were unworthy to live, and must absolutely die. The good life is a rational life, a life in which reason, the same in God and man, must guide and be master. Yet nature has its rights, though they are not independent of the supreme rights of the rational spirit; and Christianity recognises the rights of nature. For each man there is a crown of joy, though the way to it lies through the pain and toil and death of the cross. As in the victorious march of the Roman arms, the vanquished territory of nature is not ravaged and laid waste; the conquering reason annexes nature, the kingdom of nature and the flesh becomes the kingdom of the rational spirit. The whole man is redeemed from evil to goodness; the old becomes new. There is a re-birth of the entire being; nothing finally dies, it dies only to rise again to its true life. All lives in the new, transfigured, spiritual life; all becomes organic to the one central principle, an element in the one total life. The 'world' becomes part of the kingdom of God.' All other, separate and rival, interests die, because they are all alike superseded, transcended, and incorporated in this one interest. Nay, the individual self, in so far as it insists upon its separate and exclusive life, upon its own peculiar and private interests, must die. The world' is indeed just the sphere of this narrow selfish' self,' and both together must be superseded. "It is no more I that live." But the narrow and selfish self dies, that the larger and unselfish self may live. Only he that so loseth his life shall truly find it.

All this is symbolised in Christianity in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of its Founder. The idea of incarnation—the root-idea of Christianity—is a splendid and thoroughgoing protest against the ascetic view of matter as in its very essence evil, of the body as the mere prison-house of the soul, to be escaped from by the aspiring spirit, something between which and God there can be no contact or communion any more than between light and darkness. Christianity sees in matter

the very vehicle of the divine revelation, the transparent medium of the spiritual life, the great opportunity for the exercise of virtue. The Word was made Flesh-ó Aóyos Λόγος σápę ¿yéveto. Nor, in word or life, does Jesus suggest any aloofness of spirit from the things of this world, any withdrawal from its affairs as dangerous to the soul's best life, any superiority to its most ordinary avocations. "The Son of Man came eating and drinking," sharing man's common life, and realising the divine ideal in it. Even so, by his lowly and willing acceptance of human life in the entirety of its actual relations, did he transfigure that life, by turning to divine account all its uses and occasions, by making of each an element in the life of goodness. This transfiguration of human life was no single incident or crisis in the career of Jesus; men did not always see it, but his life itself was one continuous transfiguration. Nay, the life of goodness always is such a transfiguration; everything is hallowed when it becomes the vehicle of the divine life in man, nothing is any more common or unclean. Yet the persistent holding to the ideal good of this earthly life means suffering and death; only so can the earthly nature become the medium of the divine. There are always the two possibilities for man, the lower and the higher; and that the higher may be realised, the lower must be denied. "From flesh unto spirit man grows"; and the flesh has to die, that the spirit may live. The eager, strenuous spirit has to crucify the easy, yielding flesh. But the good man dies, only to live again; his death is no defeat, it is perfect victory-victory signed and sealed. From such a death there must needs be a glorious resurrection to that new life which has been purchased by the death of the old.

5. The ethical problem: the meaning of self-realisation. The conclusion to which we are forced by the facts of the moral life is, that the true and adequate in

terpretation of it must lie, not in the exclusive assertion of either side of the dualism, but in the discovery of the relation of the two sides to one another. In order to the statement of this relation, we must have recourse to a fundamental principle of unity. In other words, we are led to consider the meaning of self-realisation.

