grants it shall be the duty of the master or agent of the vessel bringing them to make report to the proper inspection officers of the name, nationality, and last residence of every such alien before any of them are landed. The inspection officers are thereupon required to inspect all such aliens, either on board the vessel in which they have arrived, or at some definite time and place to which by the order of said officers they have been removed. The decision of the inspection officers adverse to the right of any alien to land is made final unless appeal be taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action may be reviewed by the secretary of the treasury. This section also makes it the duty of the commanding officer of the vessel in which such alien immigrants came to the United States "to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing of any alien immigrant at any place or time other than that designated by the inspection officers," and declares that "any such officer or agent or person in charge of such vessel who shall either knowingly or negligently land or permit to land any alien immigrant at any place or time other than that designated by the inspection officers, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by fine or imprisonment or both." Section 9 extends jurisdiction of state officers over immigrant stations, for the preservation of the peace, and arrest of persons violating state laws. This brings us to the tenth section, under which this prosecution is begun. It is unquestionable from the preceding sections that the intention of congress was the absolute exclusion from this country of all immigrants of the classes named in the act. Owners, officers, and agents of steam and sailing vessels coming from foreign ports with alien passengers, were fully and plainly warned and notified not to bring such prohibited persons. To guard against all possibility of such persons gaining admittance, duties were imposed on the owners and agents and officers of the vessels to make special report of alien passengers, to retain them on board, or only to land them at designated places, for the sole purpose of inspection, until they had been thoroughly inspected. For willful or negligent violation of those provisions of the act penalties were imposed. Congress, in the tenth section, dealt with the disposal of immigrants found on inspection to belong to the prohibited class, and brought to the United States in contravention of the previous sections; and it is to be noted that removal from the vessel to places on shore for convenience of inspection it is expressly declared "shall not be considered a landing during the pendency of such examination." The tenth section directs that all rejected persons shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back on the vessel by which they were brought in. The condition of practicability is simply a recognition of the contingency that the vessel might not be about to return to the port or country whence she had come. She might be bound to some other place, or she might be detained a long time for necessary repairs, or might be condemned as unseaworthy, or for other sufficient reasons would not be available for the reconveyance of the unlawful comers into the United States; but in every such case the immigrants were to be detained at the expense of the owners of the v.58F.no.3-36 vessel on which they came. They are regarded and treated as if still passengers under the care and control of the vessel's owners. Furthermore, if the master, agent, consignee, or owner of the vessel shall refuse to receive back on board the vessel such aliens, or shall neglect to detain them thereon, or shall refuse or neglect to return them to the port from which they came, or to pay the cost of their maintenance while on land, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished. The duty to receive back on board arises either when there has been a wrongful landing, or a removal to an appointed place for inspection. Detaining on board is required when the inspection has been had without any removal from the vessel, as well as when the alien, having been off the vessel, is sent back; and the obligation to return always exists. To secure payment of fines imposed, the clearance of the vessel is refused till they are paid. We cannot doubt, after thus examining the statute, that the tenth section imposes on masters, owners, agents, and consignees absolutely the duty to do the things required of them respectively. It admits of no excuse. They must at their peril conform to the provisions of the statute. They took the risk, when they brought the alien from a foreign port, that he would be adjudged not lawfully suitable to be admitted here, and must be taken back. The statute is analogous to acts regarding the sale of unwholesome or diseased provisions, or the keeping and storage of dangerous explosives, or the sale of intoxicating spirits. The safety and protection of the public is the end sought. Upon every one rests the duty to see to it that no act or omission of his shall endanger that safety; and, if he fails of the full performance of that duty, good intention, or the absence of evil intention, will not excuse him. The responsibility may be regarded similar to that resting upon a sheriff in case of an escape. He cannot excuse