lowed. Vide Strong v. U. S., 34 Fed. Rep. 17; McKinistry v. U. S., 34 Fed. Rep. 215; Faris v. U. S., 23 Ct. Cl. 374; Calvert v. U. S., 37 Fed. Rep. 762. On the other hand, it has been decided that they may be legally allowed, notwithstanding the proviso in question. Vide Bell v. U. S., 35 Fed. Rep. 889; Rand v. U. S., 36 Fed. Rep. 675; Hoyne v. U. S., 38 Fed. Rep. 543. For reasons fully stated in Strong v. U. S. and Faris v. U. S., supra, it appears to this court that congress intended to abolish docket fees in future; and the charge made in that behalf is accordingly disallowed. Second. Fees charged for drawing "recognizances" and "complaints, amounting in the aggregate to $107.05, form the next subject of contention. It is conceded by the government that a commissioner may charge for drawing recognizances; but it is contended that the form of bond in use in this district is too prolix. The comptroller has accordingly scaled the commissioner's bill, allowing him in some instances for only three folios, and in other instances for a less number, without any reference to the number of folios actually contained in the bonds taken. In some instances the charges contained in the commissioner's accounts for drawing complaints have only been scaled; in others, such charges have been disallowed in toto, on the theory that they are illegal. For drawing recognizances and complaints, I find, as a matter of fact, that the commissioner has only charged for the actual number of folios contained in the papers by him drawn. The form of recognizance now in use in this district has long been in use, and has been impliedly sanctioned by the court. I conclude, therefore, that the commissioner is entitled to the compensation claimed for drafting recognizances. The court fully agrees with what was said on that subject in Rand v. U. S., 36 Fed. Rep. 673, Some difference of opinion exists concerning the right of commissioners to charge for drawing complaints. The question has been considered at some length in two cases, to-wit, Strong v. U. S., supra, and Rand v. U. S., 38 Fed. Rep. 666, 667. I conclude that good and sufficient legal reasons are shown in the case last cited for allowing such fees, and that the due administration of the criminal law requires that such fees should be allowed. The plaintiff is accordingly entitled to recover all that is claimed in his account for drawing recognizances and complaints, to-wit, $107.05. Third. Plaintiff makes a small claim, amounting to $4.50, for "filing final bonds." This, as I understand, is a claim for compensation for indorsing on a bond the date that it is presented to and accepted by the commissioner. Section 847, Rev. St. U. S., makes no provision for compensation for such service, nor does the statute in any place make it the duty of the commissioner to make such indorsements on bonds or recognizances. Final bonds taken by such officers are returned into court, and there filed. So far as I can see, it is wholly unnecessary to indorse and file bonds in the manner indicated. For these reasons the claim is disallowed. Fourth. Claim is made for taking acknowledgments to bonds, at the rate of 25 cents for each person who acknowledges the same. Different opinions have been expressed as to the legality of such charges, and among the courts that allow such fees there is a difference of opinion as to whether a charge should be made on account of each surety, or only one fee of 25 cents for each bond. Vide Strong v. U. S., and Rand v. U. S., supra; Barber v. U. S., 35 Fed. Rep. 887; Heyward v. U. S., 37 Fed. Rep. 764. It seems to be the practice to allow such fees in most districts. I accordingly assent to that view of the law. Such fees being allowed, it seems to me most reasonable to hold that it should be allowed for each acknowledgment by a surety, and should not be limited. to 25 cents for each bond. Fifth. A charge is made, in the sum of $26.40, for entering returns of warrants and subpoenas in the commissioner's docket. With respect to this charge there is also a difference of opinion as to its propriety. Strong v. U. S., supra, and Rand v. U. S., 38 Fed. Rep. 666. In this district it has long been the practice of some commissioners to note the return of warrants and subpoenas in their dockets. The practice was very likely adopted in analogy with that of justices, who, by the laws of this state, are required to make such entries in dockets by them kept, For many reasons it seems desirable that a notation should be made in a commissioner's docket of the time warrants and subpoenas are returned. Authority for the allowance of such fees is to be found in subdivision 7 of section 847,' and subdivision 8 of section 828.2 The charge made ($26.40) is hereby allowed. Sixth. A controversy next arises over several charges made by the commissioner for what he terms "certificates of attendance;" the whole amounting to $10.05. The phrase used by the commissioner to indicate the character of the service referred to is misleading. He really means by the phrase "certificate of attendance" a short statement indorsed by him on the back of complaints, after cases were disposed of, showing what action he had taken. It has never been