yarns, threads, or filaments of artificial or imitation silk or imitation horsehair, or any yarns, threads, or filaments made from waste of such materials, pay a less rate of duty than thirty per centum ad valorem; braids, laces, embroideries, galloons, neck rufflings, ruchings, fringes, trimmings, beltings, cords, tassels, ribbons, or other articles or fabrics composed wholly or in chief value of yarns, threads, filaments, or fibers of artificial or imitation silk or of artificial or imitation horsehair, by whatever name known, and by whatever process made, forty-five cents per pound, and in addition thereto sixty per centum ad valorem. As will be observed from the foregoing copies, paragraph 349 in its concluding sentence provides that no article or fabric of any description composed of flax or other vegetable fiber, or of which these materials or any of them is the component material of chief value, when embroidered, shall pay a less rate of duty than that imposed in the act upon any embroideries of the materials of which such embroidery is composed. This enactment is in the form of a proviso to the paragraph, but in its real force and effect it is an independent provision which by reference establishes a minimum rate of duty for the articles named within its descriptive terms. That minimum rate of duty is undoubtedly the same rate as that assessed by the collector upon the articles involved in this case. Therefore the only real question in the case is this: Are these goods covered by the description contained in the concluding clause of paragraph 349; that is, are they composed of "flax or other vegetable fiber"? Of course the goods contain no flax; therefore the question is really limited to "vegetable fiber." The article in question is composed in chief bulk and also in chief value of cotton, which is not only a vegetable fiber, but is in fact the best known and most important vegetable fiber in the world. Therefore the descriptive term "vegetable fiber" would clearly include the article at bar unless the natural and ordinary meaning of the term is to be limited and controlled by some other provisions of the act. The appellants contend that a consideration of the entire paragraph in question discloses that Congress did not intend to include cotton within the class "vegetable fiber," as therein used, and that cotton is mentioned eo nomine or by direct reference in the paragraph whenever it is intended to be included. The body of paragraph 349 deals with many articles which have a general similarity to the merchandise in question, and in naming the component material thereof cotton is three times mentioned by name and once by unmistakable reference. The first mention of component materials in the paragraph reads "composed wholly or in chief value of cotton, flax, or other vegetable fiber"; the next one reads "or of cotton, flax, or other vegetable fiber, and india rubber"; the next reads "or of cotton, flax, or other vegetable fiber, india rubber and metal," and the first general reference to component materials is in the following language, "one or more of the materials or goods specified in this paragraph.' It may be noted again that the concluding provision of the paragraph, being the one under review, mentions as the component materials of the articles covered by it only "flax or other vegetable fiber." Appellants contend that the mention of cotton eo nomine in conjunction with "other vegetable fiber" in the body of the paragraph indicates a legislative purpose to use the term "vegetable fiber" as exclusive of cotton, and therefore that the term "vegetable fiber" in the concluding provision, used alone and without mention of cotton eo nomine, should be construed to mean vegetable fiber except cotton. The argument is that Congress would not have mentioned cotton eo nomine in conjunction with other vegetable fiber in the body of the paragraph unless it was intended to imply thereby that the term "vegetable fiber" as used in the paragraph did not ex proprio vigore include cotton. This argument, however, is answered by several considerations. In the first place the term "vegetable fiber," in its ordinary and correct meaning, includes cotton, and there appears to be no substantial reason why Congress should have intended to use it here in any different sense. The argument of appellants depends wholly upon mere verbal construction. In the next place, whenever cotton is named in the paragraph it is named definitively as a vegetable fiber. It is not contradistinguished from vegetable fibers, but distinctly and in terms classified as one of them, the expression being "cotton or other vegetable fiber." This use gives to vegetable fiber a definition which includes rather than excludes cotton. The construction does not imply that cotton is a thing outside of or apart from vegetable fiber, which must therefore be mentioned specifically in order to be included, but rather that cotton is itself a vegetable fiber, and that wherever it is specifically named in the provision it is done out of mere