himself by showing that he had exercised care to keep his prisoner. Notwithstanding this view of the aims and purpose of the statute, if it cannot without violence be construed so as to effect its intention, it will be found a case where the legislature, by inadequate or inconsistent expression, has fallen short of its design. And in support of the contention that this is such a case, stress is laid on the expression "neglect to detain;" but we have no doubt that, in view of the general purposes of the statute, the word "neglect" must here receive a common and popular signification, as the equivalent of “fail” or "omit." The employment of the term "neglect" in this sense is neither infrequent nor unfamiliar, and assigning to it here any more restricted or narrow definition would defeat the whole end of the statute, a result to be tolerated only when necessary. It follows, therefore, that the rulings of the court below were correct, and the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment of the circuit court affirmed. CORBIN CABINET LOCK CO. v. YALE & TOWNE MANUF’G CO. et al. (Circuit Court, D. Connecticut. November 23, 1893.) Nos. 778, 779. 1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-ACQUIESCENCE. When validity is denied, and the state of the art shows that the invention is at best a narrow one, proof of acquiescence on the part of purchasers alone, coupled with complainant's affidavit showing that the only large competing manufacturer was notified when he first brought out his goods that complainant claimed infringement, and that thereupon "negotiations were entered into which resulted in an arrangement satisfactory to complainant," whereby said competitor "was permitted to continue the sale of its goods," is not sufficient to show such acquiescence as will warrant a preliminary injunction, in the absence of any details of the alleged arrangement or any affidavit from the competitor in regard thereto; especially when complainant's former superintendent denies that any such arrangement was made at the time stated, or for several years afterwards. 2. SAME-ACQUIESCENCE-CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED. In determining the completeness of acquiescence, the fact that complainant and one other are the only large manufacturers of the class of goods in question, and that it requires a very large investment to make the necessary line of patterns, are circumstances to be considered. 8. SAME VALIDITY-ESTOPPEL-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. A patentee who has assigned his patent should not be allowed, when sued for infringement thereof, to prevent the operation of the estoppel applicable in such cases, merely upon his ex parte affidavit, presented on a motion for preliminary injunction; for the questions of consideration, good faith, and the effect of his action on the action of complainant, can only be satisfactorily determined by a hearing on the merits. 4. SAME. The mere fact that an inventor, who has assigned his patent, subsequently becomes an officer in a corporation which is alleged to be an infringer does not render applicable to such corporation the estoppel which operates against him personally. In Equity. Bills by the Corbin Cabinet Lock Company against the Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company and Frank W. Mix for infringement of patents. On motion for preliminary injunction. Granted as against said Mix only. Mitchell, Hungerford & Bartlett, for complainant. TOWNSEND, District Judge. These are two motions for preliminary injunctions to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 295,270 and No. 309,238, granted to the complainant, as assignee of the defendant Frank W. Mix, for improvements in locks and keeper plates. At the hearing the motion in the second suit was withdrawn. The motion herein considered is upon patent No. 295,270, dated March 18, 1884, for an improvement in piano locks. It is not an adjudicated patent, but complainant claims such acquiescence as should have the force and effect of a prior judgment. The defendants admit infringement, but deny either patentability or acquiescence. It is not necessary to the disposition of the motion to discuss the evidence as to the prior state of the art. It has, therefore, seemed desirable that the consideration of the question of patentable novelty should be deferred until final hearing. Sessions v. Gould, 49 Fed. Rep. 855. The facts as to acquiescence appear to be substantially as hereinafter stated. The complainant corporation has been engaged since 1882 in the manufacture of locks of the class to which the lock in suit belongs. The defendant Mix was superintendent of said company from 1882 until 1891. In 1884, shortly after the grant of said patent, the complainant commenced to advertise and put upon the market locks embodying the construction claimed in said patent. They sold readily, and the demand for such locks has since increased, "until the present sales thereof amount to many thousand dollars per annum," amounting altogether to nearly $200,000. Among complainant's purchasers have been large dealers in and makers of desks and similar articles of furniture, and they have, without exception, acquiesced in the validity of said patent. The sharpest and ablest competitor in complainant's business has heretofore been the Eagle