dismissed the cross-bill for want of jurisdiction, the parties being all citizens of the same state; and it was held that this decree was erroneous, the proceeding being merely ancillary to the judgment which was recovered in the same court as that in which |