Dec. '21.] THE PEOPLE v. ST. L., A. & T. H. R. R. Co. 519 (No. 14218.-Judgment affirmed.) THE PEOPLE ex rel. M. P. Murray, Jr., County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE ST. LOUIS, ALTON AND TERRE HAUTE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. Opinion filed December 22, 1921. TAXES-detention home tax may be levied in the year in which the act is adopted by election. Section 6 of the act of 1907 for the establishment and maintenance of detention homes, providing that where the act is adopted by election in any county and the county judge has entered an order declaring the act in force a tax "shall thereafter be annually levied and collected," means that the tax may be levied annually after the act is in force in said county, and not that the first levy cannot be made until the year following the adoption of the act. CARTWRIGHT and DUNN, JJ., dissenting. APPEAL from the County Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. JOSEPH B. MESSICK, Judge, presiding. KRAMER, KRAMER & CAMPBELL, (JOHN G. DRennan, of counsel,) for appellant. H. E. SCHAUMLEFFEL, State's Attorney, and W. R. WEBER, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of St. Clair county overruling the appellant's objections to judgment against its property for a detention home tax. At the general election held November 2, 1920, St. Clair county by vote of the people adopted the act of 1907 authorizing the establishment and maintenance of a detention home, and the county judge entered an order of record declaring the act in force in that county. Section 5 of the act as amended in 1919 provides that where the act is in force, in addition to other taxes, the board of supervisors shall have power and authority "to annually levy and collect a tax not exceeding two-thirds of one mill on the dollar valuation upon all property within the county" for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a detention home. Section 6 provides for an election on the question of adopting the act, and that where an election is held and the act adopted and the county judge enters an order of record so declaring, the tax authorized by the act "shall thereafter be annually levied and collected" until such time as the legal voters of the county shall abandon the act in manner provided by section 7. At an adjourned meeting of the board of supervisors December 4, 1920, it passed a resolution for the levy of $26,000 for a detention home, and pursuant to the resolution the tax was extended at the rate of five cents on the $100. Appellant refused to pay that tax and objected to the application for judgment and order of sale. The court overruled the objection and rendered judgment, from which this appeal is prosecuted. Appellant says in its brief: "The sole question presented in this case is whether or not the county board had the right to levy a tax for the establishment and maintenance of a detention home in the year 1920." It is argued the provision of the statute that the tax shall "thereafter be annually levied and collected" means for the years subsequent to the year when the act was adopted and went into force, and that the county board was without authority to levy any tax authorized by statute until 1921. It is true as appellant asserts, that the power of the board of supervisors to levy a tax is derived from the legislature and that such power will be strictly construed and must be exercised within the terms of the statute, but we are of opinion the construction contended for by appellant is unwarranted. As we read and understand the statute, its clear meaning and intent is the same as if it read, "after the act is in force" the tax shall be annually levied, and that the year in which the act is adopted is one of the years for which the tax is authorized to be levied. We are referred to no authority on the question and its decision depends wholly on the meaning and intent of the statute. To our minds there is nothing in the statute to indicate that it was intended to restrict the authority to levy the tax to the years following the expiration of the year in which the act was adopted, and so far as we are able to see there is no reason for any such restriction. In our opinion the judgment of the county court was correct, and it is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. CARTWRIGHT and DUNN, JJ., dissenting. (No. 14304.-Decree affirmed.) WILLIAM I. EDMISTON, Appellee, vs. ANNIE DONOVAN et al. Appellants. Opinion filed December 22, 1921. I. WILLS-when a devise creates a contingent remainder with double aspect-merger. A devise of a remainder in real property to the testator's only child and the heirs of his body, with a subsequent provision that in the event of the son dying without any children surviving him the property shall go to the testator's nieces and nephews, creates a contingent remainder with a double aspect, and a conveyance by the son while still unmarried and after he has acquired the life estate and the interests of the nephews and nieces merges the life estate and the reversion and destroys the contingent interests. (Hickox v. Klaholt, 291 Ill. 544, distinguished.) 