the plaintiff in error was armed with a deadly weapon, so that he was liable to imprisonment for any term of years or for life. The testimony of Kurtz applied to both the defendants on trial and he was successfully contradicted as to one of them, so that on the question of his credibility counsel for plaintiff in error had a right to present to the jury all the evidence and facts which discredited him. Section 9 of the bill of rights secures to the accused in every criminal prosecution the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, and this is not a mere empty and nominal right or an idle form. Plaintiff in error had a right to have his counsel given a reasonable opportunity to discuss before the jury both the facts and the law of the case, and the court could not legally deprive him of that right. Any limitation of the constitutional right which deprives a defendant of an opportunity to have his counsel argue the law and the facts has always been regarded as error requiring a new trial. (Williams v. State, 60 Ga. 367; People v. Green, 90 Cal. 564; State v. Rogoway, 45 Ore. 601; Wingo v. State, 62 Miss. 311; Yeidell v. State, 100 Ala. 26.) From the nature and importance of this case, the condition of the evidence and the time necessarily required to make a fair presentation to the jury, the limit imposed was unreasonable. Complaint is made of an instruction concerning Kurtz, which was the same instruction given in People v. Thompson, 274 Ill. 214, concerning the witness Alfreda Nelson. It was not incorrect, at least when taken in connection with instruction No. II given at the instance of the defendants. stating practically the same rule, with a statement that the testimony of the accomplice was subject to greater scrutiny than that of any other witness and that the jury should so weigh his testimony. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. (No. 14278.-Judgment affirmed.) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. WILLIAM F. KRELL, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed December 22, 1921. CRIMINAL LAW-Parole law does not violate Federal constitution. The Illinois Parole law, in providing for indeterminate sentences, does not violate section I of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution. (People v. Doras, 290 Ill. 188, followed.) WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES A. McDONALD, Judge, presiding. LESTER E. WILLIAMS, for plaintiff in error. EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, ROBERT E. CROWE, State's Attorney, and EDWARD C. FITCH, (EDWARD E. WILSON, HENRY T. CHACE, JR., and CLYDE C. FISHER, of counsel,) for the People. Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: William F. Krell, plaintiff in error, was indicted by the grand jury of Cook county in an indictment charging that he and others on September 10, 1920, assaulted Marie McGuire and certain money (described in the indictment) belonging to her from her person and against her will feloniously and violently, by force and intimidation, did rob, steal, take and carry away, etc., and that the defendants were armed with a dangerous weapon, a revolver. On a plea of not guilty plaintiff in error was tried, convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary at Joliet for an indefinite term, not to exceed the maximum term fixed by the statute for the crime charged, and the jury found by their verdict that he was armed with a dangerous weapon, with intent, if resisted, to kill and maim the person robbed, and that he is of the age of twenty-four years. He has sued out this writ of error to review that judgment. No bill of exceptions appears in the record. The case is brought to this court solely upon the common law record. There was a motion in arrest of judgment, which was overruled by the court. Plaintiff in error's entire brief, which is unaccompanied by argument, is in this language: "It is assigned as error that the court erred in denying the motion in arrest of judgment; that the verdict was insufficient because the jury did not fix the term of imprisonment; that the court erred in imposing an indeterminate sentence, and in holding that the law of this State providing for indeterminate sentences does not violate section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. The ground of plaintiff in error's objection is that no means are provided for ascertaining, either by the judgment of the court or any authorized body, what the extent of the punishment should be, and the convict is not permitted to be heard on the matter." The questions raised on this record have had the attention of this court in a number of cases, and all of those contentions have been decided adversely to plaintiff in error's claims for reversal of this judgment. The following are some of those decisions: People v. Doras, 290 Ill. 188, People v. O'Donnell, 291 id. 178, People v. Connors, 291 id. 614, and People v. Simmons, 299 id. 201. As was stated in the case last cited, the decisions were reached by a divided court, but as they have been so often followed by this court we must consider all the points raised on this record as finally decided so far as this court is concerned. For that reason we do not consider it necessary to further consider those points. For the reasons given in the cases above cited, the judgment of the criminal court of Cook county is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (No. 13765.-Reversed and remanded.) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. EDWARD REDOLA, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed December 22, 1921. I. CRIMINAL LAW-what questions are improper in examination of jurors. A defendant in a criminal case, in examining jurors upon their voir dire, has a right to advise them of the presumption of law in favor of his innocence and to ascertain whether they will act upon that presumption and give him the benefit of it in considering the evidence but has no right to demand jurors who have a present belief that he is innocent, and it is proper to sustain objections to questions asking a juror if he believes, before hearing the evidence, that the defendant is innocent. 2. SAME what statement volunteered in testimony of police officer is prejudicial to defendant. In a prosecution for the larceny of an automobile, where the defendant claims he was merely driving the car for another person, whom he was to meet at a certain hour at a certain hotel, a statement volunteered in the testimony of a police officer that the police called the hotel every fifteen minutes and had such person paged is merely hearsay, where the witness has no personal knowledge of what was done at the hotel, and the statement is prejudicial to the defendant in leaving the impression with the jury that there was no such person at the hotel, without having that fact testified to directly by a witness under oath who knew the fact. 3. SAME-evidence of the defendant's reputation as a peaceable citizen is not relevant in trial for larceny. The theory upon which proof of the defendant's reputation is admitted in evidence in his favor in a criminal case is that the reputation proved is at variance with the nature of the crime charged, and on a trial for the larceny of an automobile the defendant is not entitled to prove his reputation as a peaceable citizen. 4. SAME-argument of State's attorney must be based on the evidence. It is the right and duty of a State's attorney to present the evidence to the jury and make all legitimate argument in behalf of the People based upon it, but he has no right to indulge in assertions not based on the evidence for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the jury against the defendant or his witnesses. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. WILLIAM T. CHURCH, Judge, presiding. KENWORTHY, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & SINNETT, and WILLIAM B. SCHRODER, for plaintiff in error. EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, BENJAMIN S. BELL, State's Attorney, JAMES B. SEARCY, and EDWARD L. EAGLE, for the People. Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff in error, Edward Redola, was convicted in the circuit court of Rock Island county of the larceny of a five-passenger automobile upon an indictment consisting of two counts, the first charging him with larceny of the automobile, and the second with receiving the same knowing that it had been stolen. In the examination of the jurors upon their voir dire one of them was asked this question: "I would like to ask you if now, before you have heard any evidence in this case, if you should be selected as a juror, can you start out on a trial of this case believing the defendant is innocent?" A similar question was asked of another juror, and this question was put to a third juror: "And do you in good faith believe him innocent before you have heard any of the evidence in this case?" Objections to these questions were sustained. The defendant had a right to a legal and impartial jury and to make any proper examination of each juror to ascertain whether he possessed the necessary legal qualifications, whether he had prejudged the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant, whether his mind was free from bias or prejudice, and any state of facts from which the defendant might deem it advisable to challenge him peremptorily in case he should be declared competent by the court. (Lavin v. People, 69 Ill. 303; Donovan v. People, 139 id. 412.) The defendant was entitled to examine jurors to ascertain whether they stood indifferently |