Regional Monetary IntegrationCambridge University Press, 2007 M11 26 This book surveys the prospects for regional monetary integration in various parts of the world. Beginning with a brief review of the theory of optimal currency areas, it goes on to examine the structure and functioning of the European Monetary Union, then turns to the prospects for monetary integration elsewhere in the world - North America, South America, and East Asia. Such cooperation may take the form of full-fledged monetary unions or looser forms of monetary cooperation. The book emphasizes the economic and institutional requirements for successful monetary integration, including the need for a single central bank in the case of a full-fledged monetary union, and the corresponding need for multinational institutions to safeguard its independence and assure its accountability. The book concludes with a chapter on the implications of monetary integration for the United States and the US dollar. |
Contenido
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Sección 2 | 41 |
Sección 3 | 71 |
Sección 4 | 80 |
Sección 5 | 87 |
Sección 6 | 88 |
Sección 7 | 115 |
Sección 8 | 147 |
Sección 9 | 179 |
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Términos y frases comunes
adopted agreement Argentina ASEAN Asia assets bilateral Bundesbank capital Chapter China coins common currency common external convergence correlations coun Council of Ministers country pairs country’s crisis currency basket currency board currency consolidation currency union debt Delors Report depreciation discussion East Asian countries Eastern central bank ECOWAS effects euro area European Central Bank Eurosystem excessive deficit exchange-rate exchange-rate changes exchange-rate regimes exports external basket facto Federal Reserve fiscal floating exchange rates foreign-currency France full-fledged monetary union Furthermore Germany growth important independent inflation rates inflation targeting institutions interest rates Japan jure dollarization Maastricht Treaty markets member countries MERCOSUR monetary integration monetary policy moreover NAMU national central banks national currencies optimum currency area output pegged exchange rates percent political price stability renminbi Rogoff role seigniorage single currency supply shocks tion trade U.S. dollar unilateral United WAEMU WAMZ West Western
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Página 57 - When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute . . . , neither the ECB nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.
Página 69 - ... either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value; — or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value...
Página 57 - ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decisionmaking bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any Government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.
Página 58 - The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
Página 69 - Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. 2. The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria: (a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless...
Página 59 - Commission shall address an opinion to the Council. 6. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, and having considered any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists.
Página 75 - The criterion on the convergence of interest rates referred to in the fourth indent of Article 109j(l) of this Treaty shall mean that, observed over a period of one year before the examination, a Member State has had an average nominal longterm interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
Página 75 - State has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency on its own initiative for the same period.
Página 75 - Respect of the normal fluctuation margins provided for stability by the exchange rate mechanism on the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued its currency 's central rate against the euro on its own initiative for the same period.
Página 92 - OECS include the independent states of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.