2. SAME the act of 1921 to prevent destruction of future interests is not retroactive-constitutionality. The act of July 2, 1921, (Laws of 1921, p. 470,) preventing future interests from being defeated by the termination of any precedent estate, is not intended to be retroactive, and as it does not apply where the conveyances relied upon as destroying the future interest were all executed before the act went into effect its constitutionality will not be considered in such case. 3. STATUTES—a statute should not be given retroactive effect unless intention is clear. No law should be given a retroactive effect unless the intention to make it retroactive is clearly expressed therein. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of DeWitt county; the Hon. GEORGE A. SENTEL, Judge, presiding. SMITH & SMITH, (WILLIAM F. SMITH, guardian ad litem,) for appellants. HERRICK & HERRICK, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This was a bill to quiet title and for partition, filed by appellee in the circuit court of DeWitt county. The matter was referred to a master in chancery, who heard the evidence and made a report recommending that the prayer of the petition be denied. On a hearing the court sustained exceptions to the master's report and entered a decree for partition. From that decree this appeal was prayed. * * * David W. Edmiston, the father of appellee herein, a resident of the city of Clinton, in said county, died seized of a farm in Iowa and some lots in Clinton and certain personal property. At the time of his death, May 10, 1907, he was divorced from his wife. He left his son, the appellee, his sole heir-at-law. His will, dated July 30, 1904, after providing for the payment of debts and funeral expenses, bequeathed certain personal property absolutely to different legatees. It also provided: "I give, devise and bequeath to my housekeeper, Annie Gardner, the life use of the south half of lots 5 and 6, in block 27, in the original town (now city) of Clinton, Illinois, and at her death the remainder to my son, William I. Edmiston, and the heirs of his body." And also: "I give, devise and bequeath to my son, William I. Edmiston, and the heirs of his body, 160 acres of land situated in the township of Douglas, county of Sac and State of Iowa; also the north half of lots 5 and 6, block 27, in the original town (now city) of Clinton, Illinois." By a codicil dated January 27, 1907, he declared that his wife, Jeannette, having accepted a divorce from him without alimony was no longer * * his wife, legally, and that she had no claim against his estate, and then provided: "In the event of my son, William I. Edmiston, dying without any children surviving him, then it is my will and desire that the property conveyed to him shall be divided equally among my nephews and nieces, Ella Morris, Frank Barber, John Barber, Milo Barber, Jr., and Daisy Courtwright, they being the children of my full sister, Mary Edmiston Barber." A second codicil, dated May 6, 1907, stated that if the provisions laid down in his will and the first codicil were not accepted by his legatees and devisees, his executor might sell the real estate and settle all just debts and claims, the residue, if any, to go to his son, the appellee. The nephews and nieces above mentioned, with the respective husbands or wives of such as were married, executed warranty deeds of the lots to appellee on February 22, 1916. Annie Gardner (afterwards Annie Donovan) quit-claimed her life estate in the south half of the two lots September 17, 1917, to the divorced wife. These lots had in 1913 been sold for taxes and a certificate of purchase issued to Weldon Ward, who assigned his certificate to the divorced wife, Jeannette Edmiston. She afterwards received a tax deed thereto executed by the county clerk and quit-claimed her interest in the two lots to appellee on December 10, 1919. On December 11, 1919, appellee executed a warranty deed to lots 5 and 6 to Ralph Parker, in which deed it was stated to be the intention that the particular estate then owned by the grantee should merge in the reversion in fee thereby conveyed and by virtue thereof be prematurely destroyed and the grantee at once vested with the fee simple title, and that any contingent future interest and any other interest in any lineal descendant thereafter born to the grantor should be thereby destroyed. Parker quit-claimed his interest in said lots to the appellee, who then conveyed by warranty deed a one-third interest to his mother, Jeannette Edmiston. |