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THE

EDINBURGH MAGAZINE,

AND

LITERARY MISCELLANY.

NOVEMBER 1819.

ON THE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN
FROM THE EVENTS OF THE WAR.

turies of the previous history of the world, the information which it is calculated to convey.

THE war has now ceased, and the nation has had several years to consider the interesting events which it occasioned, and the extraordinary combination of circumstances to which it gave rise. During the progress of that momentous struggle, and at a period when every year was marked by new and unheard-of changes, both in the political aspect of Europe and the relative situation of the contending parties, it was impossible to contemplate coolly the political lessons with which it was fraught, or the light which it was fitted to throw on the comparative wisdom of the statesmen by whom it was at first either supported or opposed. We, in common with all our contemporaries, have shared in the influence of these cir-riod to which they refer. cumstances; and we are, perhaps, still too near the events which have occurred, and too much under the influence of the temporary feelings to which they gave rise, to view in its true light the memorable conflict in which this country has been engaged. After a breathing time, however, of four years, during which our attention has not been distracted by any very novel or interesting circumstances, it is proper that we should begin calmly and dispassionately to survey the extraordinary events which have occurred in our recollection, and endeavour to extract from that period, which is unquestionably filled with more political instruction than cen

On the most cursory view, there appear to be many particulars in which the opinion which is now adopted by the public seems to be erroneous, and in which posterity, judging from the events themselves, and not from the feelings with which those events were accompanied, will probably come to a different determination. What we say of others in this respect may equally be said of ourselves; and, therefore, the opinions which are now to be advanced will, of course, be judged of by the same test as we apply to those of o-thers, and acquiesced in only in so far as they may seem to be borne out by the facts, and to be devoid of the prejudices and party-feelings of the pe

It seems to be pretty generally assumed by the adherents of Mr Pitt's administration, and tacitly conceded by a great majority of his opponents, that the successful and glorious termination of the war with revolutionary France was a complete and triumphant demonstration of the justice of the views which first prompted that great statesman to undertake a contest with that kingdom at the commencement of the Revolution. The principles which first led him, it is said, to form coalitions against its alarming power, and to raise a crusade against its dangerous principles, were steadily adhered to during the whole subsequent conduct of the war, Un

dismayed by misfortune, unsubdued to a period of such unparalleled poli

by defeat, this system was pursued for twenty years, until at length the glorious accomplishment which he always anticipated was brought about, and the struggle which he had commenced for the restoration of legiti macy, and the overthrow of revolutionary principles, was terminated by the destruction of the revolutionary army, and the triumph of the legitimate Sovereign of France.

It is no wonder that this course of events should have led Mr Pitt's adherents to conceive that they satisfactorily demonstrated the truth of the principles which they had maintained, and that many, even of the most respectable among the opposition, recollecting the vehemence with which Mr Fox had always opposed the forming of coalitions against France, should have admitted, that the successful issue of the last coalition was not reconcileable with his doctrines, and that it was to be ascribed rather to chance, or an extraordinary fatuity on the part of Bonaparte, than to any political principles which could be foreseen by human wisdom.

We have observed, accordingly, that the subject of the war is one upon which the adherents of opposition, in general, are little disposed to enter, and that the national trophies by which its triumphs are to be commemorated meet with a very luke warm support at their hands. Regarding, however, as we do the success of this war as the strongest of all confirmations of the real whig principles, and the victories of Leipsic and Waterloo as the triumph of civil liberty, it does appear a little extraordinary that this view should be entertained by men of the acknowledged abilities and enlightened views by whom we have sometimes heard it maintained. We can hardly account for the perversion of understanding by which the real import of these political events is misunderstood or overlooked, or for the timidity with which they shrink from a battery which it is in their power to seize, and turn with such triumphant effect upon their adversaries.

