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other three judges agreed that the warrant was illegal and bad, believing that "no degree of antiquity can give sanction to an usage bad in itself." The judgment was therefore affirmed.

-

fax.

Wilkes had also brought actions for false imprisonment against both the secretaries of state. Lord Egre- Wilkes and mont's death put an end to the action against him; Lord Haliand Lord Halifax, by pleading privilege, and interposing other delays unworthy of his position and character, contrived to put off his appearance until after Wilkes had been outlawed, when he appeared and pleaded the outlawry. But at length, in 1769, no further postponement could be contrived, the action was tried, and Wilkes obtained no less than 40007. damages. Not only in this action, but throughout the proceedings in which persons aggrieved by the general warrant had sought redress, the government offered an obstinate and vexatious resistance. The defendants were harassed by every obstacle which the law permitted, and subjected to ruinous costs. which government itself incurred in these were said to have amounted to 100,000l.*

The expenses various actions

assured, at this

The liberty of the subject was further period, by another remarkable judgment of Lord Search Camden. In November, 1762, the Earl of Hali

warrant
for papers:
Entinck v.

fax, as secretary of state, had issued a warrant Carrington,
directing certain messengers, taking a constable to 1765.
their assistance, to search for John Entinck, Clerk, the author,
or one concerned in the writing, of several numbers of the
1 Burrow's Rep., iii. 1742; St. Tr., xix. 1001; Sir W. Blackstone's Rep.,

555.

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10. clergyman

2 Wilson's Rep., ii. 256; Almon's Correspondence of Wilkes, iv. 13; Adolph. Hist., i. 136, n.; St. Tr., xix. 1406.

8 On a motion for a new trial in one of these numerous cases on the ground of excessive damages, Ch. Justice Pratt said: "They heard the king's counsel, and saw the solicitor of the treasury endeavoring to support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyrannical and severe manner."- St. Tr., xix. 1405.

4 Almon's Corr. of Wilkes

"Monitor, or British Freeholder," and to seize him, "together with his books and papers," and to bring them in safe custody before the secretary of state. In execution of this warrant, the messengers apprehended Mr. Entinck in his house, and seized the books and papers in his bureau, writing-desk, and drawers. This case differed from that of Wilkes, as the warrant specified the name of the person against whom it was directed. In respect of the person, it was not a general warrant; but as regards the papers, it was a general searchwarrant, not specifying any particular papers to be seized, but giving authority to the messengers to take all his books and papers, according to their discretion.

Mr. Entinck brought an action of trespass against the messengers for the seizure of his papers,1 upon which the jury found a special verdict with 300l. damages. This special verdict was twice learnedly argued before the Court of Common Pleas, where at length, in 1765, Lord Camden pronounced an elaborate judgment. He even doubted the right of the seretary of state to commit persons at all, except for high treason but in deference to prior decisions the court felt bound to acknowledge the right. The main question, however, was, the legality of a search-warrant for papers. "If this point should be determined in favor of the jurisdiction," said Lord Camden, "the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel." "This power, so assumed by the secretary of state, is an execution upon all the party's papers in the first instance. His house is rifled, his most valuable papers are taken out of his possession, before the paper, for which he is charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction, and before he is convicted either of writing, publishing, 1 Entinck v. Carrington, St. Tr., xix. 1030.

2 Queen v. Derby, Fort., 140, and R. v. Earbury, 2 Barnadist., 293, 346.

or being concerned in the paper." It had been found by the special verdict that many such warrants had been issued since the Revolution: but he wholly denied their legality. He referred the origin of the practice to the Star Chamber, which in pursuit of libels had given search-warrants to their messenger of the press, a practice which, after the abolition of the Star Chamber, had been revived and authorized by the Licensing Act of Charles II. in the person of the secretary of state. And he conjectured that this practice had been continued after the expiration of that act, a conjecture shared by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's Bench.1 With the unanimous concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now finally condemned this dangerous and unconstitutional practice.

warrants

Parliament.

