Larceny. EVIDENCE. Bill of sale. On the trial of a defendant for larceny of a chattel, and for receiving such chattel feloniously, it is error to exclude a bill of sale of the chattel, executed to the defendant by another, offered in evidence by the defendant. 57 Ind. 331. Intention of defendant.-On the trial of an indictment for larceny, the defendant is competent to testify as to what his intention was at the time the goods, with the stealing of which he is charged, came into his possession, in regard to taking and converting them to his own use. 53 Ind. 595. Larceny will not lie for obtaining goods by false representations.— An indictment for larceny can not be sustained, under section 19 (2 R. S. 432), where the evidence shows that defendant assumed the name of another person, and falsely represented himself to be the person whose name he assumed, and on the faith of such representation obtained the money or property alleged as so stolen. 49 Ind. 367. Cross-examination-Conversation.-Where, on the trial of an indictment for larceny in the stealing of a coat, a witness, on examination-in-chief, has detailed part of a conversation with the defendant in relation to the subject-matter of the action, on crossexamination, it is competent to introduce all that was said in the conversation material to the case. A witness having testified in such an action that he had charged the defendant with having stolen the coat, it was proper for the witness, on cross-examination, to give the answer then made by defendant. 39 Ind. 596. Public taking.—In a prosecution for larceny, whether proof that the taking was done openly, in presence of the owner of the property taken, in the day time, and not by robbery, is or is not important evidence of the fact that the taking was not felonious, depends on all the circumstances of the case. 33 Ind. 283. Copy of writing-Parol evidence to prove contents of stolen bank notes.-The court can not compel a defendant in a criminal prosecution to produce an instrument, in writing, in his possession, to be used as evidence against him. On the trial of a prosecution for larceny of bank notes, or other written instruments, where the stolen property is alleged to be in possession of the accused, parol evidence may be given of the contents of the notes or writings, without notice to the accused to produce them. 24 Ind. 500, overruling Williams v. State, 16 Ind. 461. Larceny. On the trial of an indictment for an assault and battery with intent to commit a larceny, it appeared that the defendant had put his hand or fingers into the pocket of A., with the evident intention of stealing his money, but was detected and arrested in the attempt. Held, a conviction for assault and battery with intent to commit a larceny was not. erroneous. 16 Ind. 232. The exact sums of money laid in an indictment for larceny need not be proved. 14 Ind. 39. The genuineness of a bill and the existence of a bank may be established by the testimony of one witness only. 14 Ind. 26. See also 2 Ind. 132. General disposition to commit larceny.-Upon an indictment for larceny, evidence is not admissible to show that the defendant has a general disposition to commit that offense, nor that he had been guilty of a similar offense, much less that he had been guilty of a felony of a different character. 10 Ind. 106. Greenbacks.-On an indictment for larceny of promissory notes, evidence that they were of the currency denominated greenbacks, of the denomination of $100 bills, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Runsen v. The People, 57 Barb. 324. Treasury notes-Greenbacks.—Where the indictment charges the larceny of treasury notes, it was held sufficient to prove that the property stolen was "greenbacks." 23 Ind. 21. Intoxication and mental condition.-Where the defendant's mind is so far destroyed by a long-continued habit ol drunkenness as to render him mentally incompetent, intentionally and knowingly, to commit the larceny, he should be acquitted, although he was intoxicated at the time he took the property. 26 Ind. 422. See 16 Ind. 428; 14 Id. 420. Voluntary intoxication no excuse. In a prosecution for larceny, proof of the voluntary intoxication of the accused, just before and at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, is not admissible in his behalf. In cases both civil and criminal, where malice is an ingredient of the charge, it seems that simple intoxication may be given in evidence to rebut it; but this principle does not seem to be extended to the ingredient of intention. 16 Ind. 428. See 14 Ind. 420; 26 Ind. 422. Mental condition of defendant from use of opium.-On the trial of an indictment for larceny, it having appeared in evidence that the defendant was addicted to the habitual and excessive use of opium in some of its forms, and that at the time of the supposed larceny Larceny. he had been deprived of his accustomed supply of the drug, he sought to prove by competent testimony what effect such deprivation would have upon his mental condition. Held, that the evidence was admissible, as tending to show whether the defendant was in such a condition mentally as to be able to commit a larceny. 33 Ind. 543. See 26 Ind. 422. Instruction to jury-Snatching property from hand of owner.-On the trial of a defendant charged with larceny, the court instructed the jury that if the defendant snatched the property, alleged to have been stolen, from the hand of the owner, and retained it without the consent of the latter, this constituted larceny. Held, that the instruction is erroneous. Held, also, that, to constitute larceny, the taking must be with felonious intent, existing at the time. 57 Ind. 102. Value of property.-On the trial of a defendant indicted for grand larceny, where the value of the property is clearly proved, so as to preclude any question whether the crime is a grand or a petit larceny, it is not necessary to instruct the jury specially as to the value of the property. 49 Ind. 549. Verdict-Defective verdict.