The Economic Intstitutions of CapitalismSimon and Schuster, 1985 - 450 páginas "An extraordinarily impressive achievement and must reading for all serious students of law, economics, and organization." —Paul L. Joskow, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts of Technology From Simon & Schuster, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism is Oliver E. Williamson's new perspective on the structure of economic life, and one not to miss. |
Contenido
The Governance of Contractual Relations 1 Contracting Traditions | 1 |
Efficient Governance | 2 |
Uncertainty | 3 |
Transaction Cost Economics | 15 |
Contractual Man | 43 |
Measurement | 80 |
The Distribution of Transactions | 83 |
Theory and Policy | 85 |
Power Versus Efficiency | 231 |
Concluding Remarks | 237 |
The Organization of Labor | 240 |
Central Issues 2 An Abstract Approach 3 Union Organization | 241 |
Problematic Features of Union Organization | 263 |
The Producer Cooperative Dilemma | 265 |
Dignity | 268 |
Concluding Remarks | 271 |
Technological Determinism | 86 |
A Heuristic Model | 90 |
Further Implications | 95 |
Vertical Merger Guidelines | 98 |
Some Evidence | 103 |
Types of Evidence | 104 |
Mundane Integration | 105 |
Forward Integration into Distribution | 113 |
Lateral Integration | 114 |
Backward Integration | 118 |
Some Remarks About Japanese Manufacture | 120 |
Some Alternative Explanations | 123 |
Concluding Remarks | 129 |
Incentive and Bureaucratic Features | 131 |
A Chronic Puzzle | 132 |
Integration of an OwnerManaged Supply Stage | 135 |
Acquisition of a Supply Stage in Which Ownership and Management Are Separated | 144 |
The Costs of Bureaucracy | 148 |
LowPowered Incentives in Markets | 153 |
Illustrative Examples | 156 |
Concluding Remarks | 161 |
Unilateral Applications 1 Private Ordering 2 Credible Commitments | 163 |
The Hostage Model | 169 |
Engaging the Supplier | 176 |
Unilateral Trading Applications | 179 |
Schwinn | 183 |
Bilateral Applications | 190 |
Reciprocity | 202 |
A Comparative Institutional Framework | 213 |
A Comparative Institutional Assessment | 223 |
The Modern Corporation | 273 |
Railroad Organization | 274 |
The MForm Innovation | 279 |
Conglomerate and Multinational Enterprise | 286 |
Concluding Remarks | 294 |
Corporate Governance | 298 |
Background | 299 |
A Contractual Assessment | 301 |
Management as a Constituency | 312 |
Managerial Discretion and Organization Form | 319 |
Concluding Remarks | 322 |
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly | 326 |
Introduction | 327 |
The Simple Franchise Bidding Scheme | 329 |
The Hostage Model Extended 68 | 331 |
Franchise Bidding Elaborated | 332 |
A Case Study | 347 |
Concluding Remarks | 350 |
The Oakland CATV Franchise Bidding Experience | 352 |
Antitrust Enforcement 1 Merger Policy | 365 |
Nonstandard Contracting | 370 |
Conclusions | 385 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 409 |
| 419 | |
| 429 | |
85 | 433 |
| 437 | |
| 442 | |
| 445 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Vista de fragmentos - 1987 |
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Vista de fragmentos - 1985 |
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Vista de fragmentos - 1985 |
Términos y frases comunes
adaptations agreement alternative antitrust argument assessment asset specificity Assume assumption attributes bargaining behavior benefits bilateral bounded rationality buyer capital CATV ceteris paribus Chandler Chapter comparative institutional competition complex condition contract renewal interval corporation decision described developed discussed economic organization economies of scale effect efficiency efforts employees entry ex ante ex post exchange favor firm forward integration franchise bidding golden parachute governance structures hazards hierarchy high-powered incentives hostage human asset industry innovation Inside Contracting interest internal organization investments issues kind labor M-form manufacturers merger microanalytic modes monopoly needs node nomic observed operating organizational ownership parties posed presumably price discrimination private ordering problems purpose technology Putting-Out putting-out system realized reference relation relevant respects responsible result rivals safeguards Schwinn specific assets strategic supplier supply stage theory tion trading transaction cost economics transaction-specific uncertainty vertical integration Williamson workers