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depending upon the citizenship of the parties must be determined by their citizenship at the time of the commencement of the suit. Conolly v. Taylor, 2 Pet. 556.
This brings us to the question, whether, by the last act above quoted, (that of February 14, 1873,) or by the two acts construed together, the defendant was created a corporation of the state of Nebraska. The fact is conceded that the defendant corporation was organized under the laws of Iowa, and built a railroad in that state, which was extended into and through a portion of the territory of the state of Nebraska, and that it has filed a true copy of the original articles of incorporation in the office of the secretary of state of the state of Nebraska. The act of February 14, 1873, declares in plain terms that these facts shall constitute the defendant "a legal corporation of this state, and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and franchises of railroad companies organized under and pursuant to the laws of the state of Nebraska." It is entirely competent for the state, by its legislation, to determine the mode of creating corporations within its limits, and, if it sees fit to declare that a foreign corporation may become a corporation of the state by building a railroad therein and filing a copy of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, I have no doubt that compliance with these terms constitutes the foreign corporation a domestic corporation with respect to all its transactions within such state. It follows that the Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company was a Nebraska corporation from and after the passage of the act of February 14, 1873, and therefore was such at the time of the commencement of this suit. Of course, if both plaintiff and defendant were citizens of Nebraska at the time of the commencement of this suit, then this court has no jurisdiction of the case, and the plea to the jurisdiction must be sustained. But counsel for plaintiff insists that there is a foreign corporation—a citizen of Iowa—whose corporate name is the Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company; that it is this foreign corporation, and not the domestic corporation of the same name, that is sued; and that plaintiff should be permitted to make out, if he can, a case against the Iowa corporation by proof. His right to do this is clear enough, provided that corporation is in court and subject to our jurisdiction. Whether it is in court or not depends upon the question whether, at the time of the commencement of this action, that corpo . ration had an agent in Nebraska, engaged in the management of its business, upon whom service has been made. If the agent upon whom the service was made was the agent of the Nebraska corpora
tion, it is not sufficient; for although the two corporations may be composed of the same persons, yet they are in law, for the purpose of suing and being sued, separate and distinct. It is not impossible that the Iowa corporation might have kept an office and agents in Nebraska at the time this suit was commenced, but, upon the proofs adduced upon this hearing, I conclude that the person served was an. agent of the Nebraska corporation, and not of the Iowa corporation. At all events, it has not been shown that he was the agent of the Iowa company in such a sense that service upon him in Nebraska would be a sufficient service upon that company. The act of 1875, defining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, (18 St. 470,) provides that“No civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceedings,” etc.
It has been held that a corporation created by one state may consent to be sued in another, in consideration of its being permitted by law to exercise therein its corporate powers and privileges. Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Ex Parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369; Knott v. Ins. Co. 2 Woods, 479. But the legislature of Nebraska, instead of providing that foreign railroad corporations may extend their roads into that state, upon condition that they will consent to be sued there, has seen fit to provide that such corporations shall, by extending their lines of railroad into the state, and by filing copies of their articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, become domestic corporations, with all the powers and franchises of other state corporations. Such corporations, therefore, being citizens of the state of Nebraska—corporations of the state-can be sued by citizens of Nebraska only in the state courts. It may be that plaintiff has a cause of action against the Iowa corporation, but it is not one that can be prosecuted in this court upon process served upon an agent engaged in the operation of the extended line of railroad within the state of Nebraska, and not shown to be an agent of the Iowa corporation. It is not pretended that there are two lines of railroad in Nebraska, one of which is operated by the Iowa corporation and the other by the Nebraska corporation; but, on the contrary, it is conceded that the railroad in Nebraska is simply an extension of the Iowa road, and upon the admitted facts, without more, we must conclude that the person upon whom service was made was employed in the operation of the line in Nebraska, and as the agent of the Nebraska
corporation. The return of the marshal is not conclusive upon the defendant, and he may disprove it on the hearing of a plea to the jurisdiction. Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick, 7 How. Pr. 297; Litchfield v. Burwell, 5 How. Pr. 341; Wallis v. Lott, 15 How. Pr. 567.
If the plaintiff thinks that he can, by further proof, establish the fact that the person upon whom the service was made was the managing agent of the Iowa corporation, we will withhold final judgment until a further hearing can be had; but, if he rests the case upon the proof as it now stands, the plea to the jurisdiction will be sustained.
There is a motion to dismiss the plea to the jurisdiction, upon the ground that it has been waived by the filing of an answer.
It appears that some time since the case, upon the plea to the jurisdiction, was argued before Judge Dillon, and taken under advisement by him. Pending its consideration, the defendant left an answer with the clerk, indorsed, “To be filed subject to the plea to the jurisdiction." I think it is within the discretion of the court to hold that the answer has not been filed, within the meaning of the rule invoked by plaintiff's counsel, and that defendant has not waived the plea to the jurisdiction.