As the watchword of Hedonism may be said to be selfpleasing or self-gratification, and as that of Rationalism is apt to be self-sacrifice or self-denial, so the watchword of Eudæmonism may be said to be self-realisation or selffulfilment. It seems, however, almost a truism to say that the end of human life is self-realisation. The aim and object of every living being, of the mere animal as well as of man-nay, of the thing as well as the animal and the person-may be described as self-preservation and self-development, or in the single term 'self-realisation.' In a universe in which to 'exist' means to struggle,' self- assertion, perseverare in esse suo, may be called the universal law of being. Moreover, every ethical theory might claim the term 'self-realisation,' as each might claim the term 'happiness.' The question is, What is the self? or, Which self is to be realised? Hedonism answers, the sentient self; Rationalism, the rational self; Eudæmonism, the total self, rational and sentient. The ethical problem, being to define self-realisation, is therefore in its ultimate form the definition of selfhood or personality. When we wish to describe the characteristic and peculiar end of human life, we must either use a more specific term than self-realisation, or we must explain the meaning of human self-realisation by defining the self which is to be realised. And since man alone is, in the proper sense, a self or person, we are led to ask: What is it that constitutes his personality, and distinguishes man, as a person, from the so-called animal or impersonal self? The basis of his nature being animal, how is it lifted up into the higher sphere of human personality?

6. Definition of personality: the individual and the person.-Selfhood cannot consist in mere individuality; for the animal, as well as the man, is an individual self -a self that asserts itself against other individuals, that excludes the latter from its life, and struggles with them for the means of its own satisfaction. Man is a self in this animal sense of selfhood: he is a being of impulse, a subject of direct and immediate wants and instincts which demand their satisfaction, and prompt him to struggle with other individuals for the means of such satisfaction. These impulsive forces spring up in man as spontaneously as in the animal, their 'push and pull' is as real in the one case as in the other. And if might were right, these forces in their total workings would constitute the man, as they seem to constitute the animal; and the resultant of their operations would be the only goal of the former, as of the latter life. But might is not right in human life; it is this distinction that constitutes morality. As the Greeks said, man is called upon to measure' his impulses in temperance or moderation lies the path to his self-fulfilment; and the measure of impulse is found in right reason.' That is to say, man, as a rational being, is called upon to bring impulse under the law of the rational self; man is a rational animal. Butler and Aristotle agree in this definition of human nature and in this view of human life. In Aristotle's opinion, that which differentiates man from other beings is his possession of reason, and the true human life is a life according to right reason.' The distinctive characteristic of man, according to Butler, is that he has the power of reflecting upon the immediate animal impulses which sway him, and of viewing them, one and all, in relation to a permanent and total good. In this critical and judicial 'view' of the impulsive and sentient life consists that 'conscience' which distinguishes man from the animal creation, and opens to him the gates of the moral life, which are for ever closed to it.

It is this self-consciousness, this power of turning back upon the chameleon-like, impulsive, instinctive, sentient or individual self, and gathering up all the scattered threads of its life in the single skein of a rational whole, that constitutes the true selfhood of man. This higher and peculiarly human selfhood we shall call' personality,' as distinguished from the lower or animal selfhood of mere individuality'; and, in view of such a definition of the self, we may say that self-realisation means that the several changing desires, instead of being allowed to pursue their several ways, and to seek each its own good or satisfaction, are so correlated and organised that each becomes instrumental to the fuller and truer life of the rational or human self. This power of rising above the impulse of the moment, and of viewing it in the light of his rational selfhood; this power of transcending the entire impulsive, instinctive, and sentient life, and of regarding the self which is but the bundle of impulses as the servant of the higher rational self, is what makes man, ethically, man. It is this endowment that constitutes 'will.' We do not attribute will to the animal, because, so far as we know, it cannot, as we can, arrest the stream of impulsive tendency, but is borne on the tide of present impulse. That is a

life according to nature' for it; in such a life it realises the only 'self' it has to realise. But man, as we have seen, can take the larger view of reason, and can act in the light of that better insight. It is given to him to criticise the impulsive stream,' to arrest and change its course, to subdue the lower, animal, natural self to the higher, human, rational self; to build up out of the plastic raw material of sensibility, out of the data of mere native disposition, acted upon by and reacting upon circumstances or environment, a stable rational character. We do not attribute character' to the mere animal; its life is a life of natural and immediate sensibility, unchecked by any thought of life's meaning as a whole. In its life there is no conscious unity or totality. But for man, the rational