to the Appellate Court, the inquiry in that court on appeal or writ of error is, did the facts as they appear in the record, and the law, authorize the finding and judgment of the court below?-and in such cases the Appellate Court would be authorized to pass both upon the facts and the law though no propositions of law were held or refused by the trial court. This is in line with the holding of this court in Bradish v. Yocum, supra, where the case was appealed directly from the trial court to this court. What was said in Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co. supra, relied on by the Appellate Court in its opinion, and the other cases in which the same doctrine is laid down by this court, applies only to questions of fact when the case has been brought from the trial court to this court by way of the Appellate Court, and the rule has no application to cases brought direct from the trial court to this court, or to the authority and duty of the Appellate Court when the case is brought from the trial court to that court.

We do not find anything that is said in the cases cited in the opinion by the Appellate Court, or in the briefs of counsel for appellee, that in any way conflicts with this conclusion. For illustration, the case of Sullivan v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. 262 Ill. 317, is relied on as supporting the conclusion of the Appellate Court. In that case it is distinctly stated that there was no exception preserved in the record to the judgment, and therefore, under the reasoning of that case construing the statute as it then stood before amendment, the correctness of the judgment on the evidence was not reviewable by this court on direct appeal. Miller v. Anderson, supra.

The Appellate Court's view that it could not consider the question whether the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment not being in accord with the conclusions reached herein, the judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the cause remanded to that court for consideration of the various errors assigned on this record

and for further proceedings not in conflict with the views herein expressed. The clerk of this court is ordered to transmit the record to the Appellate Court for the First District in accordance with these directions.

Reversed and remanded.

(No. 13861.-Reversed and remanded.)

ROSAMOND MCNAUGHT, Admx. Defendant in Error, vs. WALKER D. HINES, Director General of Railroads, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed October 22, 1921-Rehearing denied Dec. 7, 1921.

I. STATUTES-statute cannot be construed if it is unambiguous. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and the words used must be taken in their ordinary, natural and commonly received sense.

2. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-section 3 of Compensation act of 1917 is a valid exercise of police power. Section 3 of the Compensation act of 1917, making the law binding upon all employers engaged in extra-hazardous enterprises or businesses as defined in the act, is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

3. SAME―when recovery for death of traveling salesman killed by railroad train must be under Compensation act. A salesman for a meat packing company, which is engaged in an extra-hazardous business under section 3 of the Compensation act of 1917, is an employee under the act within the meaning of section 5, and if he is killed while crossing a railroad track after taking orders from a customer, and the railroad company is engaged in intrastate commerce, all three parties are under the Compensation act and recovery must be had under its provisions. (Sanitary District v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 182, and Bowman Dairy Co. v. Industrial Com. 292 id. 284, distinguished; Illinois Publishing Co. v. Industrial Com. 299 Ill. 189, and Goldsmith v. Payne, (ante, p. 119, followed.)

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Third District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. SAIN WELTY, Judge, presiding.

GEORGE B. GILLESPIE, (A. E. & R. C. DEMANGE, L. J. HACKNEY, STANLEY W. MERRELL, GEO. B. & GEO. M. GILLESPIE, and F. L. LITTLETON, of counsel,) for plaintiff in

error.

SIGMUND LIVINGSTON, and W. W. WHITMORE, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant in error, as administratrix of her husband's estate, brought a suit in the circuit court of McLean county against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, operating the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis railway, for the death of her husband, claiming it to have been caused by the negligence of the railway company. On the trial before a jury a verdict in favor of defendant in error was given for $9000 and judgment entered thereon in the circuit court. On appeal to the Appellate Court that judgment was affirmed, and the case has been brought to this court on petition for certiorari.

The declaration consisted of four counts, each charging in some form negligence in the operation of the engine and cars of the railway company. It appears that on January 24, 1918, the deceased was a traveling salesman for the Wink Packing Company of Peoria. On the afternoon of that day he arrived at the village of Lilly, in Tazewell county, on an interurban car a few minutes before six o'clock. The Wink Packing Company sold meats and their by-products, and the object of the deceased in going to Lilly was to procure an order from the firm of Rutledge & Garrett, a customer. About forty people lived in Lilly, and the buildings there located consisted of several business places, plaintiff in error's railroad depot, an interurban depot and about twelve houses. The plaintiff in error's railroad runs. through this place east and west and the interurban electric

railway parallels it on the north, about seventy-five feet distant therefrom. A block south of the railroad tracks an unnamed street runs east and west parallel therewith and ends at the east side of Hay street. On the north and south sides of this unnamed street or passageway above mentioned and west of Hay street are located some of the business places mentioned. The store of Rutledge & Garrett is located at the southwest corner of the intersection of the unnamed street and Hay street. Running north from this street for a short distance is a cement walk, beyond which is a path which runs diagonally in a northeasterly direction, crossing the railroad tracks in the center of Hay street and continuing northeasterly across Hay street to the interurban station, which is north of the interurban tracks and on the east side of Hay street. Hay, street is not a regularly traveled highway and has no definite width. Where it crosses plaintiff in error's tracks it is planked to a width of nineteen feet. The evidence tends to show that after the deceased had obtained an order from Rutledge & Garrett he started north on Hay street toward the interurban station to take an interurban car then shortly to be due; that as he approached the crossing plaintiff in error's train also approached it from the east, running between fifty and sixty miles per hour; that it was dark and the headlight on the approaching engine was an oil lamp. There was some conflict in the evidence as to the signals given and as to the speed of the train. There were no eye-witnesses who were able to see the accident at the actual time it happened. Some of the witnesses saw the deceased approaching plaintiff in error's railway as the train in question was coming from the east and said that he was running or going at what might be called a "dog-trot;" that he disappeared in the steam that was escaping from the engine and was struck by the engine, but the on-lookers did not see him struck because of the steam or smoke from the engine. He died very shortly after being struck.

Numerous objections have been raised by plaintiff in error on the merits, and it is earnestly insisted that an instruction directing a verdict should have been given by the trial court. Plaintiff in error filed a plea of general issue, also a special plea. In the special plea it is averred that the Wink Packing Company, which employed the deceased at the time of his death, was a corporation organized under the laws of this State and engaged in an extra-hazardous business, in which statutory and municipal ordinances and regulations were imposed for regulating, guarding, use and placing machinery or appliances for the protection and safeguarding of its employees; that deceased was killed while engaged in the duties of his employment; that neither employer nor employee had elected not to be bound by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation act then in force; that plaintiff in error was engaged in the business of carriage by land of goods and passengers between points in the State of Illinois for hire, and that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation act applied to plaintiff in error and his employees. A demurrer was filed to this special plea and sustained and the trial was had upon the general issue.

The Workmen's Compensation act in force at the time of this accident was that of 1917. (Laws of 1917, p. 505.) That act repealed the previous provisions stating what parties came within the Workmen's Compensation act, and provided in section 3, among other things: "The provisions of this act hereinafter following, shall apply automatically, and without election, to all employers and their employees engaged in any of the following enterprises or businesses which are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous, namely." Then followed an enumeration of various articles of extrahazardous businesses, among which were included: "3. Carriage by land or water and loading or unloading in connection therewith. 4. The operation of any warehouse or general or terminal store houses. * ** 8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations