in five annual series of $10,000 each, the first series of which matured on November 1, 1920. In order to raise enough money to pay the principal and interest due on these bonds in 1920 it was necessary for the county clerk to extend against the property of the town, taxes at the rate of seventy-six cents for each $100 of the assessed valuation of the property of the town. The objection is to the excess of nine and one-third cents on each $100 of the assessed valuation. On hearing the county court overruled the objection of the appellant and entered judgment against it for the full amount of the taxes as extended. From this judgment appellant has perfected an appeal to this court. It has been conclusively settled as the law of this State that the fixing of any portion of the full valuation of property to be used as the assessed valuation is statutory and is subject to change by the legislature at any time. (People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. 247 Ill. 327; People v. Cincinnati, Lafayette and Chicago Railway Co. 247 id. 446.) When the electors of the town of Fountain Creek authorized a levy of a tax of one dollar per annum on each $100 of the assessed valuation of their property for five years to pay the principal and interest on bonds to the amount of $50,000, they did so with the knowledge that the legislature had the power to change the valuation at which property was to be assessed to any portion of the full value of the property or to fix the full value of property as the basis for assessment. It has also been settled as the law of this State that where bonds are issued. pursuant to authority given by the legislature under a statute authorizing the extension of a certain tax to pay the principal and interest of these bonds as they become due, the legislature has no authority to reduce the tax rate to a point where it will not produce enough money to meet the obligations incurred by the issuance of the bonds, on the ground that it impairs the obligation of a contract. (People v. Hoerr, 294 Ill. 338.) When a municipality in this State issues bonds under authority given it by the legislature it must pay the principal and interest on those bonds as they become due. In the case before us it does not, as a matter of fact, make any difference to the tax-payer or to the bondholder whether the taxes are extended at the sixty-six and two-thirds cents rate or at the seventy-six cents rate. The tax-payer must eventually pay enough taxes to retire these bonds and the bondholder will eventually get his principal, with interest. While a municipality is under no contractual relation with the tax-payers to retain the same method of fixing the assessed valuation of property, it is under a contractual relation with the bondholder to maintain a tax rate, within the rate fixed by law at the time the bonds were authorized, sufficient to pay the principal and interest as they fall due. Appellant relies on People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 295 Ill. 408, as authority for its position, and insists that the holding in that case is conclusive of the issues in this case. The facts in the case cited were the same as the facts in the case before us, but the court did not consider the contractual relation existing between the bondholder and the town, and, so far as the opinion shows, the question was not presented for determination. It is true that on bonds authorized to be issued under the provisions of section 112 of the Roads and Bridges act after July 1, 1919, the rate to be extended could not exceed sixty-six and twothirds cents on each $100 of the assessed valuation of the taxable property, but this is not true where bonds were issued pursuant to an election held under the section prior to July 1, 1919. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. (No. 14097.-Reversed and remanded.) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. PATRICK T. STAPLETON, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed December 22, 1921. I. CRIMINAL LAW-the mere admission of incriminating facts is not a confession-instructions. A confession is a voluntary declaration of a person charged with crime of his agency or participation in the crime and is not merely a declaration or admission of facts criminating in their nature or tending to show guilt, and where from their recollection police officers testify to certain statements made by the defendant which do not amount to a confession, it is prejudicial error to give the jury instructions characterizing such statements as a confession. 2. SAME-apparent necessity will justify self-defense. Actual and positive danger is not indispensable to justify self-defense, but if the circumstances are such as to induce in the accused a reasonable and well-grounded belief that he is actually in present danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm he will be justified in defending himself, whether the danger is real or only apparent. 3. SAME-jury should not be instructed that self-defense must be apparently necessary from a normal process of reasoning. It is not the rule in self-defense that the danger must appear to be urgent and pressing as a logical sequence of reasoning in conformity to normal standards, but in determining the extent of the danger one must judge at the time, as a reasonable man, from appearances and circumstances, whether he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, and it is error to instruct the jury that self-defense must be apparently necessary "according to normal reasoning." WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. THOMAS TAYLOR, JR., Judge, presiding. FRANCIS BORRELLI, (THOMAS E. SWANSON, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error. EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, ROBERT E. CROWE, State's Attorney, and EDWARD C. FITCH, (HENRY T. CHACE, JR., EDWARD E. WILSON, and CLYDe C. Fisher, of counsel,) for the People. Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court: Patrick T. Stapleton, plaintiff in error, was indicted by the grand jury of Cook county for the murder of John Walsh. Upon a trial in the criminal court there was a verdict finding him guilty and fixing his punishment at confinement for twenty years in the State penitentiary at Joliet, and judgment was entered on the verdict. After midnight of October 11, 1919, the defendant, with John Walsh and others, was in a saloon at Forty-fifth street and Wentworth avenue, in Chicago. There was a quarrel there between some of them about change left on the bar in paying for drinks. It was one o'clock in the morning of the 12th when the saloon-keeper told them that he was going to close the place and if they wanted to fight he would call the police, and they were all turned out of the saloon. When they got out of the saloon the defendant and Walsh had a fight, which was stopped by a policeman. They started in the direction of the defendant's home, at Forty-fifth street and Normal avenue. Walsh lived at Forty-third place and Wallace street, and they were not going toward his home. When they reached a point on Forty-fifth street where a railroad crosses the street at an elevation there was another fight and Walsh knocked the defendant down and kicked him. The defendant ran to his home and procured a revolver and returned and met the others. He and Walsh talked a few minutes, apparently in a friendly way,—at least on the part of the defendant, who was not quarreling or attempting in any way to provoke a quarrel,—and after talking in that way a short time the defendant drew the revolver, shot Walsh and killed him. The defendant and three others picked up the body and carried it to the defendant's home, where it was laid on the floor and he had a doctor called. The defendant testified that when the fight started in the saloon he said to Walsh that they were good friends and asked him why he did not go home, but Walsh said he would see him outside, and when they got outside Walsh struck him; that when they were under the viaduct Walsh knocked him down and kicked him three or four times; that he got up and ran home, going west on Forty-fifth street and south on Normal; that he got his revolver and came back and met the others, who were following him; that he walked up to Walsh and talked with him a few minutes and said that they had always been good friends and advised him to go home and they would be good friends again in the morning; that someone in the crowd said, "Get him now!" and Walsh put his hand in his right-hand coat pocket; that he stepped back about a foot and Walsh pulled out his revolver, and he pulled out his revolver to defend himself and fired the shot; that when he shot, Walsh said he would either get the defendant or the defendant would get him; that Walsh was pulling the gun out of his pocket and the defendant honestly believed he was in actual danger of being killed or receiving bodily harm; that he was awful sorry, because they were good friends, and that he, with three others, carried the body to his house and told a woman to call a doctor. Walter Bowen, who was with the party and was called by the court as a witness, testified that while the body of Walsh was lying on the floor in defendant's home the witness reached down and took a gun out of Walsh's righthand coat pocket, ran down the stairs and took it into the alley and threw it underneath a barn; that he then went to a wake, where he had been with Walsh the previous evening before going to the saloon; that it had been raining while the gun was under the barn and it got rusty, and he took it from under the barn and gave it to the State's attorney. The revolver was identified and had two cartridges in it. There is an assignment of error on the giving of two instructions asked by the People relating to confessions, and |