measure on the ground, that whatever the temporary danger of placing such power in the hands of the government, it was far less than the danger with which the constitution and society were threatened. If ministers abused the power intrusted to them, they would be responsible for its abuse. It was vigorously opposed by Mr. Fox, Mr. Grey, Mr. Sheridan, and a small body of adherents. They denied the disaffection imputed to the people, ridiculed the revelations of the committee, and declared that no such dangers threatened the state, as would justify the surrender of the chief safe guard of personal freedom. This measure would give ministers absolute power over every individual in the kingdom. It would empower them to arrest, on suspicion, any man whose opinions were obnoxious to them, the advocates of reform, even the members of the parliamentary opposition. Who would be safe, when conspiracies were everywhere suspected, and constitutional objects and language believed to be the mere cloak of sedition? Let every man charged with treason be brought to justice: in the words of Sheridan, “where there was guilt, let the broad axe fall;" but why surrender the liberties of the innocent? Yet thirty-nine members only could be found to oppose the introduction of the bill. Ministers, representing its immediate urgency, endeavored to pass it at once through all its stages. The opposition, unable to resist its progress by numbers, endeavored to arrest its passing for a time, in order to appeal to the judgment of the country: but all their efforts were vain. With free institutions, the people were now governed according to the principles of despotism. The will of their rulers was supreme, and not to be questioned. After eleven divisions, the bill was pressed forward as far as the report, on the same night; and the galleries being closed, the arguments urged against it were merely addressed to a determined and taciturn majority. On the following day, the bill was read a third time and sent up to 1 Ayes, 201; Noes, 39. the Lords, by whom, after some sharp debates, it was speedily passed.1 Grounds and the measure. The strongest opponents of the measure, while denying its present necessity, admitted that when danger is imminent, the liberty of the subject must be sacri- character of ficed to the paramount interests of the state. Ringleaders must be seized, outrages anticipated, plots disconcerted, and the dark haunts of conspiracy filled with distrust and terror. And terrible indeed was the power now intrusted to the executive. Though termed a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, it was, in truth, a suspension of Magna Charta, and of the cardinal principles of the common law. Every man had hitherto been free from imprisonment until charged with crime by information upon oath; and entitled to a speedy trial, and the judgment of his peers. But any subject could now be arrested on suspicion of treasonable practices, without specific charge or proof of guilt his accusers were unknown; and in vain might he demand public accusation and trial. Spies and treacherous accomplices, however circumstantial in their narratives to secretaries of state and law officers, shrank from the witness-box; and their victims rotted in jail. Whatever the judgment, temper, and good faith of the executive, such a power was arbitrary, and could scarcely fail to be abused. Whatever the dangers by which it was justified, never did the subject so much need the protection of the laws, as when government and society were filled with suspicion and alarm. Notwithstanding the failure of the state prosecutions, and the discredit cast upon the evidence of a traitor- Its conous conspiracy, on which the Suspension Act had 1794-1800. 1 Parl. Hist., xxxi. 497, 521, 525. ..... tinuance; 2 "Nullus liber homo capiatur aut imprisonetur, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum.' Nulli negabamus, nulli differemus justiciam." 8 Blackstone says:-"It has happened in England during temporary suspensions of the statute, that persons apprehended upon suspicion have suffered a long imprisonment, merely because they were forgotten."— Comm. iii. (Kerr) 146. been expressly founded, ministers declined to surrender the invidious power with which they had been intrusted. Strenuous resistance was offered by the opposition to the continuance of the act; but it was renewed again and again, so long as the public apprehensions continued. From 1798 to 1800, the increased malignity and violence of English democrats, and their complicity with Irish treason, repelled further objections to this exceptional law.1 of Rebellion Habeas Cor sion Act Indemnity 8 2 At length, at the end of 1801, the act, being no longer defensible on grounds of public danger, was sufpus Suspen- fered to expire, after a continuous operation of expired 1801. eight years. But before its operation had ceased, a bill was introduced to indemnify all persons who since the 1st of February, 1793, had acted in the apprehension of persons suspected of high treason. A measure designed to protect the ministers and their agents from responsibility, on account of acts extending over a period of eight years, was not suffered to pass without strenuous opposition. When extraordinary powers had first been sought, it was said that ministers would be responsible for their proper exercise; and now every act of authority, every neglect or abuse, was to be buried in oblivion. It was stated in debate that some persons had suffered imprisonment for three years, and one for six, without being brought to trial;♦ and Lord Thurlow could "not resist the impulse to deem men innocent until tried and convicted." The measure was defended, however, on the ground that persons accused of abuses would be unable to defend themselves, without disclos ing secrets dangerous to the lives of individuals and to the 1 In 1798 there were only seven votes against its renewal. In 1800 it was opposed by twelve in the Commons, and by three in the Lords. It was then stated that twenty-nine persons had been imprisoned, some for more than two years, without being brought to trial. — Parl. Hist., xxxiv. 