The motion to dismiss the plea is overruled.
At the May term, 1881, the cause came on for further hearing, upon the plea to the jurisdiction; and, upon further proof adduced in relation thereto, a further opinion was delivered, as follows:
MOCRARY, C. J. The evidence adduced upon the trial of the issue, upon the plea in abatement, does not show that service in this case was made upon an agent of the Iowa corporation. It is true that the whole line is under one management; that the principal offices are in Iowa, and that the station agent upon whom service was made makes his reports to the general office at Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The line through both states is operated by one management, one set of officers, one board of directors, one set of stockholders. This the legislature of Nebraska is presumed to have known when it enacted the statute declaring that if an Iowa railroad company extends its line into this state, and files its articles of incorporation, it “shall be a legal corporation of the state.” Act of February 14, 1873, (Gen. St. 206.) The plain effect of this statute is to constitute the Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company, at least for jurisdictional purposes,
a Nebraska corporation, in respect to all its transactions within this state; and the agents of the company, conducting its business in Nebraska, are the agents of the Nebraska corporation, otherwise the statute could have no effect whatever. If the officers and agents of this corporation, engaged in the transaction of its business in Nebraska, are to be regarded as the officers and agents of the Iowa corporation, it follows that the statute has made it a Nebraska corporation in name only, and not in fact or in law. The same natural persons may constitute two or more distinct corporations. A corporation in Nebraska must exist by virtue of the law of this state, and if that law constitutes the defendant a Nebraska corporation, it matters not that the law of Iowa also constitutes it a corporation of that state. It is the right of each state, in which a corporation transacts business, to require it to become a corporation under and by virtue of its own laws. This right having been exercised by the state of Nebraska, in a statute plainly applicable to the defendant, we must hold it a domestic corporation, and not a foreign corporation, subject to the jurisdiction of this court.
Judgment for defendant upon the plea in abatement.
SOUTHERN EXPRESS Co. v. MEMPHIS, Etc., R. Co.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Arkansas. July, 1881.) RAILROADS—RIGHTS OF EXPRESS COMPANIES-INJUNCTION.
A temporary injunction granted, to enjoin a railroad company from charge ing a certain express company higher rates than were charged to othur speci. fied companies by the same railroad.
The complainant, an express company, has been for many years engaged in carrying on an express business over the respondent's railroad. No written contract was ever entered into between the parties; but the business was carried on without objection, and upon terms mutually satisfactory, until some time in the year 1880, when the railroad company asserted its own right to transact all the express business upon its line, and attempted
its line, and attempted to eject the complainant therefrom. Upon the application of complainant, and upon the allegations contained in his original bill, a temporary injunction was, on the twenty-first of June, 1880, granted by the district judge, restraining the respondent from interfering with the complainant, etc., and from preventing the complainant from carrying on the express business over said road, and from enjoying the same facilities in the conduct of such business permitted to any other express company, or exercised by the respondent itself, on payment by complainant of reasonable compensation therefor.
On the twelfth of May, 1881, the complainant filed a supplemental bill, by which it is alleged that respondent has engaged in the express business over the said line of railroad, and established express offices, agents, wagons, horses, etc.; that the complainant has also continued in such business. It is further averred that since the granting of the injunction herein the respondent has "continuously resorted to unlaw. ful, unjust, arbitrary, and unreasonable expedients to circumvent the force and effect of the orders and decrees of this court on his original bill, as aforesaid, and by imposition upon the plaintiff of unlawful, unreasonable, unjust, and discriminating terms, conditions, and restrictions not imposed upon itself, engaged in the express business, to destroy the plaintiff's business and competition on the defendant road, and to accomplish indirectly that exclusion forbidden by the orders of this court in this cause."
The supplemental bill sets forth in detail the terms and restrictions imposed upon the complainant, the principal of which is that the complainant is charged unjust and extortionate rates for the transportation of express matter. The prayer of the supplemental bill is that the injunction granted under the original bill may be modified so as to restrain the respondent from charging complainant upon its bags, safes, packing trunks, chests, and boxes a higher rate than upon other freights of like weight and bulk, and from charging complainant upon other freights a higher rate than it charges for similar express matter received from or delivered to the custody of the Iron Mountain, etc., Railroad Company Express, or the Pacific Express Company. Also from discriminating against the complainant in favor of itself, or any other express company or person, in the matter of rates, etc.
Upon the presentation of the supplemental bill, the respondent moved to dissolve the injunction allowed upon the original bill, and the complainant moved for a modification of the injunction as prayed in the supplemental bill, and both motions were, by consent, set down for hearing before the circuit judge at St. Louis, on Saturday, the fourth day of June, 1881, and were then fully argued by counsel before him.