the practice in this district, so far as I am advised, for commissioners to return into court a full transcript of their proceedings, as appears to be the rule in some districts. Hoyne v. U. S., 38 Fed. Rep. 545. In lieu of a transcript, the original papers are returned, with a short statement indorsed on the complaint, showing what action was taken by the committing magistrate or officer. This is necessary to render the proceeding intelligible, and the charge made for the same at the rate of 15 cents per folio is reasonable, and, in my opinion, ought to be allowed. Hoyne v. U. S., supra. I accordingly allow the charge of $10.05. Seventh. I see no reason to question the legality of the various per diem fees claimed by the commissioner, amounting to $35 in the aggregate, nor the legality of the fees claimed in the cases of Charles F. and Christian Lautenschlager, amounting to $6.60. These items are accord 1 Rev. St. U. S. § 847, provides, (commissioners' fees:) "For issuing any warrant or writ, and for any other service, the same compensation as is allowed to clerks for like services." Rev. St. U. S. § 828, provides, (clerks' fees:) "For entering any return, rule, order, continuance, judgment, decree, or making any certificate, return, or report, for each folio, fifteen cents." v.40F.no.8-29 # ingly allowed. The per diem fees were disallowed, as it seems, because the comptroller was of the opinion that certain sessions held by the commissioner were unnecessary. An investigation of the facts, satisfies me that no more sessions were held than were reasonably necessary to dispose of the business pending before the commissioner in a judicial manner. In the Lautenschlager cases it seems that the commissioner's fees were disallowed because these cases might have been prosecuted jointly with another case of the same character. It does not appear to have been the commissioner's fault, however, that more complaints were filed than were really necessary. The district attorney appears to have directed the method of prosecution by several complaints, instead of one. As no more than legal fees are demanded, they must be allowed. Barber v. U. S., 35 Fed. Rep. 888. Eighth. The last item in the account necessary to be mentioned is a claim for $126.80 for drawing affidavits qualifying 317 supervisors of election, and administering oaths to such persons; the sum claimed in each instance being 40 cents. The plaintiff was not the chief supervisor of elections for this congressional district, but appears to have rendered the services in question at the request of the chief supervisor, who was at the time disabled by sickness. If any statute clearly provided that the United States should pay the expenses of supervisors of election incurred in qualifying for the discharge of their duties after their appointment, I should have little hesitation in holding that the government was liable for the services in question. But I can find no such law. Section 2031, to which my attention was called, does not seem to me to imply that the government will, and certainly it does not in terms declare that it shall, pay such expenses. When persons are appointed to office, I believe, it is usual for them to qualify at their own expense. If congress intended that such expenses of supervisors of election should be borne by the government, the intent ought to have been more clearly expressed. I am constrained to hold that the service in question was rendered for the supervisors, and not for the government. The item of $126.80 is therefore disallowed. Deducting the amounts heretofore disallowed, aggregating $165.30, from the sum sued for, ($371.75,) the balance due is $206.45, for which judgment will be entered. 'Rev. St. U. S. § 2031, provides for the allowance of compensation to supervisors of elections. UNITED STATES v. EWAN. (Circuit Court, N. D. Florida. November 14, 1889.) GRAND JURY-QUALIFICATIONS-INDICTMENT. Although the law may require grand jurors to be registered electors, etc., the fact that one of the grand jurors was illegally registered is no ground for quashing an indictment, but is such a defect only as is contemplated by Rev. St. U. S. § 1025, which provides that no indictment shall be deemed insufficient by reason of any defect in matter of form which shall not tend to the prejudice of defendant. At Law. Plea in abatement to indictment. E. K. Foster, J. E. Hartridge, and C. M. Cooper, for defendant. SWAYNE, J. The defendant filed a plea in abatement to the indictment herein, and alleges that it should be abated and quashed upon the ground, in substance, that William Pittman, one of the grand jurors who presented said indictment, is not, and was not when he was impaneled as a member of the grand jury, a duly-registered elector of the county of Duval, his place of residence. The plea admits that his name appears upon the registration list of Duval county; but it is contended that it is there illegally, in this: that it was placed there on the 29th day of September, 1887, and by an officer not entitled to register, and therefore he is not a legally qualified juror. To this plea the government has interposed a demurrer, and alleges that the plea does not state facts