Lock Company, of Terryville, Conn. These two concerns have, until recently, practically controlled the market in this class of locks. Prior to 1888, said Eagle Lock Company had bought desk locks from the complainant, to fill its orders. About five years ago said company brought out a lock which complainant claimed infringed said patent. Thereupon "complainant notified said company, and nego tiations were entered into which resulted in an arrangement satisfactory to complainant, whereby said Eagle Company was permitted to continue the sale of its goods." No evidence upon this point, other than that contained in the above quotation, was presented by complainant. The Eagle Company has continued its manufacture of such locks down to the present time. The defendant Mix claims that the complainant had made no arrangement or agreement with said Eagle Lock Company concerning said locks prior to the time when he left the complainant company in 1891. No affidavit of the representatives of the Eagle Lock Company was produced. The question is whether, upon these facts, the complainant has sustained the burden of proof of such definite public acquiescence as to raise a reasonable presumption of the validity of said patent. "Acquiescence, in reference to this subject, is a voluntary submission, against interest, to an asserted right." 3 Rob. Pat. § 1185. Such public acquiescence must be of that part of the public which is cognizant of the extent of the monopoly. Lantern Co. v. Miller, 8 Fed. Rep. 314; Tappan v. Bank Note Co., 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 195; Sewing Mach. Co. v. Williams, Id. 133. But here the affidavits introduced to show acquiescence were made, not by manufacturers, but by dealers in cabinet furniture. They were made on printed blanks, and were as emphatic in the assertion of public acquiescence in the validity of the patent in the suit which was withdrawn as in that of the pending suit. There was no evidence of acquiescence on the part of any manufacturer of locks, other than as herein before stated. The failure of complainant to state the details of its arrangement with, or to obtain an affidavit from, said Eagle Company, seems most significant in view of the surrounding circumstances of the case. That complainant and the Eagle Lock Company were, until recently, the only large manufacturers of this class of locks, and that it requires the investment of a great amount of capital to make such a line of patterns as are necessary in order to successfully carry on this business, are circumstances to be considered upon the question of the completeness of the acquiescence. Sargent v. Seagrave, 2 Curt. 553; Foster v. Moore, 1 Curt. 279; Guidet v. Palmer, 10 Blatchf. 217. I have been unable to find any case where such circumstances alone have been held equivalent to a previous adjudication, upon a contested hearing, in favor of the patent. It does not seem to me that a court ought to grant a preliminary injunction on such incomplete and indefinite evidence, where the validity of the patent is denied, the state of the art shows that the invention of the patent in suit is at best a narrow one, and where the financial ability of the defendant corporation has not been assailed. Standard Elevator Co. v. Crane Elevator Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 718. It But complainant claims that the defendants are estopped to deny the validity of the patent, because of the assignment to it by the defendant Mix, who is now an officer of the defendant company. The defendant does not deny the application of said doc trine to an assignor of a patent for a consideration, but it claims that said doctrine has no bearing upon the facts in this case. appears that Mix, being in the employ of complainant, and believ ing himself to be the first inventor of an improved locking device, took said device to the solicitor of complainant, and authorized him to make an application therefor, in his name, but without any consideration other than that arising out of his employment. Owing to the citation of anticipations, the application was modified by complainant's solicitor so as to claim a patent upon narrower and somewhat different grounds from those stated in the original application. Whether, under these circumstances, any different rule should be applied, is by no means certain. Burdsall v. Curran, 31 Fed. Rep. 918; Cropper v. Smith, 26 Ch. Div. 700. But it does not seem that an assignor of an invention ought to be allowed, by his ex parte affidavit on such a motion, to escape the operation of the doctrine of estoppel. The questions of consideration, of good faith, and as to the effect of his action upon the action of complainant, can only be satisfactorily determined by a hearing upon the merits. Greenwood v. Bracher, 1 Fed. Rep. 858. These conclusions are supported by the cases of Barrel Co. v. Laraway, 28 Fed. Rep. 141, and Onderdonk v. Fanning, 4 Fed. Rep. 148. In the former case the defendant was the assignor of the patents in suit. But the opinion of Judge Shipman seems to indicate that the question of estoppel should not be determined in favor of an infringer upon ex parte affidavits. In Onderdonk v. Fanning, the infringer was the assignor of the invention before the issuance of the patent. There is no evidence which connects the defendant corporation |