Meanwhile, the legality of a general warrant had been repeatedly discussed in Parliament. Several mo- General tions were offered, in different forms, for declaring discussed in it unlawful. While trials were still pending, there were obvious objections to any proceeding by which the judgment of the courts would be anticipated; but in debate, such a warrant found few supporters. Those who were unwilling to condemn it by a vote of the House, had little to say in its defence. Even the attorney- and solicitor-general did not venture to pronounce it legal. But whatever their opinion, the competency of the House to decide any matter of law was contemptuously denied. Sir Fletcher Norton, the attorney-general, even went so far as to declare that "he should regard a resolution of the members of the House of Commons no more than the oaths of so many drunken porters in Covent Garden," a sentiment as unconstitutional as it was insolent. Mr. Pitt affirmed

1 Leach v. Money and others, Burrow's Rep. iii. 1692, 1767; Sir W Blackstone's Rep., 555. The same view was also adopted by Blackstone, Comm., iv. 336, n. (Kerr's Ed., 1862).

2 Jan. 19th, Feb. 3d, 6th, 13th, 14th, and 17th, 1764; Parl. Hist., xv 1393-1418; Jan. 29th, 1765; Ibid., xvi. 6.

"that there was not a man to be found of sufficient profligacy to defend this warrant upon the principle of legality."

mons, April

In 1766, the Court of King's Bench had condemned the Resolutions warrant, and the objections to a declaratory resoof the Com-lution were therefore removed; the Court of Com22d, 1766. mon Pleas had pronounced a search-warrant for papers to be illegal; and lastly, the more liberal administration of the Marquess of Rockingham had succeeded to that of Mr. Grenville. Accordingly, resolutions were now agreed to, condemning general warrants, whether for the seizure of persons or papers, as illegal; and declaring them, if executed against a member, to be a breach of privilege.1

Declaratory bill, April 29th, 1766.

A bill was introduced to carry into effect these resolutions, and passed by the House of Commons: but was not agreed to by the Lords. A declaratory act was, however, no longer necessary. The illegality of general warrants had been judicially determined, and the judgment of the courts confirmed by the House of Commons, and approved as well by popular opinion, as by the first statesmen of the time. The cause of public liberty had been vindicated, and was henceforth secure.

Suspension of Habeas Corpus Act.

The writ of Habeas Corpus is unquestionably the first security of civil liberty. It brings to light the cause of every imprisonment, approves its lawfulness, or liberates the prisoner. It exacts obedience from the highest courts: Parliament itself submits to its authority. No right is more justly valued. It protects the subject from unfounded suspicions, from the aggressions of power, and from abuses in the administration of justice.* Yet this protective law, which gives every man security and confidence in times of tranquillity, has been suspended, again

8

1 Parl. Hist., xvi. 209.

2 Ibid., 210.

8 May's Law and Usage of Parliament, 76.
4 Blackstone's Comm. (Kerr), iii. 138-147, &c.

tion to 1794.

and again, in periods of public danger or apprehension. Rarely, however, has this been suffered without jealousy hesitation, and remonstrance; and whenever the perils of the state have been held sufficient to warrant this sacrifice of personal liberty, no minister or magistrate has been suffered to tamper with the law at his discretion. Parliament alone, convinced of the exigency of each occasion, has suspended, for a time, the rights of individuals, in the interests of the state The first years after the Revolution were full of danger A dethroned king, aided by foreign enemies and a Cases from powerful body of English adherents, was threaten- the Revolu ing the new settlement of the crown with war and treason. Hence the liberties of Englishmen, so recently assured, were several times made to yield to the exigencies of the state. Again, on occasions of no less peril, the rebellion of 1715, the Jacobite conspiracy of 1722, and the invasion of the realm by the Pretender in 1745,- the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended. Henceforth, for nearly half a century, the law remained inviolate. [[During the American war, indeed, it had been necessary to empower the king to secure persons suspected of high treason, committed in North America or on the high seas, or of the crime of piracy;2 but it was not until 1794 that the civil liberties of Englishmen, at home, were again to be suspended. The dangers and alarms of that dark period have already been recounted. Ministers, believing the state to be threatened by traitorous conspiracies, once more sought power to countermine treason by powers beyond the law.

Corpus

Relying upon the report of a secret committee, Mr. Pitt moved for a bill to empower His Majesty to secure Habeas and detain persons suspected of conspiring against Suspension his person and government. He justified this May 16th.

Act, 1794.

1 Parl. Hist., viii. 27-39; xiii. 671. In 1745 it was stated by the solicitor general that the act had been suspended nine times since the Revolution; and in 1794 Mr. Secretary Dundas made a similar statement. - Parl. Hist., XXX. 539.

* In 1777, act 17 Geo. III. c. 9. * Supra, p. 152.

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