which in point of law show that the juror in question was incompetent and disqualified. * * Section 800 of the Revised Statutes declares that "jurors to serve in the courts of the United States, in each state, respectively, shall have the same qualifications * as jurors of the highest court of law in such state * * * at the time." Act Aug. 1, 1868, Laws Fla., provides that "all persons who are qualified electors of this state shall be liable to be drawn as jurors, except as hereinafter provided," etc.; and Act June 7, 1887, § 9, provides that qualified electors can register only between certain dates in each year in which there shall be a general election. The grand juror William Pittman did not register in such a year. Is he a competent grand juror, or must the indictment against the prisoner, J. W. Ewan, be quashed for this reason? In the case of U. S. v. Benson, decided by FIELD, circuit justice, SAWYER, circuit judge, and HOFFMAN, district judge, in the district of California, reported in 31 Fed. Rep. 896, the facts upon which the decision was rendered are very similar to those in this case. In that case the plea in abatement set up that "the grand jury which found the indictment was an illegal and incompetent body, having no authority or jurisdiction to find or present it, or to find or present any indictment, for the reasons that some of the persons who composed the jury were not at the time tax-payers in California, nor were they assessed for taxes on any property on the last assessment roll of the counties from which they were respectively summoned." The defendants in that case contended that the in * * * dictment was illegal and void, and should be abated and quashed. To this plea the United States demurred. In the examination of that question it appeared that the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of California, § 198, declares "that a person is competent to act as juror if he beFirst, a citizen of the United States, an elector of the county, * * * and a resident of the township at least three months before being selected and returned; second, in possession of his natural faculties, and not decrepit; third, possessed of sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings of the courts are had; fourth, assessed, on the last assessment roll of his county, on property belonging to him." And section 199 of the same Code adds that "a person is not competent to act as a juror— First, who does not possess the qualifications prescribed by the preceding section; second, who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." In deciding that case the court says that "the essential requisites of every juror are the possession of his natural faculties, and sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings before him are had to obtain a clear understanding of what is done and said," and that "the provisions of the statute passed to bring offenders against the laws to trial are not to be so construed as to defeat their purpose. The various proceedings prescribed are the means designed, not merely to protect the accused, but also to protect the public, and are to be enforced, on the one hand, so as to secure to the accused a full and fair trial, and, on the other hand, so as not to prevent the punishment of crime." The last two paragraphs are as follows: "In this case the objections to some of the grand jurors, that their names were not among the list of tax-payers on the last assessment roll of their respective counties, is technical only. There is no allegation in the plea that the jurors were not in all respects, as to ability and knowledge, fully qualified for the duties imposed upon them, or that the defendants were in any respect prejudiced by the absence of their names from the assessment roll. In these circumstances the objection must fall under the general rule of the federal courts, that omissions which do not impair any substantial right, or prejudice the defense, of the accused must be disregarded, unless otherwise required by positive statute. Section 1025, Rev. St., declares that no indictment found and presented by a grand jury, in any district or circuit or other court of the United States, shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected, by reason of any defect or imperfectica in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant.' "In U. S. v. Tuska it was held by Judge BLATCHFORD, then district judge, now a justice of the supreme court, that, where there is no averment in a plea in abatement of injury or prejudice to the defendant, irregularities in the finding of an indictment, consisting, among other things, of some of the grand jurors not possessing the proper property qualifications, became matters of mere form, to be disregarded under the above statute. 14 Blatchf. 5. Without accepting this conclusion in full, the spirit which it expresses undoubtedly governs the action of the federal courts, that omissions or defects in such cases which do not prejudice the accused shall not avail to set aside an indictment or other proceeding." The demurrer to the plea in that case was sustained, and the defendant ordered to plead to the indictment. I have quoted thus extensively |