—On the trial of an information for grand larceny, there was a verdict of guilty, and that the defendant be imprisoned in the state prison for one year, etc. After the verdict was entered, the defendant moved for his discharge, on the ground that the verdict was defective, in fixing the penalty at one year in the state prison, when the shortest term fixed by statute for grand larceny is two years. Held, that as the jury might, under the statute, have found the defendant guilty of petit larceny, and have imposed the exact penalty they did, he was not prejudiced in his substantial rights, and was not entitled to his discharge. 27 Ind. 470. A. was indicted for grand larceny. Trial by jury, and verdict as follows: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, and sentence him to three years imprisonment in the state's prison." Motion for a new trial, because the verdict is contrary to law, in failing to assess a fine, and to disfranchise the defendant for some determinate period. Held, that the defendant should have moved for a venire de novo. 26 Ind. 101. See 42 Ind. 335; 14 Id. 420. Arrest of judgment.-If, in an indictment for stealing several articles of a certain value, there be a verdict of guilty, the judgment Receiving stolen goods. should not be arrested merely because the value of each article is not specified in the indictment. 5 Blackf. 224. Persons convicted of petit larceny second time shall be deemed guilty of grand larceny.-Any person shall, on a second conviction of petit larcedy, suffer the punishment prescribed for those convicted of grand larceny. 2 R. S. 434, sec. 21. SEC. 6. RECEIVING STOLEN Goods. SEC. 22. Every person who shall buy, receive, conceal, or aid in the concealment of any stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the punishment prescribed in case of larceny. 2 R. S. 434. CHARGE. day of in the year That A. B., on the at said county, did feloniously buy, receive, conceal, and aid in the concealment of eleven hogs, then and there being, of the value of twelve dollars each, of the personal property of C. D., which said hogs, prior to the time they were so bought, received, and concealed by said A. B., had been feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, at said county, by some person to said jurors unknown; he, the said A. B., at the time he so bought, received, concealed, and aided in concealing said hogs, well knowing that the same had been stolen. 49 Ind. 248. See 1 Blackf. 390; 2 Id. 103. Sufficiency of indictment.-An indictment for receiving stolen goods alleged a felonious larceny of said goods on, etc., at, etc., by certain persons named, other than defendant, and that the defendant afterward, on, etc., "did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously receive, conceal, and aid in concealing said goods; he then and there, well knowing said goods to have been so, as aforesaid, unlawfully and feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away," etc. Held, that this was a sufficient allegation of a felonious intent in receiving said goods. Held, also, that it was sufficiently alleged that the defendant knew, at the time he received the goods, that they had been stolen. It is not necessary in such an indictment to charge the defendant with having received the goods with intent to defraud any person. 33 Ind. 439. Duplicity.-An indictment charging the defendant with receiv Receiving stolen goods. ing and concealing stolen goods is not bad for duplicity. 4 Ind. 246. Stealing and receiving. A defendant may be charged in one count with stealing and in another with receiving stolen goods. Ibid. Same. The receiving of stolen goods is a crime independent of the stealing, and is subject to punishment without reference to the trial or conviction of the thief. 1 Blackf. 429. The indictment contained two counts, one against B. for stealing, the other against A. for receiving the goods, knowing them to be stolen. Held, that the second count was not objectionable for not stating the time, place, value of goods, etc., these requisites being laid in the first count and referred to in the second. Held, also, that there was no misjoinder. Ibid. Punishment same as for larceny.-The statute prescribes the same punishment for receiving stolen goods as for the larceny of the same; that is, if over the value of five dollars' (now fifteen dollars; see acts 1877, p. 63) worth is received, the punishment is the same as for grand larceny; if goods of less than that value are received, the punishment is that of petit larceny. 14 Ind. 427. Trial on several counts.—An indictment contained three counts, the first for unlawfully, feloniously, and burglariously breaking and entering a manufactory, in the night time, and stealing certain goods therefrom; the second for larceny, and the third for receiv ing stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen; it being evident, from the face of the indictment, that all the counts were based upon the same larceny. Held, that the prosecuting attorney could not properly be compelled to elect upon which count he would first put the defendant on trial. 33 Ind. 439. Instructions to jury.—On the trial of an indictment containing a count for larceny and a count for receiving stolen goods, the court having charged the jury as to the former count, that one of the essentials thereof was, that the goods were so stolen by the identical" defendant, naming him, "named in the indictment, alone, or by him jointly acting with others," instructed them, as to the latter count, that it was material thereunder "that the articles named in that count, or some of them, were by some one feloniously stolen, taken and carried away from" the owner named in the indictment. Held, that the jury could not have been misled by such instruction as to the receiving of stolen goods, by its failure to state that the goods must have been feloniously taken by some one other than the defendant. The court also instructed the jury, as to |