Posterity, it cannot be doubted, will see this matter in its true light, Exempt, as they necessarily will be, from the passions, the jealousies, and the temporary feelings naturally incident

tical interest, they will be better able to judge of the conclusions to be drawn from the events by which it was distinguished. Judging from the facts which occurred, and not from the men by whom they were carried into effect, they will perceive, that, in the progress of that memorable struggle, other elements came into action besides those which were at first employed, and principles were acted upon on both sides utterly inconsistent with those on which they at first proceeded. They will perceive that a total alteration in the character of the war took place before Fortune changed her side; that the spirit of liberty which at first protected the arms of France shielded her adversaries, when they, in their turn, were struggling for political existence; that, like Hamlet and Laertes, the combatants exchanged weapons in the confusion of the conflict; and that the rapier by which the mortal thrust to one was at last given was that which was first used, and had been envenomed by himself.

At the commencement of the Revolution in France, the political sentiments of all ranks were immediately divided upon the course which this country should pursue in regard to it,

and it is no wonder that the opinions of the wisest amongst us should have differed when so extraordinary and portentous an event was going forward. On the one hand, it was urged that the proceedings of the people in that great and formidable country were not of a description to be calmly regarded by the rest of Europe, or by the friends of social order anywhere in the world; that the language which they used, and still more the atrocious and sanguinary conduct which they had pursued, marked, in the most unequivocal manner, that their determination was to carry war to the palace and peace to the cottage through all the civilized world; that every day they were acquiring new energy, and spreading their seductive and poisonous principles farther throughout their unhappy land; and that, not content with destroying their own nobility, and massacring their own sovereign, their emissaries were already preparing similar tragedies in other states, and carrying the seeds of revolution and anarchy through all

the European monarchies. Such a republic, it was said, could never be at peace with the adjoining countries; its very principles are inconsistent with the existence of kingly power or social order in the rest of Europe; and, if they waited till it had consolidated its energies, and calmed its intestine commotions, all the force which they could bring against it might be unavailing to stem its destructive progress. Now, then, it was said, is the moment to interfere and crush the monster in his cradle, before he has acquired the vigour and strength to which he is so fast approaching, and not wait, like the infatuated Italians, who behold the fiery torrent issuing from the volcano, and never think of saving their property till they be hold their dwellings encircled by the flames.

As such a proceeding, it was added, is clearly agreeable to the dictates of expedience, so it is entirely in consonance with the plainest principles of justice. Admitting that a nation may, in the general case, be allowed to regulate its own intestine affairs, and choose that form of government which is best adapted to its peculiar habits; yet this principle will not authorize such unheard of atrocities as have been committed in France, and as the French people are avowedly preparing for all who do not follow their frantic example. In repressing such enormities, all the civilized world have an obvious right to interfere; upon the same principle on which, in private matters, all the neighbours of one, whose house is burning, are entitled to combine, for their own sakes, and prevent the conflagration from arriving at such a height as may endanger the surrounding buildings.

On the other hand, it was urged with equal confidence, that the course which was thus recommended to obviate the evil, was the very one, of all others, best adapted to increase its danger. That although it might be perfectly true, in the general case, that republics were disposed for war, and that revolutionary France would sooner or later break loose upon the rest of Europe; yet that it never could by such a proceeding acquire the energy, or be consolidated into the united mass which would inevitably result from the combined attack of the European powers: that, if left to itself, its

strength would be wasted in intestine struggles, and its resources exhausted by civil warfare, insomuch, that if, at any future period, it might be combined under one military leader, it would, comparatively speaking, be little formidable; whereas, if it was attacked in the moment of unparal leled excitation, in which the popular mind then was, not only would all civil dissensions be immediately healed, but Europe had every thing to dread from the military power which it would develope. Experience, it was said, had shewn, that no nation ever displayed such military resources, as when roused by a coalition of foreign powers, in proof of which, it was noticed, that Austria never rose so high as after she had defeated the coalition against Maria Theresa, nor Prussia, as when the Great Frederick baffled, with the resources of a small kingdom, the three greatest powers on the Continent. The military power of France always had been formidable to Europe, even when the national zeal was least excited: what then might be expected, if to that natural proneness to military glory which they inherited from their ancestors, was superadded the extraordinary incitement, which a foreign attack, pressing on the newly developed energies of a revolution, would produce? Such energies, though doubtless formidable at all times, are rendered ten times so when they are condensed by pressure from foreign states, as the force of steam, which, when suffered to escape, is attended with no danger, becomes altogether irresistible, when a pres sure from without is applied.