abundance of caution and at the risk of tautology. In the vermuth case cited by counsel for appellants a different construction presents itself. Vermuth was in a general sense a kind of wine, and yet in composition and use was peculiar, being an article somewhat of its own class. One of the paragraphs in the act of 1897 made provision for "still wines, including ginger wine or ginger cordial and vermuth," and also for "any wines, ginger cordial or vermuth," and also provided that no allowance should be made for "leakage or damage on wines, liquors, cordials, or distilled spirits." It was held that the latter provision did not cover leakage of vermuth, inasmuch as it was not included therein by name, and the paragraph by naming vermuth separately in the manner above appearing had not included it within the general terms "wines, liquors, cordials, or distilled spirits." In the reviewing court the decision was affirmed upon the additional grounds that vermuth was not known as wine, either commercially or popularly, and an earlier decision to that effect was cited. In the present case cotton is undoubtedly a vegetable fiber and is indeed the one which is best known and most universally used, and the paragraph under review recognizes this by its repeated reference to "cotton or other vegetable fiber," and therefore we hold it to be included within the meaning of that term as used in the last clause of paragraph 349. In this view of the case the assessment was correct, and therefore the decision of the board is affirmed. TILGE v. UNITED STATES (No. 577).1 1. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. In the ascertainment of the intention of the Congress in giving final shape to a paragraph that had been a subject of contention with them, resort may be had to the current history of the times and of the particular piece of legislation in question. The Congressional Record officially preserves that history.-Aldridge et al. v. Williams (3 How., 8, 23). 2. SKIVERS NOT DUTIABLE AS SPLIT LEATHER. Reviewing the legislative history of the proviso to paragraph 450, tariff act of 1909, it can not be held the Congress meant to extend its provisions to still other paragraphs-to paragraph 451, for example-and so "split leather," as employed in that proviso, does not include articles such as the skivers of the importation. These were properly held to be dutiable under paragraph 451; and as the duty would be the same it is unnecessary to determine their classification as between either "sheepskins dressed and finished" or as "other leather." United States Court of Customs Appeals, May 29, 1911. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7134 (T. D. 31131). [Affirmed.] Curie, Smith & Maxwell (W. Wickham Smith and Thomas M. Lane of counsel) for appellants. D. Frank Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Charles D. Lawrence on the brief) for the United States. Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, DE VRIES, and MARTIN, Judges. DE VRIES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal involves the dutiable classification of skivers. The name designates the grain side of a sheepskin split in the pickled state, and subsequently tanned, dressed, and finished. While this portion of the sheepskin is designated as a "skiver," which is generally used in the making of sweatbands for hats, pocketbooks, the linings of valises, and similar uses, the inner half, when similarly tanned, dressed, and finished, is designated as a "flesher," and is principally, if not exclusively, used in the making of chamois. Asheepskin not split, but tanned, dressed, and finished, is known as a "roan." These skivers when imported at the port of Philadelphia were assessed for dutiable purposes under the provisions of paragraph 451 of the tariff act of 1909 as "sheep * * skins * * * dressed 1 Reported in T. D. 31662 (20 Treas. Dec., 1183). 32354-VOL 2-12-9 and finished." Protestants, who are the appellants here, allege, and here claim, that they are properly dutiable as split leather within the meaning of the proviso to paragraph 450 of the said act. The Board of General Appraisers held that they were properly dutiable as "all other leather" under a different provision of paragraph 451 of the act. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to here decide whether they are dutiable as "all other leather," as determined by the board, or as "sheepskins dressed and finished," as found by the collector, for the reason that the applicable rate of duty in either case is the same. The question for determination, then, is whether or not skivers are "split leather" within the terms of the proviso to paragraph 450. The determination of this question is given light by the legislative history of its adoption. It was not, as enacted, incorporated within the tariff act of August 5, 1909, it being in terms of a concurrent resolution correcting certain provisions of the act, passed after the adoption of the conference report by both Houses of Congress. The related provisions