bona fide debts owing by said banking firm to any other person, which debts exceeded the amount on hand; that said funds were in the custody of the complainant as receiver, being administered by the order of the court, and that the funds were funds of an insolvent co-partnership and that the court had made an order directing the distribution of the same; that said funds were not taxable under the law of the State of Illinois."

It is the duty of the board of review to assess all property subject to assessment which was not assessed by the assessor, under paragraph 329 of the Revenue act. (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 2488.) The property of the private bank in the hands of appellant as receiver, if taxable, was properly assessed to him as such receiver, and it was his duty as such receiver to list all property in his hands as receiver and subject to taxation, although he was not the actual owner of the same. (Wiswall v. Kunz, 173 Ill. 110; Hurd's Stat. 1917, sec. 6, par. 6, p. 2423.) The real question in the case is whether or not the money in question in the hands of the receiver was subject to taxation. It is not disputed that the board of review had the right and power to assess it as an original assessment if the property was taxable. Appellant's main contention in his argument is that the property having belonged to a private bank should be assessed under the provision of section 30 of the Revenue act, if at all, as the property of a private bank and in accordance with the rules for the assessment of a private bank under said section.

Section 30, so far as it is material to this inquiry as applied to private banks, provides as follows: "Every bank, * * banker, broker or stock-jobber, shall at the time fixed by this act for listing personal property, make out and furnish the assessor a sworn statement showing, first, the amount of money on hand or in transit. Second, the amount of funds in the hands of other banks, bankers, brokers or others, subject to draft. Third, the amount of

Fourth,

checks or other cash items; the amount thereof not being included in either of the preceding items. the amount of bills receivable, discounted or purchased, and other credits, due or to become due, including accounts receivable, and interest accrued but not due, and interest due and unpaid. * * Seventh, the amount of all deposits made with them by other parties. Eighth, the amount of all accounts payable other than current deposit The aggregate amount of the first item shall, be listed as moneys. The aggregate amount of the seventh and eighth items shall be deducted from the aggregate amount of the second, third and fourth items of said statement and the amount of the remainder, if any, shall be listed as credits."

accounts.

In reaching his conclusion that the money in his hands for distribution is not taxable, appellant assumes that it is to be considered and listed as "funds in the hands of other banks, bankers, brokers or others, subject to draft," under the requirements of section 30 of the Revenue act, as said funds are the property of a private bank and should be treated as private bank funds just the same as if they were still in the hands of Hamilton & Cunningham, bankers, instead of in his hands as receiver. Having assumed this position, he then argues that in order to obtain the correct amount in his hands for assessment and taxation said section requires that the amount due all the depositors of the bank, and who are claimants against him in the aggregate amount of more than $40,000, shall be deducted from the amount of money in his hands, and the remainder, if any, be taxed as credits, and as the remainder is less than nothing, the money in his hands is not subject to taxation.

If we concede that appellant is right in his contention that the money in his hands should be regarded as the money of private bankers, to be listed, assessed and taxed as funds of private bankers are listed, assessed and taxed, we are still unable to agree with appellant in his assumption

that the money in his hands is to be considered as credits, within the meaning of section 30, and to be listed for taxation and taxed under the designation of "funds in the hands of other banks, bankers, brokers or others, subject to draft." The funds or money in appellant's hands properly comes under the designation "money on hand," under section 30, and is to be listed and assessed as money, and in assessing such money appellant was entitled to no deduction for amounts owed depositors. When appellant reduced the assets of this insolvent bank into cash to the amount of said sum it was certainly money on hand within the meaning of said section, and it was money for one purpose only to pay the costs and expenses of the receivership and to pro-rate the remainder among the depositors or creditors of the bank. It was money on hand and money in his hands before he deposited it in the bank. If, instead of depositing it in the bank, he had placed it in his private safe at his home and kept it there for the purposes aforesaid, it certainly could not have been considered otherwise than as money on hand and subject to taxation as money and not as credits. He deposited it in the First National Bank simply because he had no safe place to keep it, and he could not change the character of the fund by simply depositing it in a bank. Neither the character of the fund nor the purpose of it was changed by depositing it in the bank. The second item to be listed for taxation under section 30, "funds in the hands of other banks, bankers, brokers or others, subject to draft," has reference to funds that are placed by banks in the hands of other banks as a fund to offset or pay existing or contemplated claims against the depositing bank and which may be used for such purpose by draft. Such a fund is properly called a credit, as it is an amount owed to the depositing bank by another bank and is deposited for the convenience and use of the bank in paying any claim that may arise against it, or as a fund upon which the depositing bank may draw to pay a cus

tomer the equivalent of money owed to the depositing bank and for which the customer in turn pays cash into the depositing bank from which he obtains his draft on the fund deposited in the other bank. Such a fund deposited in another bank is at no time "money on hand" or money used by the depositing bank for the purpose of loaning or otherwise carrying on the profitable business of banking but is at all times truly a credit. Money on hand in a bank is the fund or cash out of which it makes its loans, and is therefore at all times to be considered as money on hand within the meaning of section 30 and to be taxed as money, and it continues of that character even when the bank is insolvent and winding up its affairs and the money is to be used only for the purpose of making final distribution and settlement of the bank's affairs as a bank.

The fact that the board of review assessed the money in the hands of appellant as "moneys other than those of bank, banker, broker or stock-jobber" did not invalidate the assessment or the tax. The board of review assessed and taxed the fund in question as money of appellant as receiver, and there is no question about its being the same money that appellant had on deposit in the First National Bank. It was taxable as money on hand, and the fact that the private bank was insolvent does not relieve this sum from taxation. It would have been taxable in the hands of Hamilton & Cunningham as money on hand if they were still running the bank and in possession of the money, although insolvent. Insolvency does not change the character of the fund or property in the hands of the insolvent. Appellant sought his remedy by injunction in a court of equity, and the burden was upon him to show that the fund was not taxable under any designation, and having failed to do so the bill was properly dimissed for want of equity.

The claim that the depositors ought to have been taxed for the sum of this money and that for that reason appellant cannot be taxed on the money cannot be sustained.

under any view. It was not the money of the depositors in the sense that it should be taxed in their names. The pro rata share of no depositor was ascertained or known. The money was still in the possession of appellant and was his money as receiver and subject to taxation, without regard to the question whether or not it was the duty of the depositors to pay taxes on their certificates of deposit. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(No. 13945.-Appellate Court reversed; superior court affirmed.) JOHN GRAHAM, Plaintiff in Error, vs. J. H. PAGE, Defendant in Error.

Opinion filed October 22, 1921-Rehearing denied Dec. 8, 1921.

1. NEGLIGENCE-when owner of automobile is liable for injury caused by negligent driving by his minor child. The owner of an automobile is liable for an injury caused by the negligent driving of the car by his minor child where the car is kept for family use and pleasure and where the accident occurs while the car is being driven by the child on a family errand with the permission of the owner; but the liability rests upon the principle of agency and not on the relationship of parent and child. (Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, distinguished.)

2. SAME-when cause need not be remanded to Appellate Court. In a personal injury suit, where the Appellate Court does not pass upon the question whether the negligence of the defendant's agent was the proximate cause of the injury but reverses a judgment for the plaintiff upon the proposition that the defendant is not liable for the agent's act, the Supreme Court, upon holding that there is a cause of action, may reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court without remanding the cause and affirm the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, where it is clear that the negligence of the agent was the proximate cause of the injury and where the sufficiency of the plaintiff's proof is not argued or referred to by the defendant in his brief.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JACOB H. HOPKINS, Judge, presiding.