the employee is entitled to recover for all the consequences attributable to the injury in the acceleration or aggravation of such disease. Such aggravation or acceleration, permanent and progressive in its nature, will entitle the employee to compensation to the extent and in the proportion in which the pre-existing disease is increased or aggravated. Mere predisposing physical condition does not affect the right to compensation. If an accident results in a lesion or a new condition of which it is the proximate cause, there may be a recovery of compensation for the same, regardless of predisposing conditions making the employee more susceptible to the injury. (Big Muddy Coal and Iron Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 235; Peoria Railway Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board, id. 352; Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. 289 id. 315.) Under these rules, the previous condition of the applicant was a material circumstance to be considered in ascertaining whether his condition of total and permanent disability resulted from the accident suffered in the course of his employment and arising out of it or from the disease, and if from both, the proportion in which the accident contributed.

The doctor who attended the applicant at the time of the injury, testifying as an expert, said that there were no results remaining from the injury and that the disability therefrom was temporary, only. The other doctor said that the accident could have aggravated the heart disease which was present before the time of the injury, and, in view of the testimony that the applicant had always been able to do ordinary work, a conclusion that the accident aggravated or increased the heart condition, whether temporarily or permanently, might be justified. There can be no doubt from the evidence that the applicant had heart disease before the injury, which was progressive and organic in its nature and arose from infection, and a right to compensation depended upon the question whether the injury had aggravated and intensified the existing condition. He

would be entitled to recover so far as the accident contributed, if at all, to his present condition, but there is no evidence tending to show that such condition was due wholly to the accident. The award cannot be sustained on the evidence in the record, and there should be a further opportunity, if desired, to introduce evidence on the question whether, and if so to what extent, the injury contributed to the present permanent incapacity of the applicant.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to remand the application to the Industrial Commission for a determination of the right to compensation, and, if there is such right, an adjustment of the same in accordance with the law as herein stated, or for a further hearing of evidence, if desired. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 13959. Decree affirmed.)

NATHAN BOND, Receiver, Appellant, vs. JOHN R. MOORE, County Clerk, et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed October 22, 1921—Rehearing denied Dec. 8, 1921.

I. TAXES-property of insolvent firm is properly assessed to the receiver. It is the duty of the receiver of an insolvent firm to list all property in his hands as receiver and subject to taxation although he is not the actual owner, and the property, if taxable, is properly assessed to him as receiver.

2. SAME-funds of insolvent private bank in hands of receiver are taxable as "money on hand." The funds of an insolvent private bank in the hands of a receiver and on deposit in another bank are taxable, under section 30 of the Revenue act, as "money on hand" and not as credits, and in assessing such money the receiver is entitled to no deduction for amounts owed depositors, but an assessment of such funds by the board of review as "moneys other than those of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber" does not invalidate the tax.

3. SAME-insolvency does not affect insolvent's property in matter of taxation. Insolvency does not change the character of the

fund or property in the hands of the insolvent in the matter of taxation, and the fact that a private bank is insolvent does not relieve its funds from taxation under the provisions of section 30 of the Revenue act.

4. SAME-complainant seeking to enjoin collection of tax has the burden of proof. A complainant who seeks to enjoin the collection of a tax on the ground that the property assessed is not taxable under any designation has the burden of proof.

5. SAME-funds of insolvent bank awaiting distribution by receiver should not be taxed in names of depositors. The funds of an insolvent bank in the hands of a receiver and awaiting distribution by him is not the money of the depositors in the sense that it should be taxed in their names where the pro rata shares of the depositors is not ascertained, but the money should be assessed to the receiver as receiver, without regard to the question whether or not it is the duty of depositors to pay taxes on their certificates of deposit.

6. BANKS-money deposited as credit with other banks is not "money on hand." Money deposited by a bank with other banks as a credit is not "money on hand" within the meaning of section 30 of the Revenue act, but money on hand in a bank is the fund or cash out of which it makes its loans and is to be taxed as money on hand under said section even when the bank is insolvent and is using such money in winding up its affairs.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. WALTER BREWER, Judge, presiding.

ROBERT R. RODMAN, for appellant.

JOHN H. LEWMAN, State's Attorney, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by Nathan Bond, receiver of the firm of Hamilton & Cunningham, private bankers at Hoopeston, Illinois, from an order of the circuit court of Vermilion county dismissing a bill for relief and injunction filed by the receiver against John R. Moore, as county clerk, and Robert H. Mater, as county treasurer and ex-officio county collector, of the county of Vermilion. By the bill it was sought to restrain the defendants, and each of them, from extending and collecting any taxes against the complain

ant, as receiver, on account of a certain original assessment made and returned by the board of review of said county against him. The defendants answered the bill, and on a hearing the court dismissed it for want of equity.

The members of said banking firm were John L. Hamilton and James A. Cunningham. They operated their private bank until June 1, 1909, and then organized the Hoopeston National Bank and ceased to receive deposits as private bankers, the national bank receiving the deposits of subsequent depositors. Cunningham died about January 11, 1910, and Hamilton, the surviving partner, continued to collect and disburse the assets of the private bank until about November 1, 1913, at which time the appellant was appointed receiver by order of the circuit court of said county. The firm of Hamilton & Cunningham was insolvent. The estate of Cunningham was solvent. Forty-nine claims, aggregating more than $40,000 and evidenced by certificates of deposit, were allowed against appellant as receiver and against the estate of Cunningham. On April 1, 1919, appellant had, and since 1917 has had, in his possession as receiver about $31,152, which the board of review in 1919 assessed against him at one-half its full value, $15,500, as "moneys other than of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber," which assessment was duly returned to the county clerk of said county, John R. Moore, and duly filed as required by law. Previous to making the assessment appellant had a hearing before the board of review and furnished the board with a list of the names and addresses of the holders of all the certificates of deposit outstanding against said partnership firm and issued by the firm while conducting its private bank, and informed the board that the funds in his hands were assets belonging to the private bank of Hamilton & Cunningham, and that the aggregate amount of said certificates of deposit which were valid claims against said partnership exceeded the sum of $40,000. The further facts proved are that the $31,152 in

money in the possession of appellant as receiver was collected by him from old notes and accounts due Hamilton & Cunningham, some of it being collected by taking collateral security, such as lands, lots and buildings, and there are no other assets of said firm of value in appellant's possession. The real estate of the firm was sold in 1917. He has never listed any of the property of the firm for taxation except the real estate. On June 22, 1918, the circuit court entered a decree ordering appellant to make distribution of said sum of money as receiver. The money was then on deposit in the First National Bank of Hoopeston in the name of appellant as receiver and has remained on deposit since that time, and he draws three per cent interest on it. The reason given by appellant for not distributing the money as ordered by the court is that there is an unsettled claim against him as receiver for $14,000, and that the costs and expenses and attorney's fee and his fees have not been fixed and determined, and that he does not know how to pro-rate the distribution. The cashier of the First National Bank of Hoopeston testified that said sum of money in his bank was subject to check or draft, and that appellant's check would have been honored for the full amount of the deposit at any time.

Appellant's contentions, stated in his own language, are the following: That he "had no moneys in his possession. or control on April 1, 1919, other than those of a bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber; that the funds in the hands of the complainant were not subject to assessment and taxation as moneys other than those of a bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber; that said property and funds in the hands of the complainant were then and there choses in action and rights and claims belonging to persons. other than complainant; that the funds in the hands of complainant, in so far as complainant is concerned, were credits of a bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber, and that the complainant was entitled to deduct the amount of all