of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, as finally passed, unchanged and uninfluenced by this resolution in so far as affecting hides and leather, were as follows: 451. Band, bend, or belting leather, rough leather, and sole leather, five per centum ad valorem; dressed upper and all other leather, calfskins tanned or tanned and dressed, kangaroo, sheep and goat skins (including lamb and kid skins) dressed and finished, other skins and bookbinders' calfskins, all the foregoing not specially provided for in this section, fifteen per centum ad valorem; [Then follows the provisions for various other skins, as patent and japanned leathers and other specified leather, such as glove and pianoforte leather] * boots and shoes made of leather, fifteen per centum ad valorem: Provided, That leather cut into shoe uppers or vamps or other forms, suitable for conversion into manufactured articles, and gauffre leather, shall pay a duty of ten per centum ad valorem in addition to the duty imposed by this paragraph on leather of the same character as that from which they are cut. * * 461. Harness, saddles, saddlery, in sets or in parts, finished or unfinished, thirtyfive per centum ad valorem. 676. (Free list.) Skins of all kinds, raw (except sheepskins with the wool on), and hides not specially provided for in this section. The various phases of the provisions of paragraph 450, as adopted in reaching the form as finally approved by both Houses of Congress, unaffected by the concurrent resolution, were as follows: Paragraph 581 of the free list as it passed the House read as follows: 581. Hides of cattle, raw or uncured, whether dry, salted, or pickled. Paragraph 581 of the House bill was merged into paragraph 450 as it passed the Senate and read as follows: 450. Hides of cattle, raw or uncured, whether dry, salted, or pickled, fifteen per centum ad valorem: Provided, That upon all leather exported, made from imported hides, there shall be allowed a drawback equal to the amount of duty paid on such hides, to be paid under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. The same paragraph, as reported from the conference committee and adopted by the House and Senate, read as follows: 450. Hides of cattle, raw or uncured, whether dry salted or pickled, shall be admitted free of duty: Provided, That on and after October first, nineteen hundred and nine, sole leather made from such hides shall pay a duty of five per centum ad valorem ; that grain, buff, and split leather made from such hides shall pay a duty of seven and one-half per centum ad valorem; that boots and shoes, the upper leather of which is made wholly or in chief value from such hides, shall pay a duty of ten per centum ad valorem; that harness, saddles, and saddlery, in sets or in parts, finished or unfinished, composed wholly or in chief value of leather made from such hides, shall pay a duty of twenty per centum ad valorem. As modified by the concurrent resolution referred to and finally adopted, it read as follows: 450. Hides of cattle, raw or uncured, whether dry, salted, or pickled, shall be admitted free of duty: Provided, That on and after October first, nineteen hundred and nine, grain, buff, and split leather shall pay a duty of seven and one-half per centum ad valorem; that all boots and shoes, made wholly or in chief value of leather made from cattle hides and cattle skins of whatever weight, of cattle of the bovine species, including calfskins, shall pay a duty of ten per centum ad valorem; that harness, saddles and saddlery, in sets or in parts, finished or unfinished, composed wholly or in chief value of leather, shall pay a duty of twenty per centum ad valorem. In the ascertainment of the purposes and intention of Congress in the final adoption of the paragraph reference must be had to the current history of the times and of this legislation. The Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, first session, pages 4875 to 4954, inclusive, is the official record of that history. That such may be adverted to in the ascertainment of the intent of Congress and in explanation of ambiguous provisions of the law then enacted is well settled by the authorities. In United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (91 U. S., 72) the Supreme Court stated in construing an act of Congress that the courts may recur to the history of the times when it was passed in order to ascertain the reasons for, as well as the meaning of, the particular provisions in it. In Aldridge et al. v. Williams (3 How., 8, 23), it is stated: The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both Houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (166 U. S., 290, 318), the court said: * * * The only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the language used in the act, and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it was passed. By adverting for this information to the separate enactments of the different Houses of Congress and the law itself it is shown that at and immediately prior to the passage of the concurrent resolution |