Coalitions, it was admitted, might be formed; but coalitions, formed by kings alone, unsupported by the popular feeling, will be wholly unable to withstand the energies of revolu tionary France, guided by a single government. The defeat of such forced and unwieldy alliances will augment the confidence of the enemy, as much as it will depress that of the allies. The only policy, therefore, seemed to be, to let the enemy attack, and each nation trust to its own energies for defence: and seek thus to combat France by the same weapon which she will otherwise use with irresistible effect in her defence.

Nor, it was added, are the means by which it is proposed to coerce the

power of France, at all the ones which but never to give to the the ad

are most likely to attain the object in view. The navy of England, indeed, may destroy its trade, and the pres sure of internal taxation may swallow up its riches, but it is not from such sources, that its means of carrying on the war will be obtained. It was oùserved by the great Frederick, that the devastation of his provinces filled his ranks, and enabled him to support the war. In like manner, unlike the ordinary European wars, in which superior resources for prolonging the contest are likely, in the end, to prove victorious, the armies of France will increase with the devastation and ruin of their country, just as the hordes who overthrew the Roman empire were swelled, and pushed forward, by the famine which they had left in their native seats.

Equally impolitic is it to attempt to prevent the spreading of the revolutionary principles, by the aggression of foreign armics. Terrible, indeed, as the progress of such principles have been, and much as it becomes every government to check them within their own bounds, yet special care should be taken, lest, in the vain at tempt to put them down, in the country where they arose, they are disseminated farther than the utmost efforts of the democratical party could effect, If armies are brought up from distant monarchies to invade France, the chances are, that, by coming in contact with such principles, they will be infected by a contagion of which they otherwise, would have been ignorant; and thus the poison will be spread among the very persons to whom the civilized world looks for the means of arresting its progress; and the sove reigns of Europe may have the same cause to lament their fatal precipitancy, which the Sultan of the East had, who sent an army to extirpate the plague in a particular province, and had it universally spread through his dominions, by the soldiers who re turned from the attempt.

The true wisdom, therefore, it was concluded, in contending with the extraordinary political body that has usurped the place of a legitimate throne in France, is to guard sedulously against the dissemination of the principles on which it has proceeded; to arm the other European monarchos, with a view to a powerful defence,

vantage of being the

power,

or to its people the inspiring sentinent of national resistance.

Such were the views which the dif ferent parties in this country entertained of the policy of an aggression on the French people. The war party carried the great majority along with them, and the natural ardour of our people for war, joined to their hereditary animosity against France, rendered the measure generally ac ceptable to the country.

In an eyil hour the allics formed the project of dividing France, and the hoisting of the Imperial flag on the walls of Valenciennes, proclaimed to the French nation, that all parties must unite to save their country from destruction. The consequences which followed are universally known, That magnificent army of a hundred and eighty thousand men, which the Emperor had reviewed on the heights of Cateau, was broken up by the division of interests in the coalition, and stubbornly resisted by the enthusiastic energy of the French people. The separation of the English army to conduct the siege of Dunkirk, and the defeat of the allies at Fleurus and Jemappe, demonstrated both the impossibility of so large an alliance being maintained when no common danger was felt, and the inadequacy of these standing armies to resist the energetic valour of the French troops, fighting in defence of the French soil.