1484. The act 41 Geo. III. c. 26, expired six weeks after the commencement of the next session, which commenced on the 29th of Oct., in the same year. Parl. Hist., xxxv. 1507-1549. ♦ Ibid., xxxv. 1517. state. Unless the bill were passed, those channels of information would be stopped, on which government relied for guarding the public peace. When all the accustomed forms of law had been departed from, the justification of the executive would indeed have been difficult: but evil times had passed, and a veil was drawn over them. If dangerous powers had been misused, they were covered by an amnesty. It were better to withhold such powers, than to scrutinize their exercise too curiously; and were any further argument needed against the suspension of the law, it would be found in the reasons urged for indemnity. Suspension of Habeas For several years, the ordinary law of arrest was free from further invasion. But on the first appearance of popular discontents and combinations, the govern- Corpus Act, ment resorted to the same ready expedient for 1817. strengthening the hands of the executive, at the expense of public liberty. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act formed part of Lord Sidmouth's repressive measures in 1817,2 when it was far less defensible than in 1794. At the first period, the French Revolution was still raging: its consequences no man could foresee; and a deadly war had broken out with the revolutionary government of France. Here, at least, there may have been grounds for extraordinary precau tions. But in 1817, France was again settled under the Bourbons: the revolution had worn itself out: Europe was again at peace; and the state was threatened with no danger but domestic discontent and turbulence. Again did ministers, having received powers to apprehend and detain in custody persons suspected of treason- Bill of Inable practices, and, having imprisoned many men demnity, 1817. without bringing them to trial, — seek indemnity for all concerned in the exercise of these powers, and in the suppression of tumultuous assemblies. Magistrates had seized papers 1 Parl. Hist., xxxv. 1510. - 2 Supra, p. 186. 8 Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxv. 491, 551, 643, 708, 795, &c.; 57 Geo. III. c. 55; repealed by 58 Geo. III. c. 1. and arms, and interfered with meetings, under circumstances not warranted even by the exceptional powers intrusted to them but having acted in good faith for the repression of tumults and sedition, they claimed protection. This bill was not passed without strenuous resistance. The executive had not been idle in the exercise of its extraordinary powers. Ninety-six persons had been arrested on suspicion. Of these, forty-four were taken by warrant of the seeretary of state; four by warrant of the privy council; the remainder on the warrants of magistrates. Not one of those arrested on the warrant of the secretary of state, had been brought to trial. The four arrested on the warrant of the privy council, were tried and acquitted.' Prisoners had been moved from prison to prison in chains; and after a long, painful, and even solitary imprisonment, discharged on their recognizances, without trial.2 Petitions of ill-usage. Numerous petitions were presented, complaining of cruelties and hardships; and though falsehood and excomplaining aggeration characterized many of their statements, the justice of inquiry was insisted on, before a general indemnity was agreed to. "They were called upon,” said Mr. Lambton, "to throw an impenetrable veil over all the acts of tyranny and oppression that had been committed under the Suspension Act. They were required to stifle the voice of just complaint, — to disregard the numerous petitions that had been presented, arraigning the conduct of ministers, detailing acts of cruelty unparalleled in the annals of the Bastile, and demanding full and open investigation." But on behalf of government, it appeared that in no instance had warrants of detention been issued, except on information upon oath; and the attorney-general declared that none of 4 - 1 Lords' Report on the State of the Country. In ten other cases the parties had escaped. Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxvii. 573; Sir M. W. Ridley, March 9th, 1818; Ibid., 901. 2 Petitions of Benbow, Drummond, Bagguley, Leach, Scholes, Ogden, and others. Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxvii. 438, 441, 453, 461, 519. 8 March 9th, 1818; Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxvii. 891. 4 Lords' Rep. on State of the Nation, Haus. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxvii. 574. |