We will not fatigue our readers by dwelling on the painful history of the reverses which the Allied arms experienced, or the steady progress which the French armies made. It may be noticed, however, that all the disasters which befel their arms during the course of the war, were of such a kind as arose obviously from the division of interest and jealousy of each other, which belongs to all forced coalitions. The brilliant suc

cesses of the Archduke Charles in 1796, when he drove Marshal Jourdan from the frontiers of Suabia to the Rhine, were wholly lost by the weakness and treachery of the Austrian and Russian commanders in Italy; and, on the other hand, the glorious career of Marshal Suwarrow in 1799, graced by six complete victories, and the entire expulsion of the

French from Lombardy, was render ed fruitless by the criminal jealousy of the Austrian cabinet, who let the brave Russian army, which had done such unparalleled service to the common cause, perish in the St Gothard, for want of that co-operation which had been promised and relied on. The battle of Hohenlinden, and the humiliating peace which followed, were the punishment of Austria for this base treachery of their valiant allies: and thus through the utter failure of all the coalitions which had been formed against it, was the pow er of France, extended over one half of Germany and all Italy, and the terror of the French arms spread over the whole extent of the civilized world.

It was in this tried superiority of the French arms, more than in the territory which they had gained, or the fortresses which they had captured, that the magnitude of their suc cesses consisted. The Austrians, in consequence, uniformly went into battle in the conviction that they were to be vanquished, and this feeling, of course, brought about its own accomplishment. The Italians ceased to make any resistance to a power which the military monarchies of Austria and Russia had tried in vain to withstand. Even the English shared for a time in the general consternation, and, forgetting the glorious days of Cressy and Agincourt, trembled for an invasion from that power which had once yielded its capital to their arms, and always bowed before the hereditary prowess of their seamen.

In all these effects there was nothing that might not have been fairly anticipated from the nature of the war which was carried on, and the character of the powers which were engaged on either side. On the one side was a vast monarchy, containing thirty millions of men, in which all the powers of the human mind, and all the energies of virtue and of vice, were called forth from the slumber of centuries, by the most powerful motives which can rouse the human mind. The brave and the virtuous joined the armies to defend their native land, and to drive from her fron tiers those hostile bands who threatened to divide her soil and extinguish the ancient glories of her name. The wicked and the turbulent hastened to

the scene of foreign conquest, and sought amidst the tumult of camps, and the plunder of provinces, a fit theatre for their cruel or rapacious dispositions. The young and the am bitious of all ranks repaired to the standard of the republic, and amidst the ruin of all peaceful occupations, found in the profession of arms both the only means of subsistence which the situation of the country had left them, and the most brilliant prospects of advancement which imagination could desire. Above all, talent of every description was extricated from all classes of the state; and, as in this country, we find that the loss of those at the head of affairs only makes way, in every department of life, for thousands as able to fill their situations as they themselves had been; so the losses of the French army, whe ther in the ranks or among the officers, were filled up by crowds of daring men, capable of fulfilling the duties which they had to perform, and proud to enter on the path of ambition from which their predecessors had been removed.

To oppose this terrible power what was it that the Allies had to exhibit? Armies vast, indeed, in numbers, and renowned in military discipline;-generals established in faine, and tried in the practice of former times;-mo narchies grey in years, and celebrated in arms: but none of the vigour,→ none of the enthusiasm,-none of the determined perseverance which the cause of FREEDOM had given to the other side. When the contending powers accordingly were drawn out in opposition to each other, the difference in the resources on which they relied was soon conspicuous. discipline, the experience, and the military skill of the Allies at times procured them some advantages; but these were specdily counterbalanced by the superior energy and more prolific source of talent with which their enemies were supplied: and when at length, in the progress of the contest, the Revolutionary annies became experienced in the art of war, their an tagonists were no longer able to contend with the powers which they de veloped.

The

So far, then, the event of the wat was strictly agreeable to the predic tions of the friends of liberty in this country